Need No Caesars

Last month, this scribe wrote a piece for SouthAsia Magazine about the pitfalls of hybrid governance. Some senior cabinet members praised the write-up for efficacy, competence, and coordinated and speedy execution of the country’s foreign and security policies at the domestic and external levels. Since we have been faced with a hybrid governance for the past four decades as borne out by the ground realities marking our political landscape since 1977, this writer proposed that we may consider formalizing this unique way of governance in a grand constitutional conclave of the political and military leaderships by defining the role of the security establishment and restricting it to military’s hierarchical organization, the internal and external defence of the country, inputs for the defence budget and foreign and security policies regarding countries of strategic importance to us.

This scribe dared to make such a proposal. However, I knew that it would be anathema to constitutionalists, legal experts, and democrats, and would contradict the universal principle of civilian supremacy; It could only prevail in countries where the security establishment is perceived intellectually superior, administratively efficient and politically powerful than the civilian institutions or where the security established is too entrenched in state affairs to heed to persuasions and supplications for return to its traditional role of defending geographical frontiers of the country. Actually, I had in my mind the Turkish Constitution of 1982, which prescribed a role of the security establishment in governing the country along with the civilian leaders.

This Turkish Constitution, enshrining the hybrid governance, was framed 12 years after the military coup of 1960 that resulted in the trial of civilian leaders and execution of the former elected Prime Minister, Adnan Menderes. It held its ground for over three decades until the abortive military attempt of July 2016 to overthrow President Tayyip Erdogan. This failed coup disturbed the equilibrium between the military and civilian leaderships. During these three decades or so, Turkey enjoyed political stability and democratic continuity, with representative rule taking firm roots in the country despite smoldering Kurdish militancy.

However, I had no idea how our people within the country and abroad look at the current hybrid governance, although we have been witness to the political, legal and administrative perils the political activists and sympathizers of the PTI went through to maintain their affiliation with the party seeking its platform for election or taking part in elections as independents while soliciting votes in its name, and winning the largest number of both National Assembly and Provincial constituencies. These people have continually been facing legal and administrative prejudice since the 2024 Elections at the hands of the Election Commission, election tribunals, and judicial processes. Over 124 election petitions relating to National Assembly constituencies were filed in tribunals – mostly by PTI sympathizers after the February elections - and over 65% of them are yet to be decided. The election tribunals have since been saddled with retired judges, constitutional provisions amended, election laws altered, and coercive administrative measures revamped to prop up the current setup in power.

Appeared in SouthAsia Magazine in its August 2025 edition, the article titled ‘Mirage of Mandate’ (https://southasia.com.pk/2025/08/01/mirage-of-mandate/), which this scribe shared with a large group of fellow Pakistanis living in the USA, stirred an academic uproar and scathing criticism. Friends took a strong exception to my proposal. While appreciating the clarity, depth, and conviction with which I presented my perspective on such a complex issue, one friend strongly disagreed with my core recommendation of granting constitutional legitimacy to the security establishment’s role in governance. He wrote, “Practically speaking, this proposal risks institutionalizing a model that has already proven to be deeply flawed. For decades, Pakistan’s military establishment – despite its overwhelming influence in politics, judiciary, and administration – has not succeeded in resolving the country’s most pressing challenges. On the contrary, it has often aggravated the alienation of smaller provinces and nationalities, stifled democratic evolution, and contributed to economic and administrative over-centralization that goes against the spirit of federalism. Furthermore, while the security’s involvement is often rationalized in the name of efficiency or national security, allegations of corruption, land grabbing, and unaccountable business expansion involving retired and serving generals have become increasingly visible. These practices have undermined public trust not only in democratic institutions but in the very notion of fairness and the rule of law. Enshrining such a power structure within the Constitution would effectively mean giving a permanent legal cover to what many would rightly perceive as a constitutionalized martial law. Public sentiment, especially in the current context of political instability, judicial controversies, and suppression of dissent, is unlikely to support such a move. Democratic movements, however sporadic or imperfect, represent the people’s aspirations for accountability, representation, and justice. Weakening them further by formalizing an already dominant security role risks pushing Pakistan further away from inclusive participatory governance. The symbolic value of high-profile foreign invitations from the U.S. cannot override the foundational principles of democratic legitimacy.”