Cover Story
Pakistan’s Missile Programme
A Force for Peace and Stability in South Asia
Pakistan’s nuclear weapons programme was conceived as ‘The Great Equalizer’ against India. It was always India-specific, and it will remain India-specific. Pakistan has no other agenda.
When one examines the history of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons programme, as distinct from the civil nuclear energy programme, wherein, the Karachi Nuclear Power Plant -1 (KANUPP-1) was constructed and commissioned in the period 1966-1971, one can safely conclude that the nuclear weapons programme was a direct outcome of the 1971 debacle in East Pakistan. In early 1972, to foreclose forever the recurrence of any similar military debacle in the future, especially with a permanent state of relative asymmetry in conventional forces between Pakistan and India, the then President Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto challenged Pakistan’s nuclear scientific community, in a meeting in Multan, to give Pakistan a “nuclear bomb” as soon as possible. The Pakistani desperation to develop The Great Equalizer viz India was enshrined in Bhutto’s famous quote that Pakistanis would eat grass but would have the nuclear bomb, or words to that effect. It was Pakistan’s “Never Again” moment. Subsequently, India’s first nuclear test at Pokhran in May 1974 simply reinforced the Pakistani determination to fast-track the national nuclear effort in order to strike a strategic balance in South Asia.
Pakistani nuclear scientists and engineers rose to Bhutto’s challenge and, given absolute support over the years, irrespective of the politics or governments of the day, they delivered to the nation, in style, on the mission assigned. On 28th and 30th May 1998, Pakistan conducted six nuclear tests at Chaghi in response to India’s five nuclear tests on 11th and 13th May 1998 at Pokhran.
India and Pakistan became the 6th and 7th nuclear weapons powers respectively in the world. Both were non-signatories to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Strategic Balance in South Asia was established, forever; Pakistan’s perennial dilemma of relative conventional asymmetry viz India stood resolved forever; and doors to Indian aggression against Pakistan were closed, forever.
Proof:
No major war has taken place between India and Pakistan since 1971 because of the plain but simple illogical logic of the theory of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD). Notwithstanding low-level provocations, better sense ever since has always prevailed at the end of the day in view of the large nuclear weapons inventories of India and Pakistan, lurking over the horizon, and acting as strategic deterrence to war.
It would be prudent on their part to register that Pakistan “does not have a No First Use policy.” Pakistan’s Full Spectrum Deterrence capability has an overarching reach to every nook and corner of the Indian land mass and its outlying territories.
Conclusions:
a. Nuclear powers do not fight direct wars. The theory of MAD is as relevant to South Asia as it is to Europe, Trans-Atlantic, and Trans-Pacific.
b. Pakistan’s Nuclear and Missile Programme has enforced peace and stability in South Asia howsoever fragile it might seem at times.
From May 1998 onwards till today, the Strategic Plans Division (SPD), newly established in early 1999 at Chaklala, picked up the thread from the scientific nuclear experiments at Chaghi and embarked upon the onerous task of converting the scientific experiments into a fully operationalized nuclear weapons capability. The capability comprised a variety of strategic delivery systems on land, air, sea, and under-sea, initially according to the policy of Credible Minimum Deterrence, and subsequently from 2011 onwards, according to the policy of Full Spectrum Deterrence.
Pakistan’s nuclear weapons programme, from the outset, was conceived to provide deterrence against India’s aggression. The weapons and the delivery systems were developed keeping in mind India’s vast eastern and southern geographical dimensions as well as some of its outlying territories like the Andaman and Nicobar Islands in the Bay of Bengal where India chose to develop strategic bases. Since India chose to keep its nuclear programme dynamic, including developing long-range tri-services weapons and an ambitious space programme, Pakistan too was compelled to keep its nuclear weapons development programme dynamic to include appropriate ranges spread across powerful tri-services strategic forces, and a modest space programme. Pakistan would neither allow India to dilute the strategic deterrence effect of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons nor to let it avail and create spaces in-depth, presumably out of reach of Pakistan’s strategic weapons, so as to provide India a land-based second-strike capability. As such, Full Spectrum Deterrence policy, within the larger philosophy of Credible Minimum Deterrence, has enabled Pakistan to maintain strategic balance in South Asia and thereby, enforce peace howsoever fragile it might seem at times.
The international plot, true to history, remains oblivious and insensitive to Pakistan’s genuine security concerns viz India, and of course, generously overlooks the excessively long ranges of India’s much larger missile and space programmes.
With the foregoing background and rationale of Pakistan’s nuclear and missile programme, it will now be appropriate to examine in perspective certain developments emanating in Washington in 2024 with regard to Pakistan’s nuclear and missile programme. Some of these negative developments are of a nature that Pakistan has often grappled with in the past, and will, in sha Allah, continue to grapple successfully in the future as well. As I look at these, the negative events, in a series of five sub-events as part of a larger, linked plot, targeted Pakistan’s strategic missiles programme in the usual discriminatory manner that Pakistan has got so used to ever since Pakistan embarked on the nuclear programme in 1972. The international plot, true to history, remains oblivious and insensitive to Pakistan’s genuine security concerns viz India, and of course, generously overlooks the excessively long ranges of India’s much larger missile and space programmes. This also is a fair indicator of where the sponsorship might be coming from.
Briefly, the five sub-events of the broader anti-Pakistan push, were as follows:
a. First, on 12 September 2024, the US imposed sanctions on a Chinese research institute and several Chinese companies it said have been involved in supplying Pakistan’s ballistic missile programme, especially the long-range Shaheen-3 (range 2750 kms) and the 2000 kms Ababeel MIRV systems. MIRV stands for Multiple Independently Targeting Re-Entry Vehicle, meaning that one Ababeel missile carries multiple nuclear warheads. Pakistan strongly rejected the charge of being the recipient of the so-called supplies.
b. Second, on 18 December 2024, the US sanctioned one government and three private sector Pakistani entities for being allegedly involved in the development of weapons of mass destruction. This absurd allegation, too, was rejected by Pakistan as perplexing. Pakistan has been a declared nuclear weapons power since May 1998, as has India. Both countries are not signatories to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Pakistan has a robust and vibrant indigenous nuclear and missile programme, which is well known to the world. Why, then, suddenly, Pakistani entities needed to be sanctioned for being involved in the development of so-called weapons of mass destruction defies logic and can be placed in the category of a mala fide act?
c. Third, in an interesting contrast, in an act of blatant discrimination as well as stretching favoritism and absurdity to its extreme, the US, on January 15, 2025, almost simultaneously, actually removed three Indian nuclear entities from the sanctions list. These included Indian Rare Earths, Indira Gandhi Atomic Research Center, and Bhabha Atomic Research Center, all three involved in the development of weapons of mass destruction. Such are the ways of the world!
d. Fourth, in a similar vein, one can recall the frequent incidents that continue to occur in India regarding a string of thefts and smuggling of uranium for sale on the international black market by organized cartels, as well as by individuals. These are most benignly ignored by the US and other Western governments despite the strong potential for the stolen uranium falling into terrorist hands for the purposes of making dirty bombs. AlHamdoLillah, due to Pakistan’s strong nuclear security measures, not a single story of a similar activity has ever emerged from Pakistan. One can imagine the hell that would break loose internationally if such an incident were to occur in Pakistan. Here, Pakistan’s chief concern ought to be to highlight to the international community the possibility of a dirty bomb incident, based on India’s smuggled uranium, being sponsored by inimical forces as a false flag operation and then pinning the blame on Pakistan.
e. Fifth, and this one takes the cake, on 19 December 2024, a new debate was sparked in Washington with regard to Pakistan’s intentions about its ballistic missiles programme when Jon Finer, the outgoing US Deputy National Security Advisor, gave a talk at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Finer said:
The Indian lobby in the US, which has penetrated and acquired important placements in the US industry, bureaucracy, and the government and has thereby attained a very strong and influential voice, is now in a position to influence and shape US policies to its advantage at least in South Asia.
“Pakistan has pursued increasingly sophisticated missile technology, from long-range ballistic missile systems to equipment that would enable the testing of significantly larger rocket motors…If those trends continue, Pakistan will have the capability to strike targets well beyond South Asia, including in the United States. The number of nuclear-armed states with missiles that can reach the U.S. homeland is very small, and they tend to be adversarial,” he continued, naming Russia, North Korea, and China. “So candidly, it’s hard for us to see Pakistan’s actions as anything other than an emerging threat to the United States,” said Finer.
Now, when we link the foregoing five sub-events, that is, the sequential sanctions against the Chinese and Pakistani entities, along with the near-simultaneous removal of similar sanctions against Indian entities directly involved in the production of so-called “weapons of mass destruction,” followed a day later by the loaded but absurd allegation of Pakistan’s long-range missiles becoming a direct threat to the US, the whole package as a sinister plot, paints a clear picture of blatant discrimination and bias by the US against Pakistan’s nuclear and missile programme while fully cooperating in the development of India’s nuclear programme.
In this regard, I would say that for over five decades, since 1974, Pakistan has learnt to live with US and Western sanctions generally and against its nuclear programme specifically. There is nothing new in it; it’s a straightforward case of chronic indigestion that refuses to go away. The good news is that in practical terms, on ground, the sanctions are worthless and meaningless because Pakistan never has, and till today, does not depend on US or Western suppliers for technology or equipment. Pakistan’s nuclear and missile programme has, AlHamdoLillah, matured over five decades to a point that today it is indigenous, and that is its inherent strength.
What is new, however, and, once again, if I may use the words perplexing and absurd, is the US charge that Pakistan’s missile programme is in pursuit of long ranges that may target the US itself, and is, therefore, an emerging threat. The charge is mind-boggling. Why on earth would Pakistan, in all its sanity, want to commit national suicide by bringing the sole superpower of the world, the United States of America, into its cross-hair defies all bounds of logic and common sense? The US is 12000 kms from Pakistan. I am lost for words as to which of Pakistan’s modest range missile systems, which barely cover India, the US had in mind before going public with such a profound charge. The only conclusion that I can possibly draw is that the Indian lobby in the US, which has penetrated and acquired important placements in the US industry, bureaucracy, and the government and has thereby attained a very strong and influential voice, is now in a position to influence and shape US policies to its advantage at least in South Asia. In my opinion, it is this Indian lobby that has likely sponsored the astounding bogey of Pakistan’s nuclear and missile programme becoming a threat to the US itself. This is the dying days of the Biden Administration, basically to flag the allegation as a future agenda point for follow-up by the incoming Trump Administration, which now consists of, as is already well known, some key senior office holders who are on record as being strongly pro-India. Pakistan’s leadership and diplomacy have their work cut out and will have to face the challenges squarely.
It is important to recall that nuclear weapons were introduced in South Asia by India, and Pakistan was compelled to respond in equal measure.
If the US concern is with Pakistan’s modest space programme, it should be noted that Pakistan has every right to develop its civilian space programme as per the National Command Authority’s approved Space Vision – 2047 for a variety of peaceful uses of space technology, which has, in fact, been internationally recognized as a common heritage of mankind. Why should Pakistan be denied its due share of this common heritage of mankind while its adversary India can proceed to the Moon and Mars duly applauded by the very powers that would like to place restrictions on Pakistan? Why is the in-built “much longer-range capability” of the Indian space programme not considered a threat, which has already emerged, to the US? The usual double standards perhaps that Pakistan is expected to accept meekly?
I would like to conclude by reiterating that Pakistan’s robust nuclear and missile programme is in line with Pakistan’s stated policy of Full Spectrum Deterrence, which is focused entirely on India’s dynamic and threateningly developing nuclear capabilities; those are clearly on Pakistan’s agenda and cross-hairs. Pakistan’s nuclear programme always was and will remain India-centric. It has no other agenda.
It is important to recall that nuclear weapons were introduced in South Asia by India, and Pakistan was compelled to respond in equal measure. Pakistan will never allow a repeat of 1971; that much ought to be clear, especially to India’s current irresponsible leadership, which seems to be playing with fire by repeatedly threatening to take Azad Kashmir and Gilgit Baltistan. They obviously do not understand the dynamics of nuclear deterrence. Before entertaining such fanciful ideas, it would be prudent on their part to register that Pakistan “does not have a No First Use policy.” Pakistan’s Full Spectrum Deterrence capability has an overarching reach to every nook and corner of the Indian land mass and its outlying territories. It is prudent to keep political rhetoric within the realms of cold and harsh ground realities. To the international powers, I would submit that in the larger interest of peace and strategic stability in South Asia, it would, in fact, be realistic for them to keep India’s ever-expanding and threatening nuclear programme, which is a catalyst for Pakistan’s responses, in check
The writer, Lt Gen (R) Khalid Ahmed Kidwai, NI, HI, HI (M), founded the Strategic Plans Division (SPD) and served as DG SPD from 1999 to 2014. He conceived and oversaw the development and operationalization of Pakistan’s nuclear and missile programme as a robust strategic deterrence force according to the policy of Full Spectrum Deterrence.
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