Flowing Assumptions

For decades, the people of Pakistan viewed the Indus Waters Treaty as both a lifeline and a vulnerability. Brokered by the World Bank in 1960, the treaty has proven remarkably resilient—surviving wars, crises, and prolonged political hostility. It allocated the eastern rivers, namely the Ravi, Beas, and Sutlej, to India and granted Pakistan primary rights over the western rivers, namely the Indus, Jhelum, and Chenab. In doing so, it secured the bulk of the basin’s waters for Pakistan, forming the backbone of its agricultural economy and food security.

That framework remains intact. Yet developments on the Ravi River suggest that while the treaty endures, the assumptions built around it are beginning to shift.

The Shahpur Kandi Dam, now approaching operational status, is a run-of-the-river project located on India’s side of the Ravi. With an installed capacity of approximately 206 megawatts and the ability to irrigate tens of thousands of hectares in Indian Punjab and occupied Jammu & Kashmir, it represents a long-delayed effort by India to fully utilize waters allocated to it under the treaty.

For much of the past six decades, India lacked sufficient infrastructure to capture and divert the Ravi’s entire flow. As a result, a portion of this water continued downstream into Pakistan. Shahpur Kandi is designed to reduce that surplus flow. Importantly, this is not a violation of the treaty; rather, it is an example of its implementation as originally envisioned.

This distinction is critical. Shahpur Kandi does not “turn off” the tap for Pakistan, nor does it represent an abrupt disruption to the Indus system. The volumes involved are relatively small when compared to the massive flows of the Indus, Jhelum, and Chenab rivers. However, its strategic significance lies elsewhere. It marks the gradual end of a long-standing asymmetry—one in which Pakistan benefited from India’s underutilization of its share of the eastern rivers.

In that sense, Shahpur Kandi is less of a crisis than a transition point. It signals a future in which treaty allocations are more tightly enforced in practice, leaving less room for informal or unintended benefits.

This shift has naturally raised concerns in Pakistan about broader water security, particularly amid ongoing tensions between the two countries. Some analysts worry that India’s increasing technical capacity could translate into greater leverage over river flows, especially through the construction of hydropower projects upstream.

However, the treaty’s legal architecture remains highly relevant. Pakistan depends on the western rivers, which are protected by detailed provisions that restrict India’s ability to store or divert water. While India is permitted to build run-of-the-river hydropower projects, these must adhere to strict design and operational constraints intended to prevent significant interference with downstream flows.

Disputes over such projects are not new. They are currently being addressed through the treaty’s dispute resolution mechanisms, including proceedings involving the Permanent Court of Arbitration and neutral experts. These processes, though often slow and politically fraught, underscore an important point: the treaty is not dormant. It continues to function as a rules-based framework for managing disagreements.

If Shahpur Kandi does not constitute a direct threat, it nevertheless comes at a moment of growing vulnerability for Pakistan—one shaped less by external actions than by internal constraints.

Pakistan’s water crisis is increasingly driven by inefficiency, mismanagement, and structural neglect. A significant proportion of water is lost before it even reaches agricultural fields, due to aging canals, seepage, and poor maintenance. At the same time, the rapid expansion of private tube wells has led to unsustainable groundwater extraction, placing long-term pressure on aquifers.

Equally concerning is the country’s limited storage capacity. Pakistan can store only a fraction of its annual river flows, leaving it exposed to seasonal variability. In years of heavy rainfall, excess water cannot be effectively captured, contributing to floods. In dry periods, the absence of adequate reserves exacerbates shortages.

The devastating 2022 Pakistan floods illustrated this dual vulnerability. Climate change is intensifying hydrological extremes, compressing the gap between flood and drought cycles. In such an environment, the reliability and timing of water flows become as important as their total volume.

Shahpur Kandi Dam, designed to mitigate excess flow, does not constitute a breach of the Indus Water Treaty and instead exemplifies its implementation as originally intended

This is where the indirect implications of upstream development become more relevant. While the treaty limits India’s ability to significantly alter flows on the western rivers, even minor variations in timing—within permissible bounds—can have localized agricultural impacts. However, these risks are best understood as stress multipliers rather than primary drivers of scarcity.

The immediate challenge lies within Pakistan’s control.

Addressing it requires a shift in both policy and priorities. First, water governance must be depoliticized. Persistent disputes between provinces over allocation not only hinder effective management but also erode trust in national institutions. A more coordinated, data-driven approach is essential to ensure equitable and efficient distribution.

Second, investment strategies must prioritize efficiency alongside expansion. Large-scale infrastructure projects, including dams, remain important for enhancing storage capacity. But equally critical are smaller, system-wide improvements: lining watercourses, modernizing irrigation techniques, promoting water-efficient crops, and regulating groundwater use. Without these measures, additional supply will continue to be offset by systemic losses.

Third, Pakistan must continue to engage with the treaty’s legal framework in a consistent and technically robust manner. Upholding the integrity of the Indus Waters Treaty is essential, particularly as new disputes emerge. Legal clarity and sustained engagement will remain key to safeguarding long-term water rights.

Shahpur Kandi is not the opening salvo of a “water war.” It is something more subtle, yet potentially more consequential: a signal that the margins for complacency are narrowing.

For India, it represents the routine exercise of treaty rights. For Pakistan, it is an amber light—a reminder that historical advantages, such as surplus flows, should not be assumed to persist indefinitely.

The future of Pakistan’s water security will depend less on what happens upstream and more on how effectively it responds at home.

The stoplight on the Ravi has changed. Whether it leads to disruption or reform is a matter of choice, not inevitability.