Decent Proposal

The Kingdom of Bhutan is a small, landlocked country between India and China deep in the Himalayas. It is characterized by steep mountains and deep valleys, which led to scattered population settlement patterns. Being a landlocked country, Bhutan does not maintain any maritime boundaries. Its population is around 777,486 (2021), while its GDP is $2.707 billion and $9.937 billion. Historically, Bhutan and China have not maintained official diplomatic relations. At the core of hostile relations between Bhutan and China is its 470-kilometer contiguous border. Recently, relations between the two seem to have improved, and both countries have moved ahead to resolve their border dispute through bilateral talks.

This is considered a move that marks an upswing in its historical relations with Beijing. However, India fears that friendship between the two may impact India’s strategic interests. The two countries have signed a cooperation agreement on the responsibilities and functions of the joint technical team in dealing with the delimitation and demarcation of the border. But a question comes to mind: What is this issue about, and how can negotiations between the two countries pose a serious threat to India?

Talks between China and Bhutan on their 470-km border have been going on since 1984, although substantive talks only began in the 6th round in Beijing in 1989, as the first five rounds were spent on finalizing the guiding principles. It was at the 1989 session that the official map was given to the Chinese.

As Medha Bisht has noted, boundary negotiations between Bhutan and China have transpired in three phases—the first, started in 1984, was the “engagement phase”; the second (1996) was the “redistribution phase” in which China offered a package to Bhutan; and the third (2000) was the “normalization phase,” in which Bhutan also advanced its claims. In the seventh round of talks in 1990, the Chinese had offered the Bhutanese a “package proposal” for the Pasamlung and Jakarlung Valleys, with a total area of 495 sq. km in the north, if Bhutan conceded their western claims. The National Assembly rejected this proposal, and subsequent sessions of the Assembly, too, indicated opposition to any kind of an exchange.

Yet, there are indications that in the 10th round of talks, the Bhutanese were ready to strike a deal with the Chinese and agree to the swap. This can be gleaned from the king’s statement to the 73rd session of the National Assembly in August-September 1995, which said, among others, that the differences in claims have to be negotiated in four areas only—the 89 sq. km of Doklam, 42 sq. km in Sinchulumpa, and 138 sq. km in Dromana-Shekhar Toe, all totalling 269 sq. km. At the same time, the king had stated that “the northern boundary will be successfully demarcated through the process of friendly dialogue.” It must be remembered that Bhutan was an absolute monarchy at the time, and the National Assembly’s role was purely advisory.

The Bhutanese position hardened after that. When the two sides met for the 11th round of talks in November 1996, “to China’s surprise, Bhutan revised its claims in the south and asserted a claim to larger territory than before, leading the talks to break down.” Undoubtedly, China saw an Indian hand in this development, so Beijing reverted to its earlier stance of calling for an exchange of claims.

The recent Bhutan-China border negotiations began when Tandi Dorji met his Chinese counterpart and Vice president in Beijing for the talks on 23-24th October 2023. Both parties agreed to accelerate the boundary demarcation process and establish diplomatic ties between the two countries. Bhutan, whose foreign policy has been mainly in sync with India’s until now, does not maintain official diplomatic relations with China.

The Bhutanese government abides firmly by the one-China principle and attaches great importance to developing relations with China. The joint technical team was established during the 13th expert group meeting in August 2023.