Cover Story 
 

Cover Story

From ‘Form 47’ to ‘Federation’

Any changes to the 18th Amendment would seriously violate the foundational principles of the Federal system as outlined in the 1973 Constitution

By Ambassador M. Alam Brohi | July 2026

There have been persistent and divergent speculations about the imminent 28th Amendment to the already defaced Constitution of 1973. The Constitution passed by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s Government in April 1973 underwent five amendments to the hue and cry of the opposition within the immediate years of its enforcement, which mainly pertained to the Judiciary. The apparent purpose was to tame the third state organ. The subsequent martial-law regime, by blackmailing and forcing the non-party National Assembly of 1985 to pass the 8th Amendment, transferred all executive powers to President General Zia-ul-Haq.

The then Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, using his overwhelming majority, reverted this amendment in his second term from February 1997 to October 1999. However, General Musharraf, with the help of the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA), headed by Moulana Fazl-ur-Rahman, reintroduced it into the Constitution, with executive powers reverting to the President. The post-Benazir government of the Pakistan People’s Party under President Asif Ali Zardari (2008-2013) abrogated this scandalous amendment and retransferred all executive powers to the Prime Minister. Exercising their summary powers under this amendment, the two civilian presidents dismissed four elected governments under pressure from the establishment.

The Constitution survived two periods of martial law and several autocratic and hybrid regimes. What were the factors sustaining the resilience of the Constitution? Was the Constitution a flawless document? Did the Constitution fully answer the demands of the federal constituents for political, financial, and administrative autonomy? Did the Constitution stop the exploitation of smaller provinces by the bigger provinces and powerful federal economic, financial, and resource-management institutions?

Viewed from the perspective of these inquisitions, the Constitution has never been an ideal document since its creation, nor has it been effective in safeguarding the quantum of political and economic autonomy of the federal constituents it provides for. Even after the introduction of the 18th Amendment, touted as a strong guarantee for provincial autonomy, the political and economic rights of small provinces could not remain secure from powerful federal regimes.

The only factor that sustained the document through all the previous political and constitutional deluges was the strong belief that if the 1973 Constitution, whatever its shape or status, was abrogated, this nation of vast political, economic, and cultural diversities would not be able to frame a new consensus constitution for the federation and would fall into an ugly situation of anarchy and chaos.

We experienced this political indecision or incapacity after the first sitting of the Constituent Assembly in Karachi, which was attended by stalwarts of the Pakistan Movement. The Assembly debated several ideological, political, economic, and financial questions, including the differences between the eastern and western wings, and among the four provinces in the western wing, and took nine years to frame a Constitution in 1956. With the Constitution’s enforcement that same year, the general elections were announced.

The country was ushering in a democratic form of governance. However, the ensuing political control over the national political, economic, and administrative institutions by the country’s elected representatives was unacceptable to our establishment, spearheaded by Iskander Mirza and General Muhammad Ayub Khan. The Constitution was abrogated within two years, in October 1958, and martial law was clamped. This was the day we sowed the seeds of the secession of the country’s eastern wing. The autocratic rule of General Ayub Khan helped this seed germinate, grow, and evolve into a mighty tree of Bengali nationalism.

Autocratic or coercive measures cannot hold federations together. Founded on the bedrock of shared political, economic, and strategic interests, Federations are sustained by geographical or ideological proximity, a common cultural identity, a common civilizational heritage, a lingua franca, the rule of law, and political and economic justice as provided for in the Constitution. We have all the sustaining factors to save the constitutionally guaranteed security of the political and economic rights of the small provinces.


We lack empathy, broader vision, and patriotism. We are guided by short-term, narrow political and economic interests. Like bad workmanship, we always curse our tools. There is no flaw in the country’s geographical structure or in its national institutions, as sanctioned by the Constitution. Our insincerity, incompetence, and endless greed for power have been driving us into futile exercises of political and constitutional experiments. The political, economic, and administrative ailments afflicting our federation are of our own making. No foreign country has created them. They took advantage of our stupidities and settled their old scores.

This happened in 1970, and it has been happening in Balochistan since 2006. Did a foreign power force us to ignore the recommendations of the Committee on Balochistan appointed by General Musharraf himself under Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain? Did a foreign power sponsor the rebellious uprisings in Balochistan in 1954 and 1973? All these uprisings were triggered by our own wrong political, economic, and administrative decisions. We should be true to ourselves to realize our wrongdoings; otherwise, we shall keep wandering in the dark alleys of delusion, indulging in long, repetitive, and repulsive self-praise.

The arbitrary takeover of the two coastal cities in Sindh and Balochistan by the Federal Government will not bode well for the health of the Federation, which is already under excessive strain

The underlying purpose of Constitutional amendments is to enhance the welfare and well-being of the people of Pakistan, who elect and send their representatives to the Assemblies to protect their rights. It is a different question how conscientiously these representatives discharge their obligations towards their constituencies. Their performance has never been above board. After witnessing the miracles of Form 47 in the February 2024 General Elections, the people have become incredulous about the legitimacy of their respective representatives. The cynics publicly claim that the entire Balochistan government is the creation of Form 47.

We witnessed the enthusiasm of the hybrid regime and its main supporter, the Pakistan People’s Party, for the passage of the 26th and 27th amendments, bending over backward to assure the public that all this was being done to reform the judiciary to deliver quick and inexpensive justice, clearing the backlog accumulated over the years. The campaign was overseen by the Minister for Law and Parliamentary Affairs, Nazeer Tarar, and Bilawal Bhutto Zardari. The young man pursued the JUI Chief continuously for his seven votes in the National Assembly. We also witnessed some sleuths hounding the Opposition Senators, particularly those from the Balochistan National Party (Mengal), for their votes.

The amendments, by hook or by crook, were passed. What advantages in terms of justice, rule of law, and equality before the law, or the enforcement of constitutional rights, accrued to the common man? No tangible or intangible dividends. Good governance is participatory, transparent, responsive, inclusive, and accountable. Conversely, the entire judiciary was turned upside down for the sake of stopping the elevation of two senior Supreme Court judges considered to be opposition-sympathetic or resistant to the intervention of a powerful institution into judicial processes, particularly after the excessive use of Form 47, the appointment of election tribunals, and the allocation of reserve seats among parties.

The amendments made the ruling party-curated JCP (Judicial Commission of Pakistan) more powerful in the appointment, elevation, and intra-province transfer of High Court Judges. They also created a Federal Constitutional Court from the womb of the Supreme Court, reducing the latter to the pale shadow of its previous glory. The entire exercise appeared to be intended to bring the Judiciary under the control of the Executive; to stop the elevation of Justice Mansoor Ali Shah as the Chief Justice of Pakistan and Justice Muhsin Akhtar Kiani as the Chief Judge of the Islamabad High Court; and to effect the intra-province transfer of some untamed Judges—no dividends for the people of Pakistan.

It is widely speculated that the 28th Amendment will hand over Karachi, the mainstay of the economy of Sindh, and Gwadar, the newly developed Seaport of Balochistan, to the control of the Federal authority. Karachi remained the capital of the country from 1947 to 1962 and under the West Pakistan regime from 1955 to 1969 as part of Sindh in the ill-reputed One-Unit. Was this experiment advantageous for the people of Pakistan or Sindh? If yes, then why was there a sustained movement for the return of Karachi from Federal control?

Karachi has two well-developed seaports, which are properties of Sindh, though administratively under the Federal Ministry of Marine Affairs. The case of the Deep Seaport of Gwadar is no different. The arbitrary takeover of the two coastal cities in Sindh and Balochistan by the Federal Government will not bode well for the health of the Federation, which is already under excessive strain.

Similarly, tampering with the 18th amendment, transferring the Ministries of Health, Education, Local Bodies, and Mines and Minerals, or reducing the share of the federal constituents in the National Financial Award will be a gross violation of the Federal scheme underlying the Constitution of 1973. These Ministries were part of the federal portfolios for decades, and their performance as adequate public service providers was always questionable.

Given the planned fragmentation of the current provinces, we will not be able to sustain the new plethora of provinces politically, economically, and administratively. There will be a long, complex process of distributing existing resources, allocating bureaucracy, apportioning irrigation water, and making financial allocations. There would be an excessive burden on the country’s exchequer for salaries for new administrative personnel, ministers, and governors, as well as for territorial disputes, constituency demarcation, and related matters.

We are running the country on foreign aid and loans, and this new experiment of 8-12 provinces will boost the country’s dependence on our foreign benefactors, reducing our people to pauperism.

Read More