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Trust Before Talks

Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs) have long served as the foundation for dialogue between Pakistan and India. However, without trust and a shared commitment to honour these measures, meaningful talks between the two rivals are unlikely to progress beyond rhetoric.

By Prof. Dr. Ahmed Saeed Minhas | August 2026

Recently, there has been growing speculation that India and Pakistan are engaged in back-channel talks aimed at resuming the stalled peace process. While such reports offer hope to those seeking lasting peace, the prospect remains distant, given the long history of rivalry and mistrust between the two countries, which has repeatedly hindered efforts to resume meaningful dialogue.

India and Pakistan have longstanding territorial disputes that must be resolved first. India, as the world’s largest democracy, with its vast territory and large population, has remained dismissive and arrogant towards Pakistan. This has been particularly evident when hardline governments have been in power. Critics argue that successive Indian governments have used anti-Muslim rhetoric to win elections.

After the partition of the subcontinent, Islam and Sikhism became the two principal minority religions, both perceived by some as challenges to a Hindu-majority society. Of the two, Muslims have always been at a disadvantage. As a result, some argue that Muslims are viewed through the lens of “Bhaiism” in India—that is, as vagabonds and as the cause of everything perceived to be wrong in society. This claim is reflected in the portrayal of Muslims in India’s domestic media as well as in films produced by the Indian film industry. This approach, rooted in the 1947 Partition, has also created a negative impression of Islam. It is because of this toxic impression spread in Indian society that the anti-Muslim card is played in the Indian elections as a threat to Indian and Hindu identity.

The same template is used for maligning Pakistan as a Muslim-majority country. As validated by some independent media reports, the Indian nationalist political leaders openly dream of Akhand Bharat—a concept drawing inspiration from the Zionist concept of Greater Israel. During his visit to Israel from 25–26 February 2026, Indian Prime Minister Modi declared Israel to be his Fatherland and called India his Motherland. It shows the kind of similarities India and Israel have in the political domain at the strategic level. In this context, the prospects for India-Pakistan talks appear overly optimistic. The chances of New Delhi getting into dialogue with Pakistan are bleak because Islamabad considers India a no-go destination for Pakistani citizens.

Role of Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs) in India-Pakistan Dialogue
For two or more states intending to enter into a dialogue process, substantial confidence-building measures (CBMs) are essential. Until confidence and trust are built, the chances of substantive talks remain improbable. Notwithstanding, the hopes and expectations for this engagement remain on the table on both sides and represent an essential first step towards sustained peace in South Asia. However, on the Indian side, the anti-Pakistan card is used for winning elections. Since 2016, when the BJP came into power in India, Pakistan has been blamed multiple times for sponsoring terrorism in Indian-held Kashmir to win general and state elections. So much so that there have been three brutal incidents over the past decade in which the Indian government did not hesitate to inflict casualties upon its own people by staging false-flag operations to gain public sympathy ahead of elections.

Three incidents are cited to support the argument that India has linked security crises with electoral politics. The first is the Uri attack of 18 September 2016, for which Pakistan was blamed. The attack occurred shortly before the state elections in Uttar Pradesh, Punjab, Uttarakhand, Goa, and Manipur, held in January 2017. The BJP used it as part of its election campaign. The second is the Pulwama attack on 14 February 2019, which occurred during the peak of the pre-election campaign and preceded the March 2019 Lok Sabha elections. The third is the Pahalgam attack on 22 April 2025, which took place ahead of the Bihar State Assembly elections scheduled for 6 October 2025. It is quite evident that the incident occurred at a time when the BJP was facing declining popularity in Bihar.


Hence, the author argues that talks, though desired by the general public at least, cannot see the light of day until the environment of mistrust is addressed. Moreover, further adding fuel to the fire, the BJP government has started testing Pakistan’s economic resilience by openly making efforts to divert the waters of the Indus River. Abrogation or putting the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) in abeyance is surely a non-starter for any process of constructive talks. Pakistan’s DG ISPR has already declared in 2025 amid Operation Marqa-e-Haq that it will be an act of war. So, the prospects for dialogue remain uncertain.

Historical Background for India-Pakistan Structured Talks and CBMs
CBMs are regarded as “diverse arrangements that can help reduce tensions and promote good-neighbourly relations between the two states”. Traditionally, these are designed to make states’ behaviour more predictable by facilitating communication among states and establishing rules or patterns of behaviour for states’ military forces. From Tashkent (1965) to Shimla (1971), and then from Indian PM Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s 1999 visit (Lahore MoU) to the Islamabad Accord (2004), the road to peace between India and Pakistan has been bumpy. None of these agreements could sustain a peaceful environment, but only provided an interval between the two conflicts. The basic issue had been that all these attempts were preceded by either a conflict (wars of 1965 and 1971) or a crisis (1998 nuclear tests and 2002 military standoff).

During the peace intervals, both states have brought forward various measures aimed at building confidence. Various conventional CBMs, such as increasing trade, establishing communication links, fostering people-to-people contacts, and easing travel links through bus and train services, have proven helpful in bringing people closer. However, they could not eliminate the threat of war and ultimately fell victim to renewed hostilities.

The most successful India-Pakistan structured talks in recent history were under the framework of the 1999 Pakistan-India Lahore MoU. The Lahore Declaration was a bilateral agreement between India and Pakistan signed on 21 February 1999. The Lahore Declaration was a breakthrough in overcoming the historically strained bilateral relations between the two nations in the aftermath of the nuclear tests carried out by both nations in May 1998. It was the first major political agreement between the two nations since the 1972 Shimla Agreement. Talks began between the two states, and both agreed on the eight elements of the composite dialogue. Pakistan is willing to take new initiatives and engage positively in the bilateral CBM process with India, but India appears somewhat reluctant.

Causes of Failure of the Composite Dialogue
As part of CBMs, including the nuclear-related CBMs, there have been seven rounds of expert-level talks, the last held in December 2012 in New Delhi. As shown below, multiple issues on both sides prevent either side from being more proactive in pursuing dialogue.

• Both states want to bring stability to the region, but on their own terms. Their approaches have differed on many issues, and they still have not found common ground.
• India believes that the Kashmir issue poses a direct threat to Indian national identity, as India is riven with separatist movements and fears that any concession to Pakistan over Kashmir will have a domino effect on other parts as well.
• India uses the issue of terrorism as a tool to pressurise Pakistan at bilateral, regional, and international forums, which, of course, irritates Pakistan.
• Pakistan has countered India’s conventional military superiority through its nuclear capability, which has, in turn, concerned Indian policymakers.
• Having fought three major wars and several border skirmishes, Pakistan’s strategic thinking has sufficient ground to view every Indian move with suspicion.
• Proven Indian involvement in creating internal instability, particularly unrest in Balochistan through Afghanistan.
• Negative role of the media, which obstructs a flexible approach among people in both countries.
• The role of right-wing political parties in India and election results.
• The possession of nuclear weapons by India and Pakistan has, on the one hand, acted as a stabiliser by making war prohibitively costly and therefore an undesirable option. On the other hand, it has reduced both countries’ bargaining leverage in negotiations.

The Way Out
There is always a solution to every problem, including India-Pakistan relations. However, there is no instant remedy for decades-old disputes. A gradual confidence-building approach (acceptable to both sides) should be adopted. Both sides should adopt the norm of ceasing all adverse propaganda against each other. Rightist forces on both sides should be brought on board and included in the negotiation process. Both states must realise that the appalling relationship has incapacitated their ability to address their socio-economic problems. Therefore, both states must resolve their conflicting issues rationally.

Optimistically, there is a strong possibility that Pakistan and India can initiate a structured dialogue process. However, both sides need to be mindful of people’s well-being. Political mileage may serve vested interests; however, it cannot bring lasting peace and prosperity to the billions of people living on the subcontinent. In a word, breaking away from entrenched political hostility is essential for any substantive peace effort.

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