Actual Control

Details of China’s invasion, including the Galwan clash engineered by the PLA, has been in the news. The scale of Chinese intrusions in Pangong Lake, Gogra-Hot Springs and Depsang is large, with some 12,000 PLA troops in Depsang; the PLA had intruded there in 2013. India has occupied heights in its own territory south of Pangong Lake, Chushul area and Kailash Range, covering the Spanggur Gap overlooking some PLA locations including Moldo camp and blocking avenues for further PLA intrusions. Luckily, the PLA’s Western Theatre Command faulted in not attempting the capture of these heights in the first wave of aggression despite having the troops to do it.

India is engaged in a flurry of defence procurements but is building hard power which will take time and cost more.

Perhaps on advice of the CSG, India denied any intrusions. This helped China accuse India of aggression from day one and put the onus of disengagement on India. Several diplomatic, military and ministerial level talks have failed to achieve a breakthrough. Both sides are dug in and ready for battle. Disengagement would imply Indian troops withdrawing in their own territory to create a buffer zone. China apparently wants India to also withdraw from all heights it occupied south of Pangong Lake, which would be a strategic folly, given China’s repeated backstabbing.

Some are of the opinion that China’s aggression is to force a border settlement with India but this is rather simplistic. Beijing shed its mask of ‘peaceful rise’ and became even more aggressive after battering the world with the China Virus. With economic clout and military muscle, China has been exercising war on multiple fronts following President Xi’s China Dream to dominate the world. A border settlement would be useless unless demarcated on ground and China cannot be trusted, given its fresh illegal claims to the Galwan Valley in Ladakh, plus parts of Bhutan and Tajikistan. Besides, after the India-China standoff at Doklam (Bhutan) was called off in 2017, the PLA occupied the Doklam Plateau.

Why China dropped all peace pretences is because President Xi Jinping knows conflict is inevitable if China wants Taiwan and the fingers of Tibet (China’s palm). Would he consider the best time now when the world is fighting the pandemic and economies of opponents are shrinking, including the US and India, or wait for them to grow stronger individually and collectively? The second Quad meeting in Tokyo on October 6 failed to issue a joint statement naming China directly for its aggression, leave aside the pandemic. Xi Jinping would be weighing America’s reaction to a Chinese invasion of Taiwan – will the US risk attacking mainland China and be prepared for reciprocal strikes?

China may not want an all-out war with India, but a limited intense war remains a possibility – in Ladakh, elsewhere, or both? India seems to have sensed this, firing away 10 test missiles in a span of 35 days to signal Beijing. Xi Jinping may want to try the latest weaponry in his arsenal to demonstrate to the world, especially the US. Eight years back western scholars were of the view that China could use tactical nukes to force India to give up territory. Can Xi do so, believing India would not respond similarly, fearing consequences that would not be in overall Indian interests?

China has been eyeing Ladakh since the era of Mao Zhedong and Xi Jinping has been planning, preparing and rehearsing the PLA for it since 2013-2014 but this much is certain that if President Xi wages war on India, he will pay a very heavy price that may lead to his dethroning.