A Continuing Enigma

By Major General (r) Inam Ul Haque | December 2019

US Special Envoy for Afghanistan, Zalmay Khalilzad visited Islamabad on October 28 and 29, 2019 after visiting Kabul and Moscow. He met Prime Minister Imran Khan and Army Chief, Gen. Qamar Javed Bajwa. As per the US Embassy in Islamabad, he ‘discussed the current status of the Afghan peace process and the importance of reducing violence’. Pakistan repeated the offer of ‘all-out help’ to revive the ‘Afghan-led and Afghan-owned peace process’. Beijing on the same dates was to host an intra-Afghan dialogue including representatives of all parties attending in ‘personal capacity’. The European Union has also called upon all sides to ‘carry forward the idea of ceasefire.’ After the recent Afghan elections, a more confident Mr. Hamdullah Mohib, security advisor to the Afghan President, has mentioned a month-long ceasefire as a ‘precondition’ for talks with the Taliban.

There are proposals for a ceasefire for a ‘limited period only’. Another proposal by the US and Pakistan is to declare ceasefire by all sides (Taliban, US, Afghan security forces) ‘once the intra-Afghan dialogue starts’. China will host the intra-Afghan dialogue as and when there is an ‘understanding’ on the ceasefire. Islamabad considers ‘ceasefire and reduction in violence necessary’ for an environment conducive to any peace deal. Hence the centrality of the elusive ‘ceasefire,’ besides the less contentious prisoner swap.

There has been no word from the Taliban to commit to a ceasefire in any formulation. However, the possibility of ceasefire - from the Taliban standpoint - was contingent upon signing the peace deal by the US and complete withdrawal of foreign forces from Afghanistan in the stipulated time of 15 months. The peace would dilate upon the intractability of the ceasefire and conflict resolution, besides some policy recommendations for Islamabad.

First, the intractability of ceasefire. The Taliban Movement mainly comprises contractual, seasonal, and volunteer manpower with only a core forming the salaried cadre. The essence and lifeline of the Movement remains in maintaining the combat tempo and retaining what is called, ‘combat relevance’. Continuation of violence is the bonding in such movements. A ceasefire - without any formal and enforceable agreement - is likely to result in demobilization of the majority of the Taliban cadre. If they retreat to their villages, it would be well-nigh impossible to mobilize and bring them back to the field. The Taliban also understand this.

Second, agreeing to a ceasefire does not make any military sense when the Taliban control the operational tempo in Afghanistan. They are ascendant as per recurrent media reports; they control the countryside predominantly; they operate in highly protected cities with impunity and they also dominate the night. Third, there has never been any implicit understanding between both sides to hold fire once the parleys began in Qatar almost a year ago. Both sides had tacitly assumed a ‘fighting and talking’ strategy. The US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo proudly and openly took credit for killing more Taliban, immediately after the tweet by President Trump, which dashed the hopes for peace.

Fourth, Taliban rank and file are likely to vocally disagree to any ceasefire, where they don’t have a significant, immediate and visible advantage. This may cause internal fissures and ultimate divisions of the Taliban Movement. They fear that most of these disenfranchised Taliban would cross over to the Daish/ ISIS/IS swelling their ranks and making it difficult for the Movement to secure Afghanistan subsequently, as and when a peace settlement takes place. Despite a rigid chain of command emphasizing obedience, the Taliban Movement is not a conventional military force and their leadership is very sensitive to the pulse of their rank and file. Fifth, from a sociological perspective, the mid-level and ranking Taliban field commanders are more radicalized, as they are the product of a violence-laden environment over generations and hence not very amenable to flexible positions.

In looking for a way forward from this impasse, one is drawn to the traditional Afghan ‘Conflict Resolution Mechanism (CRM)’. Anthropologically, Afghanistan - like all tribal societies - had a very resolute CRM, moored in a strong social system – the Pukhtunwali or Pashtunwali and its variants in the Hazara highlands and other areas of non-Pashtun habitation. This comprises the institution of Jirgah, the notion of nanewatee (going to the doorstep of the aggrieved); the tradition of mashar and kashar (respect for the decisions of elders by the younger); and the institution of spin-geeray (the white-bearded elderly cadre).

However, this traditional CRM operates optimally in the absence of outside interference for or against the parties in the conflict. That sadly is not the case. The CRM today stands badly bruised because of the greater sociological changes in Afghanistan due to emigration and migration and the near perpetuity of violence and disruptions. The traditional Afghan elite and nobility stands replaced by a newer, younger and moneyed power elite, albeit with limited ability to generate and sustain consensus. This situation - given the scope and span of the conflict and the stakes of all sides involved - makes outside arbitration mandatory as the inherent CRM does not have the capacity to deal with the magnitude of the problem, without being nurtured to its earlier effect in a long-drawn process - which nobody can afford. However, outside powers have their own interests. To put it candidly, in the zero-sum Afghan game, Pakistan’s win, for example, is India’s loss. A win for the Taliban is a loss for the US/ Afghan Government and so on.

Whereas the preferred rule for all sides is a ‘hands-off’ policy, it is not environmentally possible. Peace, therefore, would remain elusive till the time the decision is made either militarily on the ground or through a negotiated settlement on the table. With the US, the Afghan Government and the Taliban trying both options simultaneously, things may end up in more violence and no peace anytime soon. Given the imperatives of the Taliban situation, the US and Afghan Government need to relent on the ceasefire, sign the peace deal, start an intra-Afghan dialogue and work to reduce the level of violence alongside the Taliban, ultimately resulting in a ceasefire. The US Deep State needs to understand that domestically within the US, support for the Afghan war is significantly low and dwindling. And if Syria is any guide, Trump - true to his character - can precipitate a withdrawal anytime, leaving a volatile mix of Taliban, IS and Afghan forces in a mad rush to grab power.

Islamabad still has significant clout with the Taliban and needs to seize opportunities on the wing of challenges. The Pakistan Foreign Office, in adopting a ‘whole of the Government’ approach, needs to work alongside Mr. Khalilzad with the Departments of State, Defence and CIA, remaining cognizant of the domestic politics within the US (impeachment) and Afghan Government. Appointment of expert(s) as special representative(s) for Afghan Reconciliation - with due authority - would help bring the requisite energy and synergy to the cause of Afghan peace.