Cover Story 
 

Cover Story

The Crisis Within

Pakistan is unlikely to overcome its internal challenges unless the state combines effective security measures with political reconciliation, representative governance, and economic justice

By Zahid Hussain | August 2026

Pakistan is confronting one of the most serious internal security crises in its recent history. Militant insurgencies have engulfed the strategically important provinces of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan, while widespread unrest in Azad Kashmir has created an arc of instability across the country. In large parts of these regions, the state appears to be losing its writ.

Pakistani security forces have been fighting insurgent groups for more than two decades, with limited success. The latest wave of militant attacks in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan is a grim reminder that the threat has returned with greater ferocity. Although the conflicts in the two provinces have different origins and dynamics, together they have made Pakistan’s security challenge far more complex. The violence has become a national nightmare at a time of deepening political instability.

The separatist militancy that has gripped Balochistan for the past two decades now appears to have developed into a full-scale insurgency. Violence has risen sharply over the past five years, with 2025 becoming the deadliest year on record. According to the Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies, the province experienced at least 254 attacks in 2025, an increase of 26 per cent over the previous year. More than 400 people were killed. Highly trained militants have engaged security forces in gun battles lasting several hours, demonstrating their capacity to mount sustained challenges to the state.

The outlawed Balochistan Liberation Army has claimed responsibility for many of these attacks. The scale and coordination of its recent operations suggest that the organisation has substantial resources and support. The worst-affected areas include the coastal belt and districts bordering Iran. This is also the region where China is helping to develop Gwadar, a major port on the Arabian Sea and a flagship project of the multibillion-dollar China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).

The recent increase in attacks on Chinese nationals working on CPEC projects is particularly alarming. Several Chinese workers have been killed in Balochistan and elsewhere in Pakistan. After claiming responsibility for some of these attacks, the BLA issued an ultimatum demanding that China withdraw from Balochistan or face intensified attacks on what it described as Beijing’s “key interests” in the region. These attacks could have serious geopolitical consequences. The mounting casualties among Chinese nationals working in Pakistan show the gravity of the threat.

The continuing violence also contradicts the government’s claim that the situation is under control. More damaging is the state’s failure to win public support for its campaign against the separatists. Balochistan has long been an epicentre of political unrest, creating conditions in which militant groups can operate and recruit. Baloch women have carried out some major attacks. Their growing participation, particularly among women from educated, middle-class backgrounds, suggests that the insurgency’s appeal has widened.

Public discontent has intensified because many people in Balochistan believe the province has been denied its political and economic rights. Civilian administration is absent or ineffective across large parts of the province. The disputed 2024 national elections further aggravated the situation. Allegations of electoral manipulation reinforced the perception that the provincial government lacks legitimacy and has therefore been unable to establish its authority.

No state can tolerate armed violence or a direct challenge to its authority. The state has the right to use force against a separatist insurgency. But force alone cannot resolve the conflict. Pakistan must also confront the political grievances that continue to fuel unrest in Balochistan. The security establishment’s flawed and excessively coercive approach has contributed significantly to the present crisis.

Meanwhile, suicide bombings and insurgent raids have increased sharply in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. A reinvigorated Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan has reportedly carried out most of these attacks. Raids on heavily guarded security installations also suggest that militant organisations have developed the capacity to conduct complex operations in high-security areas.


The Taliban administration in Afghanistan has refused to take effective action against TTP sanctuaries on Afghan soil, worsening Pakistan’s security predicament. Cross-border raids have increased in the former tribal regions, while militant violence inside Pakistan has inflicted heavy casualties on the security forces. The militants have, in effect, declared war on the Pakistani state.

Regional inequality, the denial of political and economic rights, and the widening divide between rich and poor have created an explosive situation. Yet Pakistan’s ruling elite appears unwilling to recognise the severity of the crisis.

Even more alarming are reports that members of the Afghan Taliban have participated alongside the TTP in attacks inside Pakistan. Pakistani authorities claim to have found evidence of such involvement in raids on security posts in different parts of the country. Islamabad’s decision to expel unregistered Afghan refugees has further strained relations and may have increased sympathy for the TTP across the border.

There have also been reports of tactical cooperation among factions of the Pakistani Taliban operating mainly in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Baloch separatist groups. Such alliances, even among groups with differing ideologies, have made the security threat more difficult to contain.

These groups appear to be better trained and equipped with increasingly sophisticated weapons, in some cases with alleged support from external actors. Pakistan has long accused India of supporting Baloch separatist groups as part of the continuing hostility between the two countries. Pakistani officials also claim to have evidence linking separatist leaders to Indian intelligence agencies. Whatever the extent of such foreign involvement, regional rivalries have clearly added to the complexity of the conflict.

There is also a strong connection between economic deprivation and militancy. It is no coincidence that some of the poorest areas of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan have been hit hardest by the insurgencies. Many residents feel alienated from the state because they lack basic services, economic opportunities and meaningful democratic representation. Successive governments have failed to address these grievances and have relied too heavily on coercion.

Against this backdrop, militant groups in Balochistan find it easier to recruit disaffected young people. The shrinking democratic space has also made it harder for local communities to press for their political and economic rights through peaceful means. Both Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan are rich in mineral resources, and the federal government hopes to attract foreign investment in the sector. Yet little is being done to ensure that local people benefit from these resources or experience tangible improvements in their lives. The resulting resentment is making an already volatile situation more dangerous.

Regional inequality, the denial of political and economic rights, and the widening divide between rich and poor have created an explosive situation. Yet Pakistan’s ruling elite appears unwilling to recognise the severity of the crisis.

More troubling still is the deepening political instability at home. Pakistan’s leaders have been preoccupied with efforts to mediate one of the most consequential conflicts in recent history, a conflict with major global implications. But the country’s most urgent battle may be the one unfolding within its own borders. Unless the state combines effective security measures with political reconciliation, representative government and economic justice, Pakistan is unlikely to win the war within.

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