Region 
 

Kabul

The Ally That Wasn’t

The recent downturn in Pakistan–Afghanistan relations reflects mounting frustration in Islamabad over cross-border attacks and a policy dilemma: whether to revert to a “carrot-and-stick” approach

By Ambassador Sanaullah | May 2026


The complexities of Pakistan–Afghanistan relations encompass security, diplomacy, and refugee challenges rooted in history and geopolitical realities, largely shaped by external powers. Pakistan’s “dilemma” lies in the fact that, despite shared history, blood, and culture, it has been unable to overcome Afghan hostility, further sharpened by the Taliban’s return to power in August 2021.

Islamabad believes that the emergence of “Taliban 2.0” would have been impossible without its support; therefore, it expected the Taliban regime to act decisively against the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). Pakistan demanded either the curbing of anti-Pakistan TTP operations, the handover of TTP leadership, or permission to take direct action against them. In this context, detailed intelligence regarding TTP shelters, training camps, and operational bases was shared with the Taliban regime.

From the outset, however, the Taliban refused to accept that controlling the TTP was their primary responsibility. Instead, they maintained that Pakistan should resolve the issue through negotiations with the TTP. Consequently, reconciliation measures and multiple rounds of direct and indirect negotiations—facilitated by regional actors—failed to halt terrorist activities emanating from Afghan soil into Pakistan.

In this evolving landscape, China has emerged as a key mediator, hosting high-level peace talks in Urumqi in April 2026. Both Islamabad and Kabul have expressed a “willingness to sit down,” which experts view as a cautious but positive step toward easing tensions—the worst since 2021. However, like previous ceasefires, the current round appears fragile, with no guarantee of permanence. Pakistan itself issued a warning to this effect on April 17.

Pakistan continues to confront the TTP and its newly aligned groups, including the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA). Notably, the TTP once served as one of the fiercest militant wings supporting the Afghan Taliban against NATO and U.S. forces. Today, the Taliban appear either unwilling or incapable of restraining them. As a result, Pakistan finds itself entangled in the internal political dynamics of Afghanistan, a factor that alone generates serious and persistent security challenges. There is also a growing perception in Islamabad that the Taliban are using the TTP and BLA as leverage. The current Chinese-mediated peace efforts do not adequately address these root causes.

The recent downturn in Pakistan–Afghanistan relations reflects mounting frustration in Islamabad over cross-border attacks and a policy dilemma: whether to revert to a “carrot-and-stick” approach. This reassessment stems from the recognition that while security is paramount, a complete breakdown in relations with Kabul is not in Pakistan’s long-term interest.


Seasoned diplomats such as Tauqir Hussain and Maleeha Lodhi have emphasized that, although a permanent resolution remains elusive, peaceful coexistence is the only rational long-term path to prevent regional destabilization. Expert analysis suggests that while temporary ceasefires may continue to emerge, the region is more likely to settle into a pattern of “managed hostility” rather than full-scale conflict.

China can facilitate dialogue between Pakistan and Afghanistan, but cannot enforce outcomes. This underscores a structural challenge: even when political agreements are reached, enforcement capacity remains weak.

This, however, is not a solution. Core issues, such as the Durand Line dispute and the continued presence of militant groups like the TTP, remain unresolved and deeply entrenched. Consequently, the risk of prolonged insecurity persists. Lodhi argues that sustainable peace depends on fostering interdependence, treating the border as a socio-political and economic space for trade and development, including initiatives such as the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), rather than merely a militarized frontier.

Similarly, Hussain underscores that while Pakistan must continue to pressure Kabul to act against the TTP, it must also broaden engagement, recognizing that the Taliban regime today is less dependent on Pakistan than in the past.

Reliance on external mediators such as China, Turkey, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia also has inherent limitations. Among them, China possesses significant economic leverage through investments and CPEC, but its influence over the ideological orientation and security behavior of the Afghan Taliban remains limited. Beijing can facilitate dialogue but cannot enforce outcomes. This underscores a structural challenge: even when political agreements are reached, enforcement capacity remains weak.

The Durand Line dispute epitomizes a fundamental and non-negotiable contradiction. For Pakistan, it is a settled international border; for Afghanistan, it remains an issue of identity and sovereignty. Geography enforces coexistence, but coexistence requires compliance, not merely intent.

Former ambassador Ayaz Wazir argues that acknowledging historical grievances could help rebuild trust. Symbolic gestures—such as Afghanistan expressing regret over its opposition to Pakistan’s UN membership (later withdrawn), and Pakistan acknowledging its 1950s aerial bombing in Afghanistan—could open space for transformative diplomacy. While symbolic, such steps carry deep psychological significance and may help lay the groundwork for enforceable agreements.

Ultimately, progress on economic cooperation, trade, and refugee management depends on addressing core security concerns. If the Taliban continue to overlook this dimension, Pakistan–Afghanistan relations may settle into a prolonged low-intensity conflict—characterized by a heavily securitized border, restricted trade, and fragile, transactional diplomacy.

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