Cover Story
Interview
‘That the United States is leaving at a fixed date has its own consequences.’
– Khurshid Mahmud Kasuri,
former Minister of Foreign Affairs
Mr. Kasuri speaks to Faizan Usmani in this exclusive interview with SouthAsia.
A senior politician based in Lahore in Punjab, Khurshid Mahmud Kasuri served as the Minister of Foreign Affairs from November 2002 to November 2007. He was educated at the Universities of Punjab, Cambridge and Oxford, and was called to the Bar from Gray’s Inn, London. Khurshid Mahmud Kasuri is the author of ‘Neither a Hawk, Nor a Dove: An Insider’s Account of Pakistan’s Foreign Policy’ which is regarded as an authoritative account on the most successful Pakistan-India process between 2002-2007 and includes the details of a framework on Kashmir agreed on the backchannel.
With reference to the U.S. exit from Afghanistan, what are the complications and security challenges for the region?
After Great Britain and former Soviet Union, the United States has finally joined the league of world powers that had to leave Afghanistan after invading the country, thus confirming its status as the graveyard of empires. Now, with particular reference to foreign policy repercussions post-U.S. withdrawal, the event will reverberate internationally for many years to come. Both Pakistan and Iran, being in the Afghan neighbourhood, will be directly affected. It is thus in Pakistan’s interest to involve other regional countries like China, Iran and Afghanistan’s immediate northern neighbours in this effort. In this connection, the format of ‘Troika Plus’ involving United States, Russia, China and Pakistan can prove very useful.
On the positive side, we at least know what is America’s final position on Afghanistan and this is of critical importance to Pakistan since it impacts Pakistan’s security directly. Although observers and analysts of international affairs had concluded much earlier that United States’ efforts in Afghanistan were not proving very productive, nevertheless, the final announcement that United States is leaving at a fixed date, come what may, has its own consequences. We have seen some of these in the Taliban rapid gains, as well as a flurry of international efforts to prevent yet another civil war breaking out in Afghanistan. In this connection, the visit of the Afghan Taliban to Iran, as well as to Beijing and Moscow to assure neighbouring countries that they will not allow Afghan territory to be used against third countries, is of great significance.
Does the Afghan withdrawal signal a bigger shift in American policy?
When Joe Biden assumed the U.S. presidency in January, he wanted to extend the date of the U.S. exit from Afghanistan, perhaps because of the pressure exerted by the U.S. military and intelligence agencies. However, after getting a stern reaction from the Taliban leadership, Biden realised that his original instincts were correct. In this connection, it needs to be pointed out that President Biden, who was the Vice President under President Barack Obama, had in fact opposed Obama’s order regarding the surge of U.S. forces in Afghanistan - a decision which was made largely under military pressure.
Despite having declared the Afghan war ‘The Right War’ and the Iraq war the wrong one, Biden did not wish to have that surge. But, there was a lot of pressure and so he wanted to give the military a chance. When Donald Trump became the U.S. President, he left no doubt about America’s intention to leave Afghanistan. When Joe Biden became the President, it was crystal clear as to what was going to happen. In fact, the only surprise was a slight postponement in the U.S. exit ordered by Biden; but, I think it was quite meaningless to postpone the move for three or four months.
Is there a shift in American policy towards Pakistan?
The fact that the United States has already agreed to pull its forces out of Afghanistan, reduces Pakistan’s influence on the Taliban too, as far as the need for compromise is concerned. In Pakistan’s own interests, as well as that of Afghanistan, there needs to be a political arrangement, because in the absence of this there is a strong likelihood of a civil war in Afghanistan, as happened after the departure of the Soviet Union in 1989. Later, the Taliban came to power and, in the meantime, after Osama bin Laden was accused of masterminding the attacks on US cities on September 11, 2001, the Taliban refused to hand Osama over to the United States. I think the United States made a basic mistake at that time by disregarding Pakistan’s advice (the country had a far greater experience in terms of dealing with Afghanistan) that if non-Pashtun forces were allowed to capture Kabul, the Pashtuns would never accept it. Ever since Afghanistan was founded by Ahmed Shah Durrani, it has been a Pashtun-dominated state. Ironically, even Western educated Pashtuns of Pakistan were very upset by the diminution of Pashtun influence so significantly in Kabul, since the Northern Alliance, was basically composed of non-Pashtun elements. It had become very clear that through the reports of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), appointed by the Unites States that there was massive corruption, misappropriation and misuse of US funds in Afghanistan. The writing was on the wall for all to see. However, the truth was not very digestible, the American public was told that it was largely because of Pakistan’s lack of cooperation. The US needed a punching bag to explain its failures in Afghanistan and Pakistan proved to be the right ‘fall guy’.
What must be done by Pakistan to safeguard its interests first?
So far as Pakistan is concerned, it wants a U.S. exit from Afghanistan only after the United States is able to bring about sustainable peace in the war-torn country. In Afghanistan, the much-needed peace can only be brought about if there is political accommodation between the Taliban and other elements. This has proved a difficult task for which neither Pakistan nor the United States could be blamed, because from the very beginning of the Doha talks, the Afghan President Ashraf Ghani had opposed all such efforts. He was not supportive of the American proposals to share power with the Taliban. In fact, originally Ghani had said that he would not hand over power unless it was done through elections.
‘The fact that the United States has already agreed to pull its forces out of Afghanistan, reduces Pakistan’s influence on the Taliban’.
By this time, the Taliban strongly felt that they had won and the ground realities were on their side. President Trump had given a withdrawal date and President Biden also had confirmed a complete U.S. withdrawal by a given date. The United States needs to realise the fact that Pakistan can’t control the Taliban. According to the Taliban spokesman Suhail Shaheen, they can take advice from Pakistan, but they would not accept ‘dictation’. In the case of a civil war erupting in Afghanistan, Pakistan will also suffer. It seems that Pakistan has learnt from its past experience and seems to have taken certain precautions now. The border has been fenced and forts have been erected to prevent mass-movement without check. Additionally, Pakistan has reiterated its position that it may be compelled to close its borders, if the Taliban force their way to Kabul without a settlement with other Afghan elements.
How do you see India’s role as a spoiler of Pakistan’s interests in Afghanistan?
India has always been interested in Afghanistan. Afghanistan was the one country that opposed Pakistan’s entry into the United Nations, mainly because of the Durand Line issue and India felt that by supporting Afghanistan it could create a two-front situation for Pakistan. India has been helping Afghanistan, covertly and overtly. Historically, though, quite ironically, although India is not a country, known for giving aid to other countries, it has been doing so in the case of Afghanistan. In fact, until the 90s, India was receiving foreign aid. It wanted to use its aid to Afghanistan to support elements opposed to the Pakistani State, including the Tehreek-e-Taliban. However, India’s geography is a major hindrance towards achieving its sinister objectives in Afghanistan. Furthermore, India’s desire to get on the anti-China bandwagon may well backfire, since Afghanistan’s neighbouring countries, such as China and Iran have interests which are at variance with those of India and the United States. Russia, which was seen as India’s historical ally, is also not happy with India’s pro-American approach. Therefore, India has lots of hurdles on its way in Afghanistan and it is trying to make the best of it.
Why did India open a back-channel to the Taliban?
Perhaps, India was reading the writing on the wall and despite its strong reservations, thought it prudent to initiate talks with the Taliban. Although ironically, India’s spokesman first denied having such meetings with the Taliban leadership, the international news agencies, together with the Indian media, reported that the Indian Minister of External Affairs, S Jaishankar had met with the Taliban leaders in Doha. Regardless, whether the meeting took place or not but the Taliban spokesman had publically advised India to remain neutral. The Afghan ambassador in Delhi has, however, openly asked for help and there are other elements including important sections of Indian public opinion, as well as the media, who strongly support Ashraf Ghani’s government. Despite Taliban’s advice to India, I am not sure if India can remain genuinely neutral.
There is news that some Indian aircraft were seen dropping arms in Afghanistan? How do you see the development?
I don’t know how accurate the news is, but it makes some sense in the current context. There is no denying that India has been helping the Afghan government in different ways. Honestly speaking, Afghanistan has received an investment worth $3 billion, that too from a country like India that doesn’t believe in giving aid to foreign countries. From day one, India has been supporting the anti-Pakistan forces and terrorist groups operating on Afghan soil. With this in view, I think it is the right time that Prime Minister Imran Khan has decided to approach sections of Baloch leadership living in exile abroad.
Post-U.S. exit, what kind of political arrangement could satisfy all the local and regional stakeholders, including the Taliban?
I think the Taliban have learnt a few lessons. For instance, the leader of the Haqqani Group, regarded as most militant and the most powerful group among the Taliban, Sirajuddin Haqqani has early this year written an article in the New York Times, in which he has admitted that the Taliban had made mistakes in the past they would not repeat in the future. He specifically admitted the right of women to education and to work. There have been many indications from the Taliban leadership in recent times, in which they have admitted that the Taliban alone cannot rule Afghanistan and that other stakeholders need to be included. This is both a significant admission and an important development.
There is yet another important development that has taken place within the Taliban leadership itself. It has become more inclusive and Uzbeks, Tajiks and Hazaras have been included at their leadership level. In the past, the Taliban forces consisted almost entirely of a Pashtun movement and other nationalities ganged up against them. It seems, even in this respect Taliban have learnt a lesson by making the movement more representative. It is for this reason that the international community is surprised by the rapid Taliban advances in the North where they have ousted government forces and have taken control of border crossings with Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. Additionally, they have also captured border crossings along Iran and Pakistan borders. The non-Pashtun element of the Taliban has played an important part in this respect. Reportedly, at least 25 per cent of the top leadership of the Taliban comprises non-Pashtuns.
In my opinion, although the Taliban may not wish to have Ashraf Ghani and his close supporters in any future government, they would probably agree to include representatives from Uzbek, Tajik and Hazara communities, as well as non-Taliban Pashtuns in a future government. To achieve this objective, the Taliban would rely on Afghan-made solutions by involving the Loya Jirga and religious and tribal leaders in this integrating process.
Will the Taliban in power threaten stability in Pakistan and severely impact the CPEC?
Everything should be seen rationally and we cannot assume that the Taliban will do something against their own interests. China and Pakistan are important partners and with India and United States against them, I see no conceivable interest in their wishing to alienate their friends. I think the Taliban would not like to rule over a rubble and they would need the support of the international community to rebuild Afghanistan. If they can succeed in creating an inclusive government, they could expect support not just from their immediate neigbours, like Pakistan, China, Russia and Iran, but also from USA, EU and rich Muslim countries.
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