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New Delhi

Trojan Horse

Every Indian aid truck entering Afghanistan sends a loud and clear message: India can reach Afghanistan without Pakistan’s permission or assistance

By Atif Shamim Syed | January 2026

Pakistan viewed the Taliban’s return to power in August 2021 with cautious optimism. It was a strategic triumph, fulfilling decades-long aspirations of having a friendly regime in Kabul. The idea of strategic depth - a passive western flank - seemed to have been achieved at last.

Yet, less than four years later, the geopolitical landscape is shifting in an unpredictable manner. India’s growing engagement with the Taliban has introduced a disruptive new variable into the equation. The unexpected alliance between the two countries manifests deliberate strategic statecraft. Within this changing geo-political landscape, Pakistan needs a policy recalibration based on realism rather than nostalgia.

Since the fall of Kabul, India’s approach towards the Taliban has been a masterclass in adaptive diplomacy. New Delhi’s current Afghan policy rests on three interlocking pillars designed to advance Indian interests and simultaneously expose the limits of Pakistani influence.

First, India uses humanitarian aid as a strategic tool. It has sent tonnes of wheat, medicine, and vaccines to Afghanistan. This serves two purposes: it preserves the vast reservoir of Indian goodwill built over the years through schools, dams, and infrastructure projects. It also positions New Delhi as a responsible and capable neighbor. But the most important aspect of Indian aid is logistical. It moves not through Pakistan but through Iran’s Chabahar Port. Bypassing Pakistan is symbolically very significant. Every Indian aid truck entering Afghanistan sends a loud and clear message: India can reach Afghanistan without Pakistan’s permission or assistance.

Second, India is pursuing a calibrated diplomatic engagement. It has technical teams in Afghanistan. It has reopened its embassy in Kabul without formal recognition of the Taliban regime. India has established direct channels and holds high-level talks with Taliban ministers. This engagement strips away ideology and treats the Taliban as the de facto authority. It also signals that India will not outsource its Afghan policy to the West.
Third, India is engaged in quiet coalition-building. It has intensified security consultations with regional stakeholders, including Iran, Russia, and Central Asian republics. All of them share concerns about extremist elements spilling over into their own territories. By aligning with this nascent regional consensus, India avoids isolation. It embeds itself in a broader strategic dialogue about Afghanistan’s future. In this dialogue, Pakistan’s voice is no longer singular.

For the Taliban, Indian overtures are both tantalizing and fraught. The regime in Kabul is crippled by international isolation. Moreover, it is economically over-reliant on Pakistan. Many within the Taliban resent Pakistan for its perceived heavy-handedness. Recent cross-border airstrikes targeting the TTP have deepened this resentment. The Taliban desperately need legitimacy. Even limited engagement with the world’s largest democracy offers a modicum of international respectability and breaks the monotony of dependence on Islamabad and Beijing. Security-wise, a relationship with Delhi could provide leverage against Pakistani pressure.

India does not want to win the Taliban over. It is seeking to exploit these internal fissures and encourage pragmatic elements within the movement. The goal is to fracture the Taliban’s external dependencies and move them away from total reliance on Pakistan. In this web, India becomes a stakeholder Kabul cannot afford to alienate.

But the Taliban’s calculations are perilously complex. The movement is heavily indebted to Pakistan. Anti-India elements hold great influence within the regime. These factors create serious internal constraints.

Pakistan’s reaction to these developments is one of profound anxiety. It views the situation through an intertwined security and geopolitical lens. It fears strategic encirclement. For decades, Pakistan envisioned a friendly Afghanistan providing strategic depth against India. Taliban’s engagement with India raises the spectre of Indian intelligence gaining a foothold on Pakistan’s western flank. This could mean collaboration with anti-Pakistan elements like the TTP. From this perspective, every Indian aid shipment or diplomat in Kabul is a Trojan horse - part of a design to destabilize Pakistan’s Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa provinces.

Pakistan sacrificed immense blood, treasure, and international reputation to stand by its western neighbor. Seeing India - its arch-rival - gaining a foothold in Afghanistan is deeply devastating. India achieved this without firing a shot or extending formal recognition. It exposes the blunt limits of Pakistani influence. It reveals the Taliban as sovereign actors with their own national interests. The irony is unmistakable: the same people Pakistan supported to safeguard its western border are now forging alliances with its primary adversary in the east.


Pakistan’s response has been a mix of public fury, accusatory rhetoric, and frantic counter-diplomacy. However, recent breakdowns in peace talks and ongoing border tensions with the Taliban show Pakistan’s leverage is not what it once was. It can no longer treat Afghanistan as its backyard. Pakistan requires a strategic recalibration of its Afghan policy.

First of all, Pakistan must move beyond the patron-client framework. Despite all its flaws, the Taliban government is a reality. Engaging with it on clearly defined transactional interests is more sustainable than demanding unconditional allegiance. These interests include border security, counter-terrorism, trade connectivity, and refugee management. Both share the TTP threat. Prioritizing it through joint dialogue with Kabul will yield much better results.

Pakistan’s geographical position as Afghanistan’s primary trade and transit route to the sea is its most powerful underutilized card. Pakistan should proactively work to make this route efficient, reliable, and economically beneficial for both countries. This would make alternatives like Chabahar less attractive. It requires investing in border infrastructure, streamlining customs, and building integrated economic partnerships. Economic interdependence can be a more durable source of influence.

The region is not bipolar. Russia, Iran, and Central Asian states are all engaged with Kabul and wary of instability. Pakistan should intensify dialogue within these regional forums. The goal should not be to form an anti-India bloc. It should focus on building consensus on core stability issues like counter-terrorism and narcotics. Similarly, the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor expansion into Afghanistan is a potential lever. Pakistan must engage all stakeholders on their own merits.

A stable, peaceful western border is crucial for Pakistan’s own economic survival and internal security. Endless frontier tensions drain military resources and investor confidence. A coherent national policy on Afghanistan is urgently needed. It must transcend the traditional security-dominated narrative and incorporate economic and diplomatic tools. The aim should be a normal state-to-state relationship, however difficult that may be with the Taliban.

The Delhi-Kabul engagement is a fact of South-Asian geopolitics. It reflects India’s maturation into a pragmatic interest-driven country, showing a willingness to engage with unsavory regimes to secure its borders. For Pakistan, this is a strategic challenge. It is not an existential threat unless met with a rigid reactive mindset.

The uncomfortable truth is this. Taliban’s willingness to engage India is a symptom of Pakistan’s own strained relationship with Kabul. This is particularly true regarding the TTP. It is a signal that raw pressure tactics have diminishing returns. Another truth is that India’s influence, while growing, remains constrained. The Taliban’s ideology and its other partnerships limit it. Afghanistan is not about to become an Indian ally.

The region has entered an era of complex multi-polar rivalry. The old binaries have dissolved. In this new game, Pakistan’s success will depend not on lamenting India’s moves but on confidently advancing its own. This means offering Afghanistan a relationship of greater value than India can. It can do this through unparalleled market access, visionary connectivity projects, and serious collaboration on shared security threats. It requires Pakistan to be a partner in Afghanistan’s development.

The path forward is difficult, but it is clear. Pakistan must meet this new complexity with sophistication rather than suspicion. By doing so, it can secure its interests, stabilise its frontiers, and ensure that its voice remains central in determining the region’s future. Pakistan is and will always be an indispensable geographical and historical reality in this region. The goal is not to keep India out of Afghanistan. That is an increasingly impossible task. The goal is to ensure Pakistan’s legitimate interests are secured through proactive statecraft. Pakistan must make itself too vital a partner for both Kabul and the region to ignore.

This demands a sustained commitment. It requires patience and a willingness to evolve. The strategic depth of the future may not be a passive flank but a stable, interconnected region where Pakistan’s security is underwritten by economic strength and diplomatic credibility. The next chapter in Pak-Afghan relations must be written with this vision. The alternative is a cycle of reaction and resentment that serves no one’s long-term interests. The opportunity for leadership and stability is there. It must be seized with clarity and courage.

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