In the second chapter of the book titled “India’s Nuclear Doctrine: Stasis or Dynamism,” one of India’s celebrated strategic affairs scholars, Ali Ahmed gives an account of the Indian nuclear doctrine of ‘No First Use (NFU)’ and highlights the operational compulsions being faced by the Indian leadership. Ali Ahmed talks about the gradual evolution of the Indian nuclear doctrine and states why the Indian Cabinet Committee of National Security in 1993 included NFU as a cornerstone of its nuclear doctrine. He also accepts that India has not presented an ambiguous doctrine that would keep the enemy guessing about its exact strategic intents. He has made it clear that India could use the option of preemptive strikes against Pakistan when the need arises. From the Pakistani perspective, Ali Ahmed admits that whether it is NFU or ‘First Use’, Pakistan believes in both and will continue to plan as per a worst-case scenario.
He criticizes Indian strategic planners, asking them to refrain from using double-edged terminologies. He points to certain caveats attached to disassociating with NFU such as chances of losing a soft-cum-responsible nuclear weapons state image. He also cautions Indian policy-makers to avoid using terms like ‘massive retaliation’ and ‘massive response’ because deterrence is already in place. He does try to justify that such terms are in response to Pakistani short-range tactical nuclear weapons when used against offensive forces. Ali Ahmed’s view has an influential value in understanding the strategic troughs and crests of the Indian nuclear learning graph.
In the chapter “Nuclear Weapons Governance in India,” Sitakanta Mishra provides insights into the Indian existing nuclear command and control arrangements. He alleges that it is difficult to assert viability of the Indian nuclear command and control arrangements besides safety and security levels because of ‘ambiguity and secrecy’ and says there is very limited information available in the public domain for assessing the comfort level behind the existing safety and security setup. He quotes Vipin Narang while questioning the probability of accidental use of nuclear weapons and criticizes the ambiguous South Asian nuclear discourse which could be detrimental to future nuclear use.
In the chapter ‘Indian Export Control Regime’, Dr. Zafar Ali, who happens to be the pioneer of Pakistan’s nuclear export control regime, talks about the evolution of the Indian Export Control Regime based on empirical arguments. He says India evolved its export control regime in line with international best practices. He has listed the various export control acts of the Indian export control regime and has also reviewed the Indian control lists besides highlighting the best practices adopted to issue an export licence for dual-use items.
In ‘Indian Nuclear Regulatory Regime’, co-authored by scholars Happymon Jacob and Tanvi Kulkarni, there is a wholesome review of the Indian nuclear regulatory regime. The two authors describe the roles played by various agencies in applying controls and regulating the procedures being followed by Indian civil nuclear facilities.
Dr. Naeem Salik has made an exhaustive effort to deliberate upon the implications of the Indian BMD (Ballistic Missile Defence) capability. He lists the missile development curve of the Indian strategic missile inventory and talks about the quest for attaining the capability of BMD, besides listing the implications the system could have on the deterrence value prevailing in South Asia. Dr. Salik says the BMD system could severely challenge the balanced deterrence equation between India and Pakistan and thus, Pakistan would be compelled to take actions, especially in terms of an arms race which China can also join.
Dr. Salik sums up the discussion by saying that the Indian side has been experimenting with nuclear learning. He states that India, while habituating with the bomb, did achieve new learning in some areas, including the non-proliferation regime. However, the country is reluctant in command and control, safety and security and regulatory regimes.
Overall, the book is a useful strategic study, especially for those researchers who are seeking insights into the thinking behind the evaluation of state policies in nuclear armed India and Pakistan. 
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