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Parallel Powers

The military has often acted as a policymaker. The civilian side, in contrast, has failed to institutionalize democratic norms or offer consistent governance.

By Ambassador Sanaullah | July 2025

Parallel Powers
There is a view that the performance of Pakistan’s armed forces—1971 being a notable exception—has remained consistently stronger than that of its civilian institutions. The performance did not remain confined to security structures and the military domain. Also, there is a sense of wonder why the gap between these two parallel structures—military and civilian—continues to widen.

Over the course of Pakistan’s 77-year history, military generals have ruled the country directly for 33 years and exercised decisive influence during the remainder. Whatever the official governance model, military footprints have been deeply imprinted on the national landscape. Given the inadequacies in civilian governance and the nascent political framework in the early years, the military’s intervention may have seemed understandable. However, direct military rule contradicted the foundational ethos of a state created through democratic struggle.

Pakistan’s founding father, Mohammad Ali Jinnah, left no ambiguity about the relationship between the armed forces and the state. Addressing officers at the Staff College in Quetta on 5 November 1947, he stated:

“Do not forget that the armed forces are the servants of the people. You do not make national policy; it is we, the civilians, who decide these issues.”

Tragically, this principle was ignored even during his lifetime — some of his speeches were censored, and several of his directives were partially implemented or disregarded.

Jinnah’s early death in 1948 and the assassination of Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan in 1951 facilitated the transformation of the civil-military establishment into the country’s dominant force, pushing elected politicians to the sidelines.

By the mid-1950s, party loyalties were fluid, and many politicians lacking grassroots support aligned themselves with the military and bureaucracy to secure power. The military, in turn, cultivated a weak and pliable political class, gradually expanding its role in civilian policy-making. While political institutions like parliament, the civil service, the judiciary, and the central bank were still under construction, the military’s organizational discipline and centralization gave it a decisive edge.

Military leaders began operating beyond their constitutional roles. General Ayub Khan joined the federal cabinet as Defence Minister in 1954 — a move that blurred the civilian-military divide. Meanwhile, competent civilian leaders were increasingly sidelined.

The public, disillusioned by a feudal-dominated political elite that showed little commitment to development or governance, grew increasingly skeptical of elected representatives. Politicians not only accepted military interference — including pre-poll rigging and manipulation — but also, at times, welcomed military arbitration in political disputes. This enabled a succession of generals to take direct control of the country: Ayub Khan (1958–1969), Yahya Khan (1969–1971), Zia-ul-Haq (1977–1988), and Pervez Musharraf (1999–2008). Even during periods of civilian rule, the military retained decisive influence behind the scenes, rendering true democratic control largely illusory.

The military, being Pakistan’s most organized and privileged institution, managed to cultivate support across various segments of society. Its willingness to disrupt the status quo and implement structural reforms enhanced its perceived competence. For instance, Ayub Khan introduced measures such as the Basic Democracies system and the EBDO ordinance to “cleanse” the political system. His tenure is often referred to as a golden period in terms of industrialization, agricultural development, and economic planning. He strengthened institutions like the Planning Commission and focused on expanding manufacturing.

General Yahya Khan, Ayub’s successor, is remembered mostly for presiding over the 1971 debacle that led to the secession of East Pakistan. His reluctance to transfer power to the Awami League after their electoral victory led to civil war. While he played a role in facilitating U.S.–China relations, this diplomatic success could not redeem the national trauma of Bangladesh’s creation.

General Zia-ul-Haq, who seized power in 1977, reversed many of the economic policies initiated by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s PPP. Under Bhutto, growth had declined, and inequality and inflation had increased. Zia’s regime emphasized deregulation and private enterprise, though many of his other policies, particularly Islamization and constitutional amendments like the 8th, remain controversial for entrenching military oversight in civilian matters.
General Pervez Musharraf, the last military ruler, initiated several reforms. His government created over 11 million jobs, increased foreign reserves from $1.2 billion to over $10 billion, and devolved administrative and financial powers through bodies like the NRB and PFC. He also liberalized the media. However, his decision to appoint thousands of military officers to civilian posts — including positions in public sector enterprises and oversight bodies like the Federal Public Service Commission — raised concerns about civilian autonomy and institutional independence.


In contrast, Pakistan’s political parties remain largely personality-driven and lack internal democracy. Power is concentrated in the hands of a few charismatic leaders: Nawaz Sharif (PML-N), the Bhutto family (PPP), Fazlur Rehman (JUI-F), and Imran Khan (PTI). Except for Jamaat-e-Islami, most parties do not conduct internal elections. During general elections, party tickets are distributed top-down, without input from grassroots members. Denied candidates often switch parties, reflecting shallow ideological commitments. This centralized decision-making reinforces dynastic rule and undermines democratic culture.

Effective national leadership demands three core qualities: vision, implementation capacity, and integrity. Sadly, both civilian and military leadership in Pakistan have frequently fallen short — especially in the last of these.

Major parties are frequently accused of engaging in backroom deals and influencing electoral outcomes. Even when in power, political leaders have shown minimal respect for parliamentary procedures. For instance, both Nawaz Sharif and Imran Khan rarely attended legislative sessions. Parliament remains underutilized as a platform for policymaking, and cross-party consultation is weak. Civilian supremacy has never been meaningfully asserted.

That said, civilian governments have contributed to infrastructure development — highways, airports, urban beautification — but have failed to offer consistent economic policies needed for investment and long-term stability. Each incoming government tends to reverse or stall the initiatives of its predecessor. In 1988, Prime Minister Mohammad Khan Junejo signed the Geneva Accords against General Zia’s wishes and was dismissed. In 1998, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif initiated a peace process with India, only to simultaneously preside over nuclear tests. The PPP’s major achievement came in 2010 with the passage of the 18th Amendment, which restored the parliamentary system and decentralized governance.

Scholar Hasan Askari Rizvi rightly observes in ‘Military, State and Society in Pakistan’ that military rulers often create “beneficiaries” by co-opting political elites willing to operate within their framework. This fosters the perception that politicians are inherently corrupt and incompetent, while the military is disciplined and capable. The military, through its institutional strength and resources, reinforces the belief that it alone can safeguard the country.

But the truth lies somewhere in the middle. The military’s record includes both constitutional roles and extra-constitutional interventions. While interventions are often justified as necessary to save the country from crisis, they have left Pakistan in deeper turmoil upon each exit. Despite its strengths, the military has made grave strategic miscalculations — in 1965, 1971, and Kargil — largely because the same institution was both formulating and executing policy, a dangerous blurring of roles. Even in the economic field, they could not handle the foreign debt issue, run their business empire without supportive tax policies, and help the civilian government’s begging bowl policy.

Meanwhile, the civilian bureaucracy, once competent and merit-based, has been politicized and hollowed out by years of military rule and poor political leadership. It played power games with early politicians, was later compromised by Z. A. Bhutto’s patronage politics, and eventually became the military’s administrative arm rather than a neutral executor of public policy.

Today, both institutions suffer from serious flaws. The military, originally intended to be an instrument of policy, has often acted as a policymaker. The civilian side, meanwhile, has failed to institutionalize democratic norms or offer consistent governance. Effective national leadership demands three core qualities: vision, implementation capacity, and integrity. Sadly, both civilian and military leadership in Pakistan have frequently fallen short — especially in the last of these. It is a tale of Pakistan’s Parallel Powers: Civilian Institutions vs. Military Dominance, which means Divided Governance. “The Balance Sheet of Pakistan’s Power Centers” shows a mixed performance by both, where the main victims have been democracy, the diminishing middle class, and the rule of law.

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