Risk Reduction

India’s response to the incident questions it acting as a responsible nuclear weapons state. It took India two days to make a clarification that the missile fire was an accident. Further, the statement did not mention an apology to Pakistan over the incident. Admitting the occurrence of an accidental missile fire into another nuclear-armed state after two days did not merit acting responsibly. Moreover, India really needs to focus on safety protocols of its weapons systems. Maintaining the highest standards of safety is imperative for being a responsible nuclear state. India should learn from this incident where it lacks safety protocols and fill those gaps in its weapon systems.

Dangers

India’s missile fire endangered aviation safety of a commercial aircraft in air spaces of both India and Pakistan as it flew at around 40,000 ft. Notably, there were two air routes active at that time and several commercial airliners were in the area. The commercial flights also flew at around 35,000-42,000 ft. The missile might have hit a commercial aircraft in a populated area over a strategic location in Pakistan, resulting in retaliatory action in self-defence induced by misunderstanding or miscommunication.

It needs to be assessed if this incident was a deliberate attempt, particularly in the wake of India’s shifting its ‘No First Use’ policy to a more flexible pre-emptive counterforce strategy against Pakistan. If this is the case, strategic and deterrence stability in South Asia is significantly at stake. An expert, Adil Sultan noted that the missile fire was an accident and not an intentional fire.

Pakistan’s responsible behaviour and the luck factor averted the occurrence of a crisis and escalation. If Pakistan had misunderstood or misperceived India’s accidental missile firing, events might have spiralled up and the results might be different. Any human loss or hitting a strategic installation might have brought the two nuclear armed neighbours into a serious confrontation.

Need for Risk Reduction Measures

Given the accident, there is increasing need for establishing and strengthening the existing Risk Reduction Measures (RRMs) between India and Pakistan to avoid miscalculation, nuclear accidents, and unauthorised use of weapons systems. Three important measures can be adopted in this regard.

First, India and Pakistan should strike a legal binding treaty of prior notification of a cruise missile test and military exercises involving test flights of cruise missiles. Importantly, Pakistan and India have an existing Confidence Building Measure (CBM) agreement of 1999 that requires each state to make a three-day prior notification to the other party of any land or sea launch or surface-to-surface ballistic missile test, but this agreement does not include prior notification of a cruise missile test.

The proposed RRM of prior notification of a cruise missile is significant as India and Pakistan have been producing and testing short-range weapon systems, particularly cruise missiles in their arsenals. Any miscalculation or misperception resulting from accidental firing from short-range weapon systems may trigger a crisis.

Second, Pakistan and India signed an ‘Agreement on Reducing The Risk From Accidents Relating To Nuclear Weapons’ in 2007 by informing each other of radiological fallout of any accident related to nuclear weapons. This agreement was made for 5 years and extended further until it expired in February 2022. It is imperative to extend the agreement for further five years.

Third, Pakistan and India have a hotline agreement signed in 1971 of a direct communication link between Directors General Military Operations (DGMOs) during a crisis. It’s a matter of inquiry why India did not resort to this communication link during this episode. To strengthen communication links, particularly in case of accidental or misuse of any weapon system by any of the states, India and Pakistan need to engage in a legally binding treaty to establish a hot line between National Command Authority (NCA), Pakistan and Nuclear Command Authority (NCA), India. A similar hotline can be proposed between the National Security Advisors (NSAs) of India and Pakistan, who can use such a hotline to communicate with each other in any such eventuality. Zafar Jaspal, an expert on strategic matters proposed Nuclear Risk Reduction Centres in India and Pakistan which would be dedicated to official and timely communication between each other to avoid escalation emanating from miscalculation.

Luckily, India’s accidental fire, dropped in a private property in Pakistan, did not incur any damage or loss of life; it did not endanger aviation safety or hit a strategic target. Any dangerous outcome of similar accidental fire from either India or Pakistan targeting any strategic location or resulting in casualties may escalate the tensions exponentially. In such a situation, both lack a crisis management mechanism. A formal hotline agreement between NCAs or NSAs of India and Pakistan is a significant RRM. Such RRMs will help strengthen strategic and deterrence stability and contribute to confidence building between India and Pakistan.

The near misses and accidents of weapon systems between nuclear armed states urge safety of their weapon systems. Irrespective of the fragility of the nature of relationships between India and Pakistan, they must pool their energies to develop crisis management mechanisms involving Risk Reduction Measures to avoid escalation emanating from accidental or misuse of weapons.