Change and Stability

When US President Joe Biden stated in a recent speech that Pakistan was “maybe one of the most dangerous nations in the world” as it had “nuclear weapons without any cohesion”, the remark raised a furore in Pakistan. The US ambassador in Islamabad, David Bloom, was summoned to the foreign office and asked to explain the US President’s remarks.

It was obvious that the American President seemed to expect too much from Pakistan - a country that has looked after its nuclear programme much more carefully and responsibly than many other nuclear states. It has done so despite the fact that it is the most economically and industrially disadvantaged nation among all the world’s nuclear powers - declared or undeclared. There is the case of India for example - a country almost five times bigger than Pakistan. Such is India’s level of responsibility that it cannot even monitor its nuclear-powered missiles. An Indian missile recently strayed ‘mistakenly’ into Pakistani territory but the US President still says Pakistan is one of the most dangerous countries as it has nuclear weapons without cohesion. India is never questioned about its litany of irresponsible behaviours where nuclear capability is concerned.

President Biden is reported to have later withdrawn his remarks about Pakistan but the damage had already been done and the world had been set thinking that did Pakistan, an unstable nation, really need a nuclear programme whereas it direly lacked in so many other key areas?

Besides, the weight of foreign loans on the country has been constantly rising and it has always been dependent on rich nations and multilateral agencies to bear its financial burden.

Perhaps one element that comes to Pakistan’s rescue is the recently published book, “No Exit from Pakistan”, written by Daniel S Markey.

This book tells the story of the tragic and often tormented relationship between the United States and Pakistan. Pakistan’s internal troubles have already threatened U.S. security and international peace. Its rapidly growing population, nuclear arsenal, and relationships with China and India will continue to force it upon America’s geostrategic map in new and important ways over the coming decades.

The book explores the main trends in Pakistani society that will help determine its future; traces the wellspring of Pakistani anti-American sentiment through the history of U.S.-Pakistan relations from 1947 to 2001; assesses how Washington made and implemented policies regarding Pakistan since the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001; and analyzes how regional dynamics, especially the rise of China, will likely shape U.S.-Pakistan relations.

It is true that in the new geo-strategic realities, the United States and Pakistan need to rebuild a modest but pragmatic relationship, based on mutual respect for each other’s interests, and not on exaggerated expectations.

The Americans cannot afford to walk away from a country that involves three key regions — South Asia, Central Asia, and the Middle East — and has borders with China and Iran and is close to Russia.

This line of thinking is also supported by a report prepared by American scholars associated with the Pakistan Study Group (PSG), Washington. They include a former US secretary of state for South Asia, two former US ambassadors to Pakistan, a former Pakistan ambassador to the US and other senior diplomats who have worked in Pakistan, and American scholars specializing in South Asia.

A modest, pragmatic relationship between the US and Pakistan would involve understanding that Pakistan and the US will “continue to see Afghanistan through a different lens but can cooperate in maintaining peace in that country and alleviating its people’s suffering”.

It needs reminding American policymakers that attitudes toward India at both the elite and popular levels in Pakistan will, at best, change slowly.

It has been emphasized that public opinion in both the US and Pakistan acts as a constraint on bilateral relations. The United States, however, can still induce Pakistan to change its overall strategic calculus, which is based on Pakistan’s understanding of its security environment.

The United States and Pakistan have divergent views on China and the US needs to develop a more nuanced policy in this respect.

It has been argued that US engagement with Pakistan would benefit if it were based on a realistic appraisal of Pakistan’s policies, aspirations, and worldview. Inducements or threats will not result in securing change in Pakistan’s strategic direction.

Washington needs to realise that it is not in American national security interests to isolate Pakistan or irreparably breach the relationship. The normalization of Pakistan’s cooperation with the US remains in the US national interest.

The general view is that there are three options for future U.S. strategy with regard to Pakistan. These are defensive insulation, military-first cooperation, and comprehensive cooperation.

The realization must come that being a nuclear power has not done much for Pakistan, but so it has not for any other country either, except the US, which used atomic power to bring Japan to its knees back in 1945.

However, in Pakistan’s case, the cost for the people has been very high and the nation’s funds have been diverted into military spending instead of catering to the common man’s need for food, clothing and other necessities. It is also an irony that despite Pakistan being a nuclear-armed state, it still continues to be one of the poorest nations in the world.

There is the China factor as well. The US presence in Pakistan must continue if China is to be contained.

Pakistan’s relationship with the United States may be troubled and tormented but the fact is that there is no exit for the US from Pakistan.