New Delhi
Back to the Future
Russian President Vladimir Putin’s visit to India is a reminder that the old Cold War alignments may have faded, but the strategic patterns they created continue to define the architecture of South Asian security

Russian President Vladimir Putin’s visit to New Delhi in the first week of the month marked yet another pivotal moment in the long and complex defence relationship between India and Russia. At the heart of the discussions lies India’s interest in acquiring next-generation platforms—most notably the Russian Su-57 fifth-generation fighter aircraft and the S-500 missile defence shield, one of the world’s most advanced air-defence systems. This comes at a time when Washington has been pressing New Delhi to scale down its defence procurement from Moscow, particularly after the evolving strategic closeness between India and the United States under the framework of the Indo-Pacific strategy.
While India and Russia describe their relationship as a “Special and Privileged Strategic Partnership”, New Delhi’s defence acquisitions over the past decade reveal a progressive diversification away from Moscow towards the United States, France, and Israel. However, the potential purchase of cutting-edge Russian hardware underlines a reality that has deep historical roots: India’s dependence on Russia for strategic military capability, especially high-end systems that Western nations are often unwilling or slow to transfer.
To understand the significance of this possible agreement—especially for Pakistan and the wider South Asian region—it is important to examine the historical context, the shifting geopolitical dynamics, and the reactions it may invite from Washington.
India’s defence relationship with the Soviet Union emerged strongly after the early 1960s. Following the Sino-Indian War of 1962 and the Western powers’ reluctance to meet India’s defence needs without political conditions, the Soviet Union became the primary supplier of arms to New Delhi. By the mid-1970s, more than 60–70% of India’s military inventory originated from Moscow.
The watershed came with the 1971 Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation, signed shortly before the Indo-Pakistan War. With Washington and Beijing tilting openly toward Pakistan, India’s reliance on the Soviet Union was solidified. Moscow’s military supplies, diplomatic backing, and naval presence in the Indian Ocean during the conflict became foundational pillars of the defence partnership.
Throughout the late Cold War, iconic systems such as the MiG-21, MiG-23, MiG-27, Su-30, and the T-72 and T-90 tanks entered Indian service. The Soviets also provided India with technologies that the West was unwilling to transfer, including submarine designs and missile technologies.
After the dissolution of the USSR, Russia inherited the defence relationship with India. In 2000, Putin’s visit to India resulted in the institutionalisation of an annual summit, affirming a long-term partnership. Co-development projects such as the BrahMos supersonic cruise missile and licensed production of the Su-30MKI reinforced the cooperation.
However, the 21st century also brought significant shifts. India began expanding defence ties with Israel, France, and eventually the United States. Washington’s willingness to sign foundational defence agreements—LEMOA, COMCASA, and BECA—paved the way for India to access advanced American platforms such as the P-8I maritime patrol aircraft, C-17 strategic lift aircraft, and Apache helicopters. By the 2010s, India was no longer overwhelmingly dependent on Russia.
Yet, certain Russian systems remained indispensable. The most notable example was the S-400 Triumf missile defence system, which India purchased despite strong US objections and the threat of CAATSA sanctions. This decision highlighted a recurring truth: whenever India faces a choice between strategic autonomy and American pressure, it tends to prefer autonomy.
Washington’s discomfort with India’s continued purchase of Russian arms is not new. Under US law, the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) mandates sanctions on countries engaging in significant defence transactions with Russia. The US has refrained from sanctioning India over the S-400 deal, largely due to geopolitical considerations, but the possibility always lingers.
The core of the crisis is rooted in a political and administrative structure that consistently prioritizes the benefits of a small, powerful elite over the prosperity of the general populace
President Donald Trump’s renewed push to reduce Russia-India military dealings—coupled with Washington’s growing strategic reliance on India against China—sets the backdrop for Putin’s upcoming visit. The United States wants India firmly aligned within the Western security architecture, especially as the Indo-Pacific strategy intensifies. High-value deals with Russia are seen as undermining this alignment. Against this pressure, India continues to invoke its doctrine of strategic autonomy, a term that has replaced the older concept of non-alignment but retains its essence: India will not be constrained by any single power bloc; however, the Su-57 and S-500 remain crucially important to India.
The Su-57, Russia’s stealth-capable fifth-generation fighter jet, represents Moscow’s attempt to match the American F-22 and F-35 platforms. While still evolving and not yet widely operational within the Russian Air Force, India’s interest highlights a capability gap: the absence of a genuine fifth-generation fighter in its inventory after the collapse of the FGFA (Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft) co-development project with Russia, which India withdrew from in 2018.
With China deploying its J-20 fighters and Pakistan expected to induct the JF-17 Block-III and future Chinese stealth platforms, India perceives the need to maintain parity in the air domain. The S-500 “Prometey” represents the next step beyond the S-400, capable of intercepting: hypersonic missiles, ballistic missiles at higher altitudes, stealth aircraft, satellites in low-earth orbit.
For India, the S-500 would provide an upper layer of air and missile defence, further strengthening its deterrence posture vis-à-vis both Pakistan and China.
Historically, India has resisted being pressured by great powers. In the 1970s, it ignored Western objections to its nuclear programme. In the 1990s, it continued buying Russian hardware even when Russia’s defence industry was in decline. And in the 2020s, it pushed ahead with the S-400 despite US disapproval.
Putin’s recent visit indicates that India is unlikely to abandon this long-standing strategic flexibility. The entire scenario will have regional Implications for the region in general and Pakistan in particular.
If India procures the Su-57, it will accelerate its move towards a fifth-generation air force. Even if the aircraft is inducted in limited numbers, the psychological and operational impact will be significant. For Pakistan, this means greater strain on the already widening gap in air capabilities as well as the need for accelerated reliance on Chinese stealth programmes. It will entail further focus on electronic warfare, integrated air defence, and missile deterrence.
Pakistan’s major counterbalance will continue to be the strategic partnership with China, including potential access to FC-31/J-31-derived platforms.
The S-500 would push this even further, potentially enabling India to create a multi-layered missile shield neutralizing certain categories of Pakistan’s short-range and medium-range systems.
This would compel Pakistan to invest more in hypersonic glide vehicles (HGVs), enhance the manoeuvrability and penetration aids of existing missiles. Strengthen the development of low-flying cruise missiles such as Babur variants. Pakistan’s deterrence posture will therefore have to adapt rapidly to overcome newer air-defence layers.
India’s newly gained strategic confidence, possessing next-generation platforms, will embolden its regional projection, previously limited by its traditional dependence on Russian hardware and the reluctance of Western states to transfer cutting-edge systems. With more advanced technology—whether from Washington or Moscow—India may be more assertive in its regional diplomacy and military posture.
This could intensify military signalling along the Line of Control, reinforce India’s continental confidence against China, indirectly pressuring Pakistan, and encourage more doctrinal innovation, such as refinement of the Cold Start-style concept.
Pakistan will need to recalibrate its diplomatic posture by strengthening strategic coordination with China, maintaining robust defence ties with Turkey and other partners, highlighting destabilising effects of Indian military build-ups in international forums, and at the same time, advancing confidence-building measures to reduce miscalculations in South Asia.
The overall effect will be an increased burden on Pakistan’s strategic planning and diplomatic bandwidth.
For Pakistan, the evolving India-Russia defence cooperation, particularly in advanced platforms like the Su-57 and S-500, represents a significant challenge. It will widen the conventional imbalance, complicate deterrence stability, and force Pakistan to accelerate its own modernisation trajectory, particularly through deeper collaboration with China.
South Asia is entering an era where geopolitical rivalries intersect with great-power competition, and India’s defence choices will shape the regional balance for years to come. Putin’s visit is a reminder that the old Cold War alignments may have faded, but the strategic patterns they created continue to define the architecture of South Asian security.
Based in Lahore, the writer is a historian and a critical analyst. He can be reached at arslan9h@gmail.com


Very in depth write ups. 👍