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Swat

Belated Measure

A meaningful shift in the Pakistani security landscape is unlikely to happen permanently with the new counterterrorism operation.

By Ambassador Sanaullah | September 2024


The recently announced counterterrorism operation Azm-e-Istehkam (Resolve for Stability) unfortunately got bogged down in the muddy internal politics of the country before it could take off. Convincing local politicians about the need to urgently provide safe-fail protection to Pakistan’s international partners, particularly China, has now become a herculean task for the government. The opposition parties, mainly from KP and religious backgrounds, have denounced the operation and vowed to block its implementation. Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) and Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam Fazl (JUI-F) have called for an in-camera briefing and parliamentary involvement to understand the operation’s scope and potential implications.

In response, the government claims that Azm-e-Istehkam is not a large-scale military operation akin to previous campaigns like Zarb-e-Azb or Rah-e-Haq, which displaced large populations from tribal areas and other regions of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. The newly approved military operation, as stated by the government, will be a “multi-domain, multi-agency, whole-of-the-system national vision for enduring stability in Pakistan,” focusing on reinvigorating and re-energizing the implementation of the revised National Action Plan against terrorism, initiated in 2014. Many analysts believe the operation is loud on rhetoric, low on substance, and may not even curtail the rising tide of militancy in Pakistan.

Would the entailed kinetic action be confined within the country or beyond borders, too, or will it be a hybrid operation, using the country’s military, diplomatic, legislative, and socioeconomic resources? There is no clarity. The government is in a quandary. From a volley of its explanations, the proposed operation will likely be limited in size and deployment of military personnel. The intent behind the operation, however, looks pretty ambitious. The military’s resolve may be unwavering, but the present state of political disarray in the country does not give enough space and confidence to the armed forces to ensure “the elimination of all footprints” of terrorism and extremism from the country.

For a realistic understanding of the government’s determination and prospect of success, comparing the new operation with its earlier versions, gains, and flaws should be reviewed. This became compulsory in the light of the ISPR press conference on August 5, where members of a popular political party were declared indulging in anti-Pakistan activities similar to foreign agents and their local facilitators. Also, it has to be evaluated while keeping in mind that for the past 16 years or more, barring brief intervals, intelligence-based counterterror operations have continued, particularly in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province and areas along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, as well as in Balochistan.

Major military operations, namely Rah-e-Haq, Sher Dil Sirat-i-Mustaqeem in Khyber Agency, Sherdil in Bajaur Agency, Rah-i-Haq-III in Swat Valley and Shangla, Black Thunderstorm in Buner, Lower Dir and Shangla district, Brekhna in Mohmand Agency, Rah-i-Rast, commonly known as Swat Operation, (2009) Rah-i-Nijat in South Waziristan were carried out from 2007 to 2009. All these operations followed a typical counterterrorism strategy. Barring Rah-i-Rast, which entailed the displacement of a large population and continued too long, no other operation made any notable success.


All these operations targeted Taliban-inspired groups, TTP, and extremists from other groups active in border areas and the tribal belt. The scope and scale of these operations changed in 2014 with the initiation of Operation Zarb-e-Azb (sharp strike). This operation aimed to wipe out the hideouts of local and transnational militant groups in North Waziristan and achieved partial success, destroying (during 2014-2016) hideouts and networks of al-Qaeda and its associated groups, both foreign and local. However, the military was forced to commence the Radd-ul-Fasaad operation in February 2017. Even this operation achieved only partial success, and the country, though comparatively peaceful, occasionally suffered suicide attacks.

Barring Rah-i-Rast, which entailed the displacement of a large population and continued too long, no other operation made any notable success.

When the Taliban returned to power in Afghanistan in August 2021, a surge in the terrorists’ activities, especially attacks against Chinese and security officials, was noted, and it peaked in 2023 and this year. The government firmly believes that the Afghan-based TTP and other groups are involved in these attacks. However, the Taliban government denies the charge and is not prepared to reign in the TTP and other splinter groups.

The new operation does not substantially differ from the ongoing and earlier counterterrorism efforts in strategy and goals. Pakistan Navy, civil armed forces, other security and law-enforcing agencies, and the military have been deployed in earlier operations. The critical lessons learned and insight gathered from previous operations have been stitched into the new proposed operation. Like Zarb-e-Azb and Radd-ul-Fasaad, it seeks to eliminate anti-Pakistan militant groups throughout Pakistan. Based on valuable lessons of the Radd-ul-Fasaad (Elimination of Strife), which was the first nationwide effort, the new operation is being claimed to have been structured in a way that it can neutralize the TTP and the BLA cells and bring back the National Action Plan on track.

The Pakistani government insists that militant strongholds in Afghanistan are the primary source of attacks within Pakistan. There is no reasonable prospect that Pakistan can launch a significant surgical operation against the TTP and the BLA terrorists across the border in the absence of the Taliban’s willingness to stop sheltering terrorists. Targeting militant strongholds in the tribal areas alone cannot eradicate terrorism. Sustainable success requires addressing the root causes of extremism, such as poverty and the lack of education, amidst full political support across the political divide in the country.

The success of the operation may not ensure the elimination of terrorists’ activities within Pakistan but a temporary pushback of active TTP militants to Afghanistan, thus alleviating the threat of militancy in some areas for a short time. A meaningful shift in the Pakistani security landscape is unlikely to happen permanently with the new operation. Pakistan will continue as before, in all likelihood, caught in the cycle of security operations and militancy encouraged and financed by India and actively pursued by the TTP, the BLA, and the ISIS-like elements.

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