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Second Strike Capability

India is utilizing all means to develop a second-strike capability.

By Burhan Ahmed Lodhi | October 2022


The thought and practice of actual warfare has been repudiated by nuclear weapons. As an alternative, it concentrates on strengthening state capacities to dissuade the adversary state from suffering the repercussions of the first strike. The ability of a state to respond to a nuclear attack with a nuclear counterattack is known as a second-strike capability. However, when the hostile state recognises that attacking will eventually trigger huge retaliation or mutually assured destruction a second strike becomes credible.

India was the first state in the South Asian region to acquire nuclear capability in 1974. Consequently, Pakistan started its nuclear programme and demonstrated such a capability in May 1998 as a response to the security dilemma vis-à-vis its eastern neighbour. At first Indian nuclear weapons were Pakistan-centric..However, with its growing relations with the United States and the signing of multiple agreements of strategic nature, India has seen itself as a regional hegemon.

The U.S.-India Nuclear deal is said to be based on peaceful use of nuclear technology. However, Charles D. Ferguson, President of the Federation of American Scientists, wrote in Arms Control Today on February 13, 2015, that India was short on uranium. “If the nuclear deal were to fall through, India would be forced to stop running about half of its indigenously fuelled reactors or only operate its nuclear submarine fleet at approximately 50 percent capacity.”

After the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, commonly known as Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) came into force, nuclear states that ratified the treaty were bound to not send fusible material to states that had not signed the NPT. Following this, India and Pakistan relied on their limited indigenous sources to meet the demand for uranium and platinum. India used 475 tonnes of uranium annually for both weaponry and civil use. Due to inability of governmental institutions in managing uranium extraction and increased demand of natural resources by 7 to 8 percent per year, India’s extraction of uranium immensely decreased to 350 tonnes annually. Consequently, it was bound to lower the weaponry use of feasible material for the sake of running its civil nuclear reactors. Although, the Civil Nuclear Deal in 2008 gave India enough access to imported uranium for running its civil reactors and after that it could easily use its indigenous uranium and platinum in feasible missiles and weapons against Pakistan and China for enhancing its second-strike capability. According to Economic Times, on March 31, 2022, India imported 100 tonnes of Uranium from the USA under the 2008 deal.

Limited to imported feasible material from the U.S., the deal also lowers the credibility of the NPT and, consequently, India is now importing Uranium from Australia, France, and Kazakhstan, etc. Altogether, in realist philosophy, the U.S., to divert India from building bilateral relations with Russia and promoting the Indo-Pacific Strategy in Asian waters, violated its own proposed treaty. Furthermore, instead of bringing India and Pakistan to NPT, the U.S. deliberately indulged both countries in an unending nuclear arms race.


In Article 3.1 of the drafted Indian Nuclear Doctrine, Indian policymakers claimed Credible Minimum Deterrence (CMD). Indian nuclear weapons are centric to both China and Pakistan and, in rational thinking, the CMD for China is not the CMD for Pakistan, and vice versa. The nuclear weapons of India to deter China will continuously raise threats to Pakistan’s security. Therefore, the CMD is not specified and India the benefit to indulge in a nuclear-race with Pakistan in enhancing its second-strike capability.

The Indian military and government have no respect for their drafted doctrine and their uncertain actions, especially in accordance with nuclear power, are substantially provoking Pakistan.

In Article 2.7 of the drafted Indian Nuclear Doctrine, India claimed to have attained conventional superiority to raise the nuclear threshold. At first glance, it looks appropriate but when conventional superiority is shifted towards India, Pakistan’s nuclear threshold is decreased and chances of a nuclear war become more certain. Secondly, it contradicts Article 3.1 for CMD and indulges Pakistan in a conventional arms race as well.

Similarly, the Section 8 of the drafted Indian Nuclear Doctrine claimed the Indian efforts for disarmament and arms control. However, other way round, the Indo-U.S. deal is provoking a nuclear war in the South Asian region. Instead of arms control, India is meaninglessly indulging in an ever-increasing nuclear arsenal, and the pursuit to strengthen its second-strike capability. Then, the Indian stance on the NPT and the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) is also stopping Pakistan from moving towards disarmament.

Altogether, the Indian Nuclear Doctrine, is totally irrational and totally opposite to its thoughts and practices. The Indian military and government have no respect for their drafted doctrine and their uncertain actions.

Excluding the five nuclear states in NPT, India was the first to build an INS Arihant SSBN submarine in 2016, which has immensely increased India’s second-strike capability. The SSBN submarines can go at a 14-15 knots speed and cannot be detected by conventional radar. They hold the capacity to stay underwater for over a month and can launch a mass destruction nuclear weapon. Hence, India opting for the SSBN is totally an authoritarian step for attaining distinctive second-strike capability and, hence, it is a violation of Indian foreign policy of credible minimum deterrence and not to indulge in nuclear arms race with Pakistan. Following the threat, Pakistan is forced to build an SSBN submarine in collaboration with Turkey.

India’s BrahMos cruise missile is the world’s fastest cruise missile with more than three times the speed of sound. It can be launched from submarines, ships, aircraft, or land and has a range of 350 km with high accuracy and precision. The Nirbhay cruise missile is the longest range missile with 900 km range with navigation facility throughout the flight.

Agni-V is an intercontinental ballistic missile with a range of 7,500 km, only three times less than the world’s highest range missile Sarmat with 18,000 km range. It holds the capacity to destroy the whole of Pakistan and even China’s largest province.

From past decades, India’s multiple agreements of strategic nature and foreign policy transgression, as mentioned in this article, are clear evidences of India’s hegemonic ambitions, bolstering the country to expedite its morally illegal practices together with Indian-sponsored terrorist activities in Pakistan. It is violating the Indus Water Treaty and building illegal dams (e.g. Lower Kalnai in India-occupied Jammu and Kashmir) and water storage reservoirs in the Indus River. The United Nations has not taken any effective action against India on any of these illegal activities, thus prompting New Delhi to go even further.

Therefore, its second-strike capability and a ten times higher GDP than Pakistan has encouraged India to fashion its foreign policy in violation of international laws.

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