Cover Story 
 

Cover Story

ALL STRANGERS IN THE END

During the second term of U.S. President-elect Donald Trump, any significant changes in U.S. policy towards Pakistan will depend on the pros and cons of its strategic relationship with India.

By Ambassador Sanaullah | December 2024

ALL STRANGERS IN THE END
No one can tell for sure what U.S. President-elect Donald Trump’s Asia policy will be. His concerns and foreign policy objectives regarding Asia, especially China’s emerging influence, are well known, and the selection of his foreign policy team signals a hawkish attitude. The undeniable reality is his focus on championing America’s choice of India as a strategic partner for geopolitical and economic reasons. His return to the White House potentially creates a situation where he may develop a focused policy if he chooses, though the prospects for this are low. In his conduct and dealings with Asian countries, he is unlikely to veer far from the current American policy. The choice of key Cabinet members has indicated stronger U.S.-India relations, including a focus on China.

Nevertheless, given the peculiarities of Donald Trump’s persona, uncertainty and sudden changes in specific situations cannot be completely ruled out. The three largest nuclear powers in Asia presently or previously held varying degrees of relevance to the US administration are China, India, and Pakistan. The other four countries that President Trump engaged with during his first term included North Korea, Iran, Afghanistan, and Russia (due to China and Afghanistan). In some form, these countries may again claim his attention.

Trump’s broad policy themes, such as “Make America Great Again” and “America First,” largely relate to this region, as China’s growing global influence is perceived as a threat to the US. Trump’s new administration will likely navigate rivalry or competition with China through transactional diplomacy while intensifying strategic partnership with India. Barring China and India, all other Asian countries may receive lower priority from his administration.

President Trump is notoriously unpredictable and impulsive, and he could change course at any time, potentially perplexing his allies and even his administration. These countries may face a blend of clear and ambiguous U.S. policy due to the nature of today’s polarized yet highly integrated world. However, fortunately, all South Asian countries that dealt with him four years ago have had time to prepare for his administration, as speculation about his return to power never faded. The challenge now is that he returns with a stronger mandate and more confidence, albeit with reduced global influence, to achieve America’s goals. The question is whether these countries can confront his deal-making habits without causing severe economic and political turmoil globally.

It seems that uncertainty will mark his business-like approach. Cooperation with countries including Pakistan, Iran, and Afghanistan will be redefined based on shared interests or the level of “convergence” these countries can create with the priorities of the Trump 2.0 administration. Another determining factor could be how seriously or swiftly the U.S. administration might respond to countries pursuing unfriendly policies. If leaders in these countries can identify areas of convergence as per American priorities, they can benefit fully from their relationship with the world’s largest economy, biggest importer, and strongest military power. Otherwise, they may endure a challenging phase of an unsteady cooperative relationship with the U.S.

While Trump’s first term is instructive, it offers no guarantee that he will behave in the same manner. Aside from his mercurial nature, the world has changed significantly in the last four years. If he follows his election rhetoric, he will prioritize focus on China. Trump has proposed a 60 percent tax on imports from China, though this figure may change due to negotiations and lobbying for more affordable Chinese imports. This scenario is not new, and China has prepared for it. Chinese leadership does not expect Trump to allow the transfer of civilian and military technology to China. Many in China remember how, in his first term, Trump imposed new taxes and restrictions on Chinese technology companies. These new moves would be worrying, as China needs advanced semiconductors, such as 7-nanometer chips, or more advanced designs used in Artificial Intelligence (AI) applications.


More importantly, they are concerned about Trump’s tendency to strengthen Taiwan’s military to maintain Taiwan’s separate status. Aware of Trump’s coercive negotiation techniques, China would likely continue to seek improved trade relations with E.U. countries through engagement and reciprocity. Unless provoked, China will unlikely resort to conflict in the South China Sea. China does not expect President-elect Trump to pursue isolationist policies, as this would leave a power vacuum for other powers to fill. Chinese relations with Iran and partnership with Russia will be watched closely. However, they may not affect its bilateral relations with the U.S. China would continue to build commonality with the U.S. to promote global peace, stability, and conflict resolution. The U.S. will watch Chinese efforts to promote the yuan as a new global currency, potentially replacing the dollar, and its reaction will be vital.

During Trump’s first term, the U.S.-Pakistan relations were rocky and filled with mutual mistrust and security concerns.

The U.S.-India relations are solid, and bipartisan support is mutually enjoyed. Nevertheless, Indians expect Trump to drive new momentum and diversification in the bilateral relationship, encompassing trade, technology, investment, and military collaboration. India has been chosen as a strategic partner in South Asia to counter China’s rise. India’s ambition to become the world’s third-largest economy and the U.S.’s encouragement of India’s role in the QUAD to counterbalance China’s growing influence is mutually beneficial. This may impact India’s broader foreign policy agenda, possibly including efforts to secure a permanent seat on the U.N. Security Council, more U.S. investment in its manufacturing sector, and a more assertive stance in dealing with its neighbors.

However, the relationship may face some irritants, such as increased tariffs on India, stricter immigration policies, and potential changes to the H-1B visa program for Indian professionals. Trump’s second term could bring a more transactional approach to the GE-HAL agreement, enabling jet engine production in India and other critical defense collaborations established under Joe Biden’s administration. India is unlikely to face difficulties enlisting American support to condemn Pakistan for supporting terrorism in India and collaborating with Sikh separatists.

The U.S. policy toward Iran is unlikely to change, with Trump adopting a more strident approach to the Iran Nuclear Deal and the current sanctions regime. He may not formally or informally allow Iranian oil and gas sales. While he may not encourage direct conflict between Iran and Israel, he is unlikely to hesitate to support Israel through aerial targeting inside Iran.

President Trump is unlikely to release frozen Afghan assets directly to the Taliban. Although he is not overly concerned about social norms and human rights violations, he would not trust the Taliban, having witnessed their behavior through the Doha Accord and its implementation. Experts believe he makes deals and moves on. As a shrewd businessman, he does not forget those who violate agreements and often uses grudges to extract higher costs from counterparts. Speculation that he may facilitate early recognition of the Taliban government is far-fetched. Diplomatic recognition might emerge from regional states or O.I.C. members rather than the U.S. However, the U.S. will continue providing humanitarian aid and may indirectly help the Taliban drive Al-Qaeda out of Afghanistan as part of encouraging stability in the country.

During Trump’s first term, the U.S.-Pakistan relations were rocky and filled with mutual mistrust and security concerns. Trump was not pleased and saw Pakistan as acting against American interests in Afghanistan. He temporarily withheld military aid to pressure Pakistan into taking action against terrorist networks. However, Pakistan later facilitated peace negotiations with the Taliban, a contribution that Trump appreciated. Since the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan in 2021, Pakistan’s relevance to American interests has diminished, and the US has adopted a lower-intensity engagement approach with Islamabad. There are unlikely to be any major surprises. Pakistan will continue receiving development assistance through NGOs, while military-to-military relations will remain friendly but limited to training exchanges. Pakistan will not receive high-tech equipment or aircraft spare parts directly from the U.S.

While the U.S. seeks to limit China’s influence in Pakistan, it understands that Pakistan will not sacrifice its strategic ties with China. The U.S. has no objections to the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) but would prefer that the developed Gwadar port not host a Chinese naval presence. The U.S. sees no special relationship with Pakistan but desires a stable and economically vibrant Pakistan to counter terrorism and extremism. Any significant changes in U.S. policy toward Pakistan will depend on the pros and cons of its strategic relationship with India. The U.S. has not entirely dismissed Pakistan as an influential Islamic state but doubts its relevance in the Middle East due to economic weakness. The U.S. remains Pakistan’s top export market, accounting for nearly a fifth of Pakistan’s exports in 2023. Even if the proposed 10 percent tariff affects exports, the impact would be marginal as Pakistan mainly exports mid-priced textiles.

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