Trump, Taliban, and Terrorism

In reality, the regime of the Taliban lacks legitimacy despite being in power for more than two years because no UN member has granted de jure recognition to Kabul. Why is the Taliban regime unable to gain proper legitimacy? What will be the response of the U.S. if, like the first Taliban regime of 1996-2001, Afghanistan becomes a hub of terrorism threatening neighboring states and Western and American interests? The abrupt and messy withdrawal of American forces from Afghanistan in August 2021 was criticized by former U.S. President Donald Trump, arguing that at least the Biden administration should have retained its control over Kabul and Begram air bases. Abruptly leaving Afghanistan was like presenting Kabul on a silver plate to Taliban forces! The nexus between Taliban and foreign jihadist groups is a foregone conclusion because of the ideological linkage between the two. However, the Taliban regime denies its role in the mushrooming of terrorist groups in Afghanistan and terms it as propaganda.

In reality, the regime of the Taliban lacks legitimacy despite being in power for more than two years because no UN member has granted de jure recognition to Kabul.

The United States is safe after 9/11 as no major terrorist attack has struck America, but it doesn’t mean that its vulnerability vis-à-vis foreign terrorist groups doesn’t exist. Therefore, as said by Asfandyar in his article, “Current terrorism activity traceable to Afghanistan - and the Taliban’s aid and support for terrorists - falls short of the worst-case scenario from a U.S. policy standpoint: There hasn’t been a major attack in the United States; al-Qaeda or ISIS-K haven’t opened large scale training camps in the country; and the Taliban’s words and select deeds, like restraining al-Qaeda from attacks, are an improvement on the Taliban posture the last time they were in power.” Therefore, according to Asfandyar, “Washington should communicate to the Taliban through a dedicated intelligence channel - as well as through shows of force when necessary - that in case of any attacks on the United States or core U.S. interests by the Taliban’s allied terrorist groups, the protections they have under the Doha agreement will go away and major consequences will follow. The channel should also be used to convey concerns and explore the possibility of exchanges on shared threats.”

It is expected that the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan will be an issue in the American presidential elections of November 2024 as Republican Party leaders will blame the Biden administration for transforming Afghanistan into a safe haven of terrorism under the Taliban regime. How President Joe Biden, who again intends to contest for presidency in the November 2024 elections, will react to the allegations of his Republican counterpart is yet to be seen. But, as rightly stated by Asfandyar, “Certainly the United States should maintain the international coalition of withholding full normalization of ties with the Taliban and other terrorism-related sanctions until there is demonstrable proof that terrorist groups are being denied safe haven in Afghanistan. To reinforce the over-the-horizon posture, the United States should beef up counterterrorism-specific intelligence analysis capabilities consisting of analysts, linguists, and screeners available to the military while expanding the Rewards for Justice Program to generate leads. The terror landscape in Afghanistan remains highly uncertain and dynamic, requiring significant vigilance.”

The U.S. and the surge of terrorist groups in Afghanistan should be analyzed from two angles. First, the ball is now in the court of Washington on how it will cope with the violation of the Doha Accord by the Taliban regime and how force can be used if the activities of terrorist groups in Afghanistan surge in the coming months. Indeed, the haphazard withdrawal of American troops from Afghanistan was the outcome of how President Ashraf Ghani, who was supposed to confront Taliban forces, fled from the country, and the Afghan military collapsed like a house of cards. But even then, there was a logical reason for the Biden administration to delay the withdrawal of American forces unless the Taliban took measures for an inclusive government in Kabul.

Violation of the Doha Accord by the Taliban is well known. Neither their commitment to inclusive government nor adherence to human rights was undertaken. They occupied Kabul and enforced the writ by force all over Afghanistan. Second, now 2024 is an election year, and to expect the United States to get itself militarily involved in Afghanistan to prevent the surge of terrorist groups is not possible. The next U.S. administration must take difficult measures to implement the Doha Accord. By that time, the Taliban will further consolidate their hold over power, continue to deny women their fundamental human rights and pursue a complacent approach vis-à-vis TTP and IS/Al Qaeda. As a result, the United States will be in a fix on how to deal with surging threats of terrorism emanating from Afghanistan.

The way out from prevailing threats from Afghanistan is to exert pressure on those powers, particularly Russia and China, to stop giving space to the Taliban regime. Cleverly, the Taliban, unlike their previous government, tend to show the world that they are engaging the people of their country by launching various developmental projects. But, deep down, the mindset of Taliban leadership is devoid of human and social development. Hence, American strategy to deal with the surge of terrorism in Afghanistan would remain elusive and devoid of tactical response.