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Pandora’s Box

Justice and governance are provincial domains, and any federal move to revive Jirgas violates constitutional boundaries and undermines provincial authority.

By Ambassador Sanaullah | September 2025

The centuries-old Jirga system is a traditional conflict resolution mechanism practiced primarily in the Pashtun tribal areas of Pakistan, with variations among Baloch, Sindhi, and Saraiki communities. While it enjoys grassroots support—being rooted in tradition, the Pashtunwali code, and easy accessibility—it is increasingly viewed as incompatible with modern norms, except in the more remote sections of Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Social media has eroded the prestige of tribal elders, exposing their duplicity and revealing to youth a once-inaccessible world of romance, freedom, and easy money. Elders are no longer unquestioned role models.

Why does the system persist? It is perceived as better than state courts, aligning with local norms, family traditions, and faith. This attitude often resists external criticism, particularly over women’s rights. A recent example was the execution-style killing of Bano Bibi and Ehsan Ullah, filmed and circulated online. Despite judicial attention, including a suo motu notice by the Balochistan High Court, legal proceedings remain slow, echoing past patterns of stalled, fruitless investigations.

Non-tribal observers believe dismantling the Jirga is possible. Jurists object to the coexistence of Sharia, constitutional law, and Jirga rulings. Many expect Jirgas to fade into mere family consultative bodies with expanding education. In Sindh, for instance, Jirgas remain active mainly in the remote kacha hinterland along the Sindh–Balochistan border, where they operate discreetly. However, statistics do not confirm their imminent decline.

Prof. Dr. Gul Hasan, Ali Azeem, and Dr. Jalal Faiz, in their book Jirga: A Historical Institute (2023), examined the Balochi Jirga system in Balochistan, its cultural roots, and its current role as informal justice. They concluded that the Balochi Jirga originated long ago and gained prominence during the rise of feudal structures in Balochistan, especially under British rule (Sandeman’s policy). Today, it operates as a mediator-like institution.

Research by Samra Iqbal and Dr. Waheed Iqbal (An Analysis of Jirga System and Perception of Local People, 2023) showed strong village-level support in Attock. Taniya Ahmed, Khurshid Ahmed, and Muhammad Arif Khan (Unveiling the Dynamics of the Jirga System in Pakistan, 2024) compared Jirga to ADR mechanisms, highlighting reform needs. Samreen Fatima (Reviving the Jirga System as ADR in Pakistan’s Tribal Areas, 2024) examined its role amid court backlogs. M. H. U. Khan, Manzoor Khan Afridi, and Shan Zeb (Installations of the Judicial Setup in the Newly Merged Areas of Erstwhile FATA, 2024) recommended the coexistence of both systems. Zahid Ullah, Karam Elahi, and Tariq Ullah (Administration of Justice in Bajaur, 2025) documented community preference for Jirga.

A 2018 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) study in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa’s merged districts found that over 70% of disputes were resolved through Jirgas rather than formal courts. This persistence is attributed to the institution’s cultural legitimacy, low cost, and community control over the dispute resolution process. Imran Khan and Dr. Kiran (The Importance of Jirga, 2025 – Urdu) found overwhelming trust in Jirga over state courts in Bajaur. Research by the International Crisis Group (2009), the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, and multiple NGOs confirms the persistence of Jirga practices despite formal legal reforms. Field studies by Dr. Fazlur Rahim Marwat and others show that even after the extension of the Pakistani legal system to tribal areas, communities still prefer the Jirga for its speed, familiarity, and perceived fairness.

Jirgas vary by tribe, sub-tribe, or even family. Typically, male elders gather to resolve disputes on issues such as land, blood feuds (Qatl/Qisas), forced marriages, and honor-related crimes. Proceedings emphasize reconciliation over punishment, but decisions are binding and lack appeal. Refusal may bring ostracism, fines, or conflict escalation. Women rarely participate.


Elders cross-question, deliberate, and listen carefully. Decisions are based on tribal codes, Pashtunwali, Islamic teachings, and precedents. The emphasis is on restoring harmony, compromise, and social cohesion, rather than punishment alone. Decisions are binding.

Criticism centers on human rights violations—notably in cases of honor killings, swara, and child marriage. Critics argue that powerful interests can sway outcomes. Some tribal leaders, like Ambassador Ayaz Wazir, defend honor killings as embedded in tribal life, though he claims families rather than formal Jirgas often decide such cases. Others, like Ambassador Asif Durani, stress that rural communities remain tied to rewaj despite modern laws, as seen in resistance to polio vaccination due to clerical opposition—sometimes resulting in the killings of health workers.

The government is reportedly considering reviving Jirgas in tribal areas as part of an integrated justice system, potentially to influence disputes involving dishonor, land, terrorism, and politics.

The Jirga, as an institution, is also evolving. Political movements like the Pashtun Tahafuz Movement have used it to address broader social, sectarian, and political issues, including cross-border mediation—such as asking the TTP to stop its operations in cities. Provincial governments fund certain Jirga-led community initiatives and integrate them into development projects. Post-merger with KP, the provincial government funds Jirgas and Saliseen panels for ADR, incorporating them into water access and women’s empowerment projects.

After the 25th Amendment (2018), the former FATA came under the constitutional courts. In 2019, Pakistan’s Supreme Court ruled that Jirgas and similar traditional assemblies are illegal when they act as parallel courts adjudicating civil or criminal matters, as this violates constitutional provisions including Articles 4 (equality before law), 10-A (right to a fair trial), 25 (equality), and 175(3) (judicial authority). The Court emphasized that Jirgas violate fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution and international treaties Pakistan has ratified, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). The ruling permits Jirgas only to function in arbitration, mediation, or negotiation roles where parties voluntarily consent.

The government is reportedly considering reviving Jirgas in tribal areas as part of an integrated justice system, potentially to influence disputes involving dishonor, land, terrorism, and politics. Proposals to revive them in merged districts have triggered controversy, with critics warning of constitutional backsliding. Proponents cite cultural acceptance and speed of resolution; opponents fear erosion of legal reforms.

Dr. Syed Akhtar Ali Shah argues (Reviving Jirgas: Undoing Constitutional Gains, 17 July 2025) that reintroducing the Jirga in the merged districts represents a dangerous rollback of constitutional progress, especially undoing the 2018 merger with KP. He stresses that justice and governance are provincial domains, and any federal move to revive Jirgas violates constitutional boundaries and undermines provincial authority. The proposals have sparked warnings that they risk eroding the merger’s gains. Still, proponents highlight Jirga’s efficiency and cultural acceptance as justification for revival. Few among the official quarters realize that reviving the Jirga institution may open a new Pandora’s box—especially when all stakeholders are not on board. Adverse Supreme Court judgments have to be tackled legally to conform the revival of this institution to the Constitution and state laws.

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One thought on “Pandora’s Box”

  • Muhammad Qamarullah
    September 3, 2025 at 6:08 pm
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    The passage presents the core functions and characteristics of jirgas in a compact way, without unnecessary detail. It touches on important dispute areas (land, blood feuds, forced marriages, honor crimes), decision-making features (reconciliation, binding outcomes), and consequences of non-compliance.
    The significance of the article is the highlighting of the limited role of women, an important dimension in evaluating fairness.
    However the article does not explain why jirgas hold authority in certain societies, their historical roots, or cultural legitimacy. Without context, readers might misinterpret jirgas only as coercive systems rather than community-driven institutions. Probably because the importance of jirgas as dispensation justice ta the door step a d without paying heavy court and lawyers fees and its being widely known in this part of the world as else where in tribal set up.
    A comparison with formal legal systems, human rights standards, or state judicial structures would had covered the gap and spotify the reasons why it stays and why should it be uprooted.
    The tone is descriptive like an experienced reporter, keeping it free of any prejudice. However reconciliation being prioritized sounds positive, but in cases of honor crimes or forced marriages, reconciliation may mean pressuring victims into silence which is implied and true.
    While it says jirgas “vary by tribe,” it doesn’t illustrate how. Some jirgas incorporate community consensus, others are dominated by powerful elites—this affects fairness of the jirgas drastically.
    As far as gender discrimination is considered, the articles has limited gender analysis – It notes women “rarely participate,” but does not assess the implications—such as systemic silencing of women’s voices in cases where they are often the victims (e.g., forced marriage, honor crimes). Elaborating such things would have given wider perspective out of the sub continent.
    The article while mentioning binding decisions without appeal, should have included the human rights implications of this lack of accountability or transparency.
    In my view, while appreciating this skillfully written article, another article evaluating the remaining aspects of this conventional jirga system and failure of our legal and constitutional judicial system’s failure to dispense justice be discussed. Side by side assessing how jirga decisions align or conflict with human rights, rule of law, and gender equality with real examples like, “vani” marriages or land disputes.
    There is a need to circumvent any effort on the part of Govt or NGOs to bring in some reforms in Jirgas to regulate or integrate this mechanism into formal legal systems (e.g., in Pakistan, some are outlawed but still persist).
    The article should have taken a bold stance to highlight power dynamics within Jirga system – Who benefits from jirgas (elders, elites, men), and who is marginalized (youth, women, weaker tribes).
    Overall, the article gives a useful descriptive overview.

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