Winds of Change

Another example of retrogression in South Asia is the ineffectiveness of the South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation (SAARC) and the bitter fact that it is in limbo since 2016 when, following the Uri attack, India along with Afghanistan, Bangladesh and Bhutan decided to boycott the SAARC summit to be held in Islamabad on various pretexts. Any SAARC summit has not taken place because of the Indian led boycott. When SAARC is in limbo for the last four years and there is no immediate likelihood of its revival, what can the incoming Biden administration do to revitalize it?

If the Biden-Kamila administration takes a position on J&K and CAA during the first 100 days in the White House, it will reflect a qualitative change in America’s position on South Asia.

One can comprehend four major possibilities about how the Biden-Kamila administration may deal with South Asia during its tenure. First, since the focus of the Democratic party administration will be on positive diplomacy instead of coercive; multilateralism, instead of unilateralism, it may take the initiative to advise New Delhi and Islamabad to resume Track-I diplomacy i.e. resumption of a comprehensive dialogue. Giving a new impetus to Track-II diplomacy by encouraging a non-governmental dialogue involving stakeholders from the two sides with the cooperation of New Delhi and Islamabad may also be the preference of the Biden-Kamila administration. The U.S has always favoured Track-I and Track-II diplomacy as a useful way to mend fences between adversaries and that also holds true for India and Pakistan.

The problem in the resumption of Track-I diplomacy between India and Pakistan is that unless New Delhi reverses its acts of August 5, 2019 and restores article 370 of the Indian constitution, Islamabad will not agree to resume a comprehensive dialogue and restore its full diplomatic relations with its eastern neighbour. Will the Biden-Kamala administration possess clout which can pursuade the BJP regime to restore status quo in its occupied J&K which existed before August 5? It seems, unless substantial pressure is exerted on India from the permanent members of the UN Security Council, European Union, OIC and other influential world organizations, the Modi regime will not bend on J&K. Second, how the Biden-Kamila administration will deal with the surge of Hindu nationalism and violence against religious minorities particularly Muslims will be a big challenge. Senator Kamila Harris, an Indian-Jamaican origin American, had sharply criticized the revocation of article 370 of the Indian constitution by the Modi regime. She said: “We have to remind Kashmiris that they are not alone in the world. We are keeping track of the situation. There is a need to intervene if the situation demands.” Likewise, on the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA) passed by the Indian government in 2019 also led to wide criticism from Kamila Harris and Joseph Biden, particularly the manner in which the Act tries to suppress the rights of religious minorities.

If the Biden-Kamila administration takes a position on J&K and CAA during the first 100 days in the White House, it will reflect a qualitative change in America’s position on South Asia. During the Trump administration, the Modi regime was quite comfortable in taking harsh measures like the J&K Reorganization Act of August 5, 2019, CAA and the National Registration Act which were meant to target particularly Muslims of J&K and India. And it is not only Muslims in India who are victims of Hindu fanatics, but other religious minorities like Sikhs, Christians and Dalits who are also facing religious persecution at the hands of Hindu extremist groups like Shiv Sena and RSS. On this account, it will be a big challenge for the new American administration to prevent colossal human rights violations in India during the Modi regime. Third, Afghanistan shall be a major test case for the Biden-Kamala administration, particularly when President Donald Trump ordered the withdrawal of all American forces from Afghanistan by Christmas this year. But, President Biden will not follow the policy of total American military withdrawal from Afghanistan because of lethal consequences in case the U.S militarily withdraws from that country and the vacuum results into the outbreak of a new civil war.

Between the policy of ‘surge’ of the American military in Afghanistan and a policy of total military withdrawal, the Biden-Kamala administration will pursue minimum but effective military presence deterrence in that country so as to keep the Al-Qaeda and other Islamic extremist/violent groups in Afghanistan at bay and at the same time promote dialogue between and among warring Afghan factions. Even during the Republican administration President Donald Trump was facing resistance from generals who were against total military withdrawal from Afghanistan because of the space which Taliban, IS and Al-Qaeda would have occupied and the danger of the country plunging into another vicious cycle of civil war. On these grounds, Afghanistan would remain a major test case for the Biden-Kamala administration in the years to come.

Finally, it is possible that during the Biden-Kamala administration, other South Asian countries like Bangladesh, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Bhutan and Maldives may also get attention as American policy will not be Indo-Pakistan-centric but also may take into consideration interests of other countries. The focus of the incoming American government on environment will be a source of satisfaction for those South Asian countries where global warming, climate change and melting of glaciers seems to be a big challenge.

Unlike the Trump administration, President Biden will not adhere to the policy of containing China by engaging India but will pursue a policy of positive diplomacy and constructive competition. On these grounds, one needs to pursue a positive but cautious approach about how the Biden-Kamala administration will deal with South Asia in the days, weeks and months to come.