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Kabul

Afghan Enigma

Why does terrorism continue to emerge from Afghanistan, and what possible solutions exist?

By Adeel Ahmed | January 2026


There is renewed interest in the Taliban’s ability to shake off its diplomatic isolation, and in this context, a comparison is often made as to whether Taliban 0.2 is better organized than Taliban 0.1 in ultimately securing diplomatic recognition. How far the second administration could adopt a softer position in ideological practices remains enigmatic to outsiders, but not to Afghans, who fully know where the real power of the Taliban lies—in Kandahar, not in Kabul.

After the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Afghanistan, Pakistan had expected a peace-loving government in its neighbour that would maintain friendly relations with Islamabad. However, after the Taliban came to power, terrorist incidents in Pakistan multiplied, and civilian and security personnel casualties have increased owing to non-stop terrorist attacks. Islamabad accuses the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA), backed by India, of being behind these terrorist incidents, and of using Afghan territory as base camps. Reportedly, Islamabad has presented ample evidence that Afghan citizens were involved in terrorist incidents inside Pakistan. Islamabad also provided incontrovertible proof that the BLA and the TTP have safe havens inside Afghanistan.

Despite repeated warnings, the Afghan Taliban have not taken concrete action against these groups; instead, they have adopted the stance that terrorist acts inside Pakistan are Pakistan’s internal matter. After the Afghan Taliban’s lack of cooperation against the terrorists, when Pakistan struck the terrorist hideouts inside Afghanistan, the Taliban regime itself began a confrontation with Pakistan, suggesting the Afghan Taliban are not interested in acting against those groups.

With the help of friendly countries, talks were held between the Afghan Taliban and a Pakistani delegation in Doha and Türkiye, but in vain. According to media reports, Pakistan’s agenda in those talks was based on a single point: to stop terrorism emanating from Afghan soil. However, the Afghan Taliban expressed an inability to implement Pakistan’s demand.

Analysts say one important reason the Afghan Taliban ignore Pakistan’s demand is that the Tehreek-e-Taliban Afghanistan (TTA) and Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) are two sides of the same coin. When the Afghan Taliban were fighting the Americans and the Kabul government, the TTP strongly supported them. The two movements share the same ideology and political outlook. Neither accepts the Durand Line between Pakistan and Afghanistan as an international border; they claim Afghanistan’s boundary extends up to Attock, a city in Punjab, Pakistan. The claim is absurd, as any country other than India or Pakistan cannot stand up today and say it does not accept the India-Pakistan border established in 1947.

A second important reason is Afghanistan’s current instability. Although the Taliban have taken Kabul, there remain many groups in Afghanistan that could threaten the Taliban, the most important of which is ISIS or Islamic State Khorasan (IS-K). Some circles suggest there are factional groupings even within the Afghan Taliban, which makes them fear that if they took a hard line against the TTP, those factions or the TTP might join ISIS and threaten their regime. Still, observers closely following Afghan affairs believe the Afghan Taliban have considerable influence over the TTP and, if they wished, could compel the TTP to stop operations against Pakistan. They are simply not doing so. If the Taliban’s excuse is accepted that action against the TTP would weaken them, then why do they not act against the BLA networks residing in Afghanistan?

Islamabad has given the Afghan Taliban incontrovertible evidence that BLA terrorists, after murdering innocent people, take refuge in Afghanistan to escape Pakistan’s law enforcement. The Taliban’s policies suggest they are using the TTP and BLA against Pakistan under a deliberate strategy to achieve some of their objectives; similarly, by developing ties with India, they may be trying to increase pressure on Pakistan.


So, what do the Afghan Taliban want? Currently, Pakistan may be the only country that enjoys reasonably good relations with all three great powers — the United States, China, and Russia. The U.S. needs Pakistan’s role regarding Iran, the Middle East, and China. Yet the U.S. does not formally recognise the current Afghan regime and has imposed sanctions; it has also frozen about $9.5 billion of Afghan assets. On the other hand, China needs Pakistan to expand its trade corridors, and a strong Pakistan next to India is important for China. But China is hesitant to invest in Afghanistan because of Afghanistan’s instability; China does not see a future for investment there at present. The Taliban understand well that as China and Russia draw closer, the Eurasian region grows in importance, and Afghanistan’s location is crucial for linking China, Pakistan, Central Asia, and Russia.

Likewise, the Taliban are important in tackling the ISIS threat: if ISIS became strong in Afghanistan, it would pose a threat to the U.S., Europe, Russia, and Central Asian countries. Therefore, the Taliban want their importance to be formally recognised, for their government to be acknowledged, sanctions lifted, and investment to flow into Afghanistan so they can strengthen themselves. If instability in Pakistan increases, the interests of the three major global powers would be affected. If the Taliban remained silent and inactive, they would attract no attention; TTP operations, conversely, underscore the Taliban’s presence and importance.

But how can Pakistan handle this problem? If Pakistan remains under tension or warlike conditions on both its eastern and western borders, the situation could become dire. Given Pakistan’s weak economic state, the country must enjoy peaceful borders, allowing the state to focus its full energy on economic recovery. Externally, Pakistan must take the United States, Russia, China, and other friendly Islamic countries along with it on the Taliban issue. U.S. intelligence could be invaluable to Pakistan in targeting the safe havens of the TTP and BLA. Although the U.S. has listed the BLA as a terrorist organization, the United Nations has not yet done so. As permanent members of the UN Security Council, the roles of Russia and China are crucial in this regard.

Pakistan also needs to focus on its internal issues. The state has struggled to gain substantial political support from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK), the province most affected by terrorism. No state can win a war without a consensual political narrative. In KPK, the rift between the federal government and Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI), the ruling party in the province, is unlikely to be resolved in the near future; other provincial political forces, such as the Awami National Party (ANP) and even Maulana Fazlur Rehman’s Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam, do not appear fully aligned with the state’s narrative. The state must also take the Pashtun Tahafuz Movement (PTM) seriously. Through dialogue, the Pakistani government can bring PTM into the national mainstream, which would strengthen the state’s narrative in the war against terrorism.

Most importantly, many tribes live on both sides of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. Pakistan should involve the tribal elders within its territories and bring the tribal communities on its side in the war against terrorism. Afghan society is also tribal, and the Taliban government depends on that system; by bringing the tribes in Pakistan together, state operations against the TTP would be highly effective, since TTP attacks inside Pakistan are nearly impossible without the connivance of border tribes.

On the other hand, in Balochistan, the state faces a situation somewhat similar to Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Although the BLA may not pose as serious a threat to the state as the TTP does, it remains a significant security concern and hampers economic activities in this mineral-rich region. Poor governance, rising unemployment, and a lack of basic necessities have created widespread frustration, especially among the youth, which helps terrorists strengthen their narrative. Urgent measures are needed to address these issues.

The state can and will win the war against terrorism, but achieving lasting peace may not be possible unless the populations of the affected regions are integrated into the national political mainstream.

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