Four Reasons Why

There are at least four reasons why it is in the vital national interest of both Pakistan and Bangladesh to revive and strengthen relations in 2025.
They pertain to identity, geo-politics, political economy, and history.

Let us start with identity:
In both countries, Islam is predominant in determining the faith of the vast majority, notwithstanding the fact that one of the four principles of the founding of Bangladesh in 1971-72 was secularism. (Note: Islam is inherently secular, but that is another theme which requires to be addressed separately.) The other three ideals of the birth of Bangladesh were socialism, democracy, and nationalism. Article 2 A of the Constitution of Bangladesh, inserted in 2011 (during the earlier part of Shaikh Hasina’s rule), explicitly begins by affirming that “The state religion of Bangladesh is Islam, but the state shall ensure equal status and equal rights in the practice of the Hindu, Buddhist, Christian, and other religions.”

In Pakistan, the very title of the state is “The Islamic Republic of Pakistan,” and the Constitution elaborates this parameter through Articles 2, 2 A, 20, 27, and others while also stressing that there shall be no discrimination on the basis of religion.

Words on soft paper express hard realities on the ground. While national identity can be shaped by one or more factors such as ethnicity, language, culture, territory, traditions (in one country, a singular ethnicity and language, in the other, multiples of each) --- religion too, through all of human history and in the past 500 years in particular, impacts the genesis and evolution of nation-states. Whether this is formally acknowledged in countries that claim to be secular and non-religious is or is not admitted, does not diminish the reality of the decisive role of religion.

In South Asia, the world’s most diverse concentration of religious identities on a multi-million numerical scale, it is in the crucial mutual interests of both Bangladesh and Pakistan, as predominantly Muslim nations, to revisit, rediscover, and reassert the shared DNA of Muslim nationalism in the region. The more so because the rapid ascent of Hindutva in India --- uniquely hostile to Muslims and Islam --- poses a malevolent threat to fellow Muslims in India. Unlike Muslim separatism, which emphasized distinctness and did not devalue Hinduism and other faiths, or rejection of the other, Hindutva directly attacks the very right of Muslims to be Indian citizens, e.g., “You can only be Indian if you are Hindu “ is a cardinal principle of Hindutva.

Both as a deterrent reactive response to this menace --- which also threatens nation-states adjacent to the Hindutva-driven state --- and as a valid affirmation of common beliefs, practices, and ideals, shared assertion of Muslim nationalism will reinforce both independent states. This will also underline that the Muslim minority in India is a specific religion-based community, which is not alone and abandoned but has a valid right to its own continuity within the Indian state and has immediately proximate, peaceful, yet potent external support, one of them possessing deterrent nuclear weapons.

A new geo-political casing:
This brings us to consider the second reason: to build a powerful new geo-political framework to enable Muslim-majority nation-states to off-set, diffuse, and non-violently manage the containment of an instinctively hegemonistic large state occupying the biggest land portion of the region with the longest coastline --- to counter-balance the only entity with direct access to the Bay of Bengal, the Arabian Sea and the “Indian Ocean” (it should be renamed the “Asian Ocean”). All big states elsewhere should be similarly faced with irreducible counter-weights as checks and balances.

With SAARC having been sabotaged by the Indian state’s petty-minded refusal to attend the overdue summit in Pakistan, direct, state-to-state coordination and cooperation between Pakistan and Bangladesh, embracing wherever feasible, collaborative action in multilateral diplomatic forums and initiatives would fetch tangible benefits for both states.

In South Asia in particular, given the record of how, post-August 1947, a predatory Indian state swallowed up over 550 Princely states as well as other territories by military force, a close linkage between Bangladesh and Pakistan would discourage, if not weaken, the Indian state’s tendency to coerce and control its neighbours. Victims of such traits are most evident in the cases of land-locked Nepal and Bhutan. But even Sri Lanka and the Maldives, with access to the seas, suffer subtle as well as crude attempts by India to bully and dominate smaller neighbours.

Despite being surrounded on three sides by India, from its very birth, Bangladesh has always demonstrated its determination to forever retain its own independent Bengali and Muslim identity, separate from Indian and West Bengali identity. In 1971, the creation of Bangladesh was the rejection of the state structure of Pakistan. Still, it was NOT a rejection of the Two-Nation Reality and Theory, as so strongly reflected in Bangladeshi people’s pride in being Muslim.

In the larger global geo-strategic context as well, a Bangladesh-Pakistan partnership would be a notable counter-weight to the US-Indian axis that unwisely aims to contain and curb China. The challenge for both Muslim-dominant entities would be to develop and maintain their cooperation on the international stage in a manner and with measures that are diplomatically appropriate, constructive, and peaceful, as well as respectful of the rights of other nation-states, including India.

Optimizing bilateral gains:
The third reason is the enormous potential gain to be attained through increased bilateral trade, both in goods and in services, through enhanced exchange of experiences in the diverse development sectors. These sectors include population growth in which Bangladesh has excelled in achieving the balance so direly needed in Pakistan’s case, or in the sphere of non-governmental institutions that efficiently supplement, often outperform official organisms, in delivering authentic progress for the people in sectors as different as micro-credit, education and women’s participation in the organized labour force. Though Pakistan has also witnessed effective non-governmental efforts in these spheres, Bangladesh’s successes are admirable and offer much to learn from.

If Pakistan in 2025 were to take the lead in demonstrating humility and grace by initiating the exchange of apologies and regrets, a vibrant new era in relations could commence.

With SAARC having been sabotaged by the Indian state’s petty-minded refusal to attend the overdue summit in Pakistan, direct, state-to-state coordination and cooperation between the two countries, embracing wherever feasible, collaborative action in multilateral diplomatic forums and initiatives would fetch tangible benefits for both states. The two states are already among the largest contributors to global peacekeeping forces deployed by the UN.

As distinct from the Indian state’s Hindutva dimension, both Pakistan and Bangladesh would affirm their joint commitment to building better, peaceful relations with the friendly people of India, a vast majority of whom do not espouse extremism.

From yesterday to tomorrow:
The fourth reason is to come to terms with the legacy of the history shared up to 16th December 1971. While Pakistan has already, through President General Pervez Musharraf (during his state visit in 2002, expressed regrets at the violence suffered by East Pakistani Bengalis between 26th March 1971 and the date of separation, Bangladesh insists on an explicit apology. If a confidential, candid, preparatory process is initiated, Pakistan could link the apology to an immediate but subsequent issuance of a similar acknowledgment by Bangladesh of regrets --- or even an apology --- for the mass killings of tens of thousands of innocent non-Bengalis. These were perpetrated between 1st March 1971 and, initially, up to May 1971, when the Pakistan Army regained control of most or all areas in East Pakistan from the Awami League and Mukti Bahini mobs. But post-16th December 1971, such killings also recurred when persons suspected of, or actually associated with the Pakistan Army were brutally massacred.

Though Pakistan was engaged in a full-blown civil war in 1971 with India covertly, then overtly, aiding and arming one side, and Pakistani forces were validly striving to preserve their state’s territorial integrity, excesses and atrocities did occur. But these were nowhere near the vastly exaggerated scale fabricated and widely propagated by Bangladesh and India in the years following 26th March 1971.

If Pakistan in 2025 were to take the lead in demonstrating humility and grace by initiating the exchange of apologies and regrets, a vibrant new era in relations could commence. This would become an era in which the respective resplendent treasures of culture, language, talent, creativity, and productive potential could benefit each other and together contribute to regional stability and global advancement.