Quest for Peace

By Raja Rafi Ullah | June 2020

As the entire world continues to battle the COVID-19 pandemic, many other issues seem to have been put on the back-burner, such as those of international conflict and diplomacy. The invasion and occupation of Afghanistan by America and its allies has continued for far too long. The war started in 2001 in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks it still continues, in one form or the other, 19 years later. According to figures released by the Watson Center at Brown University, direct U.S. spending on military operations in Afghanistan stood at $975 billion in 2019 with aggregate spending, if one includes funding through departments other than the Department of Defence, being much higher.

The massive human, economic and societal cost to Afghanistan may be put aside for once. Even from an ethically removed strategic point of view, the Afghan war has proven to be an expensive affair for the US tax-payers. Yet it is apparent that despite the billions spent, not much progress has been made in Afghanistan in the past decade. The Taliban have never been fully pushed into the periphery and the Afghan government faces issues with its legitimacy and capacity to exercise effective state-control. Hence, it was only apt that with the election of a new Trump-led Republican government, efforts were ramped up to finally end US-led intervention in Afghanistan. The crux of the withdrawal strategy was to bring relevant stakeholders from the Taliban leadership and Afghan government together under US supervision so that a power-sharing ‘deal’ could be reached between the Taliban and the Afghan government which would in turn facilitate US forces’ withdrawal.
The tangible result that has come out of this is the US signing a “Peace Deal” with the Taliban on February 29, 2020 in Doha in the presence of Taliban Political Chief Mullah Abdul Ghani and US Special Envoy Zalmay Khalilzad, with the US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo being a witness to the deal. The February 29 Afghan peace agreement is unique in the sense that the United States has negotiated and signed an agreement with the Taliban, an entity “which is not recognized by the US”. Today the American position is more tenuous due to the ravages of the coronavirus domestically and its undetermined economic mayhem worldwide. But before identifying other causes to the supposed failure of the peace deal, it seems instructive to examine the deal itself, as most analysts seem to be oblivious to the commitments made by either side.

The deal that has been signed between the two parties is better described as a conditional agreement that if successful can facilitate more such future agreements leading to a total US-Allied withdrawal from Afghanistan. According to the terms of the agreement, the US is to bring down its troops total to 8,600 in 135 days along with the other allies bringing down their troops totals down proportionately. In return, the Taliban are not to attack any foreign troops in the country and cut their ties to Al-Qaeda. The US will also lift sanctions on the Taliban and will work with the UN to lift other sanctions if the Taliban keep their part of the deal. Another critical part of the agreement is a prisoner exchange between the Taliban and the Afghan government.

It is this prisoner exchange part that is proving to be the biggest impediment to the working of the US-Taliban deal.

It is this prisoner exchange part that is proving to be the biggest impediment to the working of this deal. According to the agreement, the Taliban were to release 1000 Afghan security forces personnel in exchange for the Afghan government releasing 5000 Taliban prisoners by the 10th of March, 2020. This prisoner exchange has not materialized fully as of yet partly due to the Afghan government’s unwillingness to free high-level Taliban prisoners as a part of the 5000 Taliban prisoners that are supposed to be freed. These prisoners the Afghan government claims were part of large attacks and cannot be freed given the nature of the crimes they have committed and the security risk that they pose. This deadlock between the Afghan government and the Taliban has increased levels of distrust among parties and, with the recent spike in Taliban attacks on Afghanis, the much celebrated “peace deal” is looking more fragile with each passing day.

Although it would be naïve to think that the US and its diplomats didn’t take the input of the Afghan administration before signing the agreement with the Taliban, what is puzzling is the seeming absence of operational specificitions when it comes to the prisoner exchange between the Afghan government and the Taliban. Perhaps, such details were not listed, given that the US wanted this to be something that the Afghan government and the Taliban should decide amongst themselves. Having said that, the level of distrust between the two sides seems to be too great for an effective “intra-Afghan” negotiation process to materialize.

The United States apparently on an international diplomatic front is fulfilling its promise and has brought the issue up for debate during the meeting of the UN Security Council on the 10th of March, 2020. Having said that, the members of the Security Council while unanimously adopting Article 2513 reiterated that for any lifting of international sanctions against the Taliban, an effective intra-Afghanistan peace process needs to happen between the Afghani government and the Taliban. And if the recent spike in attacks against civilians and local forces by the Taliban is an indication, an intra-Afghanistan peace process is in no near sight. In due course, the February 2020 Doha agreement between the US and the Taliban may provide political leverage for the Trump administration as they go into this year’s elections, but is unlikely to lead to end the Allied intervention in Afghanistan i.e. unless the US decides to leave regardless and leaves Afghanistan to the ravages of another full-scale civil war.

Region/Kabul

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