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Nuclear Nightmare
As tensions soar between India and China, two nuclear-armed neighbours, there is need for more responsibility as use of nuclear weapons will prove to be a foolish strategy for all sides.

The violent border conflict on June 15, 2020 brought serious casualties to both China and India, which is rare in the history of China-India relations in recent decades. Many people may have thought that why didn’t nuclear weapons have enough deterrent functions for such conflicts? Is this a failure of nuclear deterrence, or the transformation of China-India relations?
The Sino-Indian border disputes and conflicts are fundamentally different from the traditional mode of war. This is a state of sub-warfare or cold peace between war and peace. Both China and India are very careful in restricting any possible conflicts outside the traditional scope of war, including the Galwan Valley conflict that caused heavy casualties. Neither side fired a single shot, nor did it use any modern weapon. The main offensive weapons from both sides were stones and sticks. This was basically a Neolithic war. This kind of sub-war conflict is outside the scope of nuclear deterrence. Moreover, Sino-Indian border conflicts have always had little to do with nuclear deterrence. In the 1962 conflict, neither side had nuclear weapons. China took the initiative to withdraw its troops not because of any form of nuclear deterrence, but because of the geographical features of the Himalayas, which are not suitable for a large-scale war.
The same is true for India. It is also the geographical features that restrict India’s activities in the border area, not China’s nuclear weapons. In recent years, especially in 2020, India has significantly increased the intensity and frequency of activities in the Sino-Indian border area. This is mainly due to India’s improvement in infrastructure areas, especially from the highway link of Leh to the Depsant Plateau. With the completion of the road, India’s ability to transport troops and supplies to the border area has been greatly improved. Under these circumstances, India believes that its “disadvantage” at the border has been greatly improved, and it can launch an “offensive” operation towards the Chinese side.
For most nuclear-weapon states, nuclear weapons are a deterrent and defensive weapon. Unless a country has achieved a nuclear monopoly or an absolute nuclear dominance, it will not actively use nuclear weapons first. The only nuclear weapon attack in the world occurred when the United States monopolized nuclear weapons. After the Soviet Union and more countries came to possess nuclear weapons, although the United States and the Soviet Union had successively deterred the use of nuclear weapons, they were ultimately deterred by other countries’ nuclear weapons.
Neither China nor India is a nuclear monopoly, nor do they have a nuclear superiority.
Neither China nor India is a nuclear monopoly, nor do they have a nuclear superiority. There is no possibility of their first-use of nuclear weapons. Of course, the main directions of the nuclear deterrence forces of China and India are asymmetric and unbalanced. China’s nuclear deterrence is mainly used to prevent possible nuclear strikes by hegemonic countries against China and possible violations of China’s sovereignty and territory. India’s nuclear deterrent is mainly used to target possible “aggression” from powerful neighbours and to compensate for its disadvantaged position in conventional power. As long as this situation does not change, the “asymmetric mutual nuclear deterrence” between China and India will continue to exist, and there is no need or urgency to adjust and change nuclear relations.
Compared with the United States, both China and India are world powers with relatively backward military offensive technology. This makes both countries to have a relatively low level of vigilance towards each other and neither has the ability to launch a fatal surgical strike on the other. Of course, there is no need for China and India to engage in this action. In addition, China and India are both large countries, and their ability to resist such surgical blows is also very strong. This situation is completely different from those small but strong countries, such as Israel. Therefore, China and India need not worry much about such an attack. In this case, advances in military technology will not lead to changes in the nuclear principles of the two countries. The de facto no-first-use (NFU) principle of China and India will not be abandoned regardless of how officials and scholars on both sides make new interpretations.
At the same time, there is still a lot of ambiguous space between the no-first-use and the first-use approaches. There are at least four positions: declared no-first-use, undeclared no-first-use, undeclared first-use and declared first-use. In fact, only the United States and Russia have officially announced, under different circumstances, that they may be the first to use nuclear weapons. Other countries, whether it is the traditional nuclear-weapon states such as China, Britain and France, or the new nuclear-weapon states such as India and Pakistan, will not break the bottom line of the nuclear principle of non-first use.
At present, the nuclear deterrence relationship between China and India is stable and effective. It is an important factor leading to the strategic restraint on both sides. Whether the nuclear relationship between China and India will change is not clear because the key is not China and India. The number of nuclear weapons in China and India is very low within the world’s nuclear arsenal. If China and India change their nuclear principles, this would be an impact that would come after the nuclear principles of the stronger nuclear countries are changed. Therefore, when it comes to nuclear principles and nuclear relations, the key is not to look at China and India, but to look at the United States and Russia, especially the United States. In the world, only the United States has the ability to develop new weapons systems that can change nuclear principles. The stability of nuclear relations in South Asia is important for the region, but it is relevant to the stability of world nuclear relations. China and India, including Pakistan, should cooperate on this issue.![]()
The writer is Director and Professor at the Center for South Asian Studies at Fudan University in Shanghai, China. He can be reached at jiadongzhang@fudan.edu.cn |
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