The current Pakistan-Afghan crisis is not the result of a single trigger but rather the convergence of several structural and immediate factors that have gradually eroded the fragile equilibrium along the Durand Line. For decades, the conflict along the Durand Line largely unfolded through proxy dynamics, militant sanctuaries, and intermittent skirmishes. However, recent events, including airstrikes, cross-border attacks, and large-scale troop deployments, suggest a shift toward direct military confrontation between the two states.
After the Taliban returned to power in Afghanistan in August 2021, many analysts initially expected relations with Pakistan to improve. Pakistan had long supported the Taliban and their negotiations with the United States and facilitated the peace process that ended with the Doha Agreement. However, rather than stabilizing, Pakistan-Afghanistan relations deteriorated sharply. Several structural factors undermined expectations of a return to normalcy in the region.
The most serious issue in the current tensions has been the resurgence of Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, where TTP activity is concentrated, recorded 2,331 fatalities in 2025—a 44 percent increase from 2024. The statistics for the current year are even more disturbing. After the Taliban’s takeover, many TTP fighters who had fled to Afghanistan were released from Afghan prisons or allowed to reorganize. TTP fighters now operate from Afghan territory to conduct cross-border attacks on Pakistani military posts. Afghanistan either does not care or lacks the capacity to control them. Pakistan has argued that if the Taliban cannot hand over the TTP leadership or control the group themselves, they should allow Pakistan to dismantle TTP and BLA sanctuaries operating from Afghan territory.
Another source of tension relates to the Taliban’s views on the status of the Durand Line and the border fencing erected by Pakistan. Taliban fighters have often removed sections of Pakistan’s border fence and engaged in cross-border firing incidents, provoking military responses and sudden closures of border crossings at Torkham and Chaman.
Pakistan’s Afghan refugee deportation policy has also irritated the Taliban authorities. They did not fully appreciate Pakistan’s security concerns and the economic pressures that forced the authorities to launch deportation policies against undocumented Afghan refugees. However, Afghan authorities argued that deportations would create humanitarian problems in an already fragile economy.
Many analysts believe that the deportation policy hardened recalcitrant elements within the Taliban leadership who dispute the Durand Line as the international border between the two countries. In fact, successive Afghan governments, including elements within the Taliban, have historically viewed the Durand Line as a colonial boundary dividing Pashtun tribes and depriving Afghanistan of its traditional tribal areas.
Another contributory factor is that the Taliban government continues to ignore Pakistan’s requests regarding the non-use of Afghan territory for attacks against Pakistan. This situation may also relate to simmering leadership differences between the Kandahar-based leadership around Hibatullah Akhundzada and the Haqqani network based in eastern Afghanistan, each with its own priorities and power base. Because of these internal dynamics, the Taliban leadership may be reluctant to abandon its former ally, the TTP. Some analysts also argue that Afghanistan’s fragile economy makes it extremely difficult for the Taliban government to effectively control militant networks or stabilize the remote border regions.
The broader regional geopolitical environment has also generated pressures contributing to Pakistan-Afghanistan tensions. India has sought to improve its relations with the Taliban to limit Pakistan’s influence in Afghanistan. Pakistani analysts believe that such engagement may indirectly encourage militant proxies targeting Pakistani military posts and civilian targets. This complex regional environment complicates mediation efforts and makes it difficult to secure a verifiable commitment from the Taliban leadership regarding the containment of TTP and BLA activities.
Pakistan has attempted a range of responses, from bilateral negotiations to multilateral diplomatic initiatives and limited aerial strikes against militant camps. Yet these efforts have not persuaded the Taliban authorities to prevent TTP, BLA, and other militant groups from launching attacks on Pakistani military posts, security officials, and civilian infrastructure.
In October 2025, Pakistan closed all border crossings with Afghanistan and carried out airstrikes targeting TTP leadership and infrastructure in Kabul, Khost, Jalalabad, and Paktika. Pakistan refused to rely on what it considered empty verbal reassurances while militant groups continued to operate from Afghan territory. Through drone and missile strikes on militant training camps, Pakistan attempted to demonstrate its determination to prevent cross-border terrorism.
Pakistan now finds itself in an extremely difficult strategic position. If the Taliban government refuses to restrain TTP and BLA militants, as suggested by statements from Afghan Defence Minister Mullah Yaqub on March 7, Pakistan’s current campaign of aerial strikes is unlikely to abate. Pakistan’s military leadership appears determined to pursue aggressive counter-terrorism operations, as indicated by attacks on Bagram airbase and targets in Kabul and Kandahar. Pakistani forces have also captured certain border posts previously used by Afghan forces to launch artillery and drone attacks on Pakistani positions.
The writer is a former ambassador and can be contacted at rahimmkarim@gmail.com
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