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Quetta

The Road Not Taken

Meaningful action could help rebuild trust, foster empathy and national solidarity, and begin restoring the fractured relationship between Balochistan and the federation

By Ambassador M. Alam Brohi | August 2026

The saying, often attributed to George Orwell, reminds us: “In a time of deceit, telling the truth is a revolutionary act.”
During the first week of July, Balochistan witnessed a wave of coordinated terrorist attacks across several locations, including the outskirts of Quetta, Ziarat, Noshki, and Bela-Winder, claiming numerous innocent lives. These were among the deadliest and most sophisticated coordinated attacks carried out this year by the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) and the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). In a particularly audacious strike, the BLA targeted an army convoy in the Bela-Winder region, creating an atmosphere of fear and insecurity.

Meanwhile, TTP militants attacked a police station in the restricted Mangi Dam area, killing nine police officers, including two Station House Officers (SHOs), and abducting eighteen law enforcement personnel. They were later executed, and their bodies were dumped in the surrounding area. Despite repeated distress calls, no security agency succeeded in rescuing them, leaving grieving families to mourn both the tragedy and the apparent failure of the state’s response. Whether the outpost was inadequately equipped or overwhelmed by surprise remains unclear. The TTP also carried out attacks in the Hanna Orak Valley, a popular recreational area on the outskirts of Quetta, killing several civilians.

The families of the victims from Hanna Orak and the Mangi Dam region staged protests for several days, organising well-attended sit-ins and blocking roads connecting the affected areas with Quetta. Sardar Akhtar Jan Mengal, President of the Balochistan National Party, addressed the protesters at the Mangi Dam sit-in, followed by Nawabzada Lashkari Raisani. Earlier, Akhtar Mengal had convened a multi-party conference in Quetta to discuss the rapidly deteriorating political and security situation in Balochistan. Their warnings, however, appeared to fall on deaf ears.

The conference sharply criticised the provincial government led by Mir Sarfraz Bugti, calling for its immediate dismissal on grounds of incompetence, unresponsiveness, corruption, and lack of public legitimacy. Similar accusations had previously been made by former provincial minister Sardar Abdul Rehman Khetran upon his resignation from the cabinet. There is little doubt that the PPP-backed provincial administration has lost public confidence. Its inability to address the worsening security situation over the past two years has become an increasing liability for the federal government.

As has become routine after such incidents, the federal leadership rushed to Balochistan and convened an emergency meeting of the Provincial Apex Committee on Security to demonstrate resolve against the insurgency. Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif declared that military operations in the Shaban region would continue until the last insurgent was eliminated. Once again, responsibility for the escalating insurgency and militancy was largely attributed to Pakistan’s eastern neighbour. While rival states often exploit each other’s vulnerabilities in international politics, such external factors should not distract from addressing the country’s own internal weaknesses.

The authorities subsequently launched a large-scale operation in the Shaban region involving the police, the Frontier Corps (FC), and the regular army. Yet the federal government’s continued reliance on military measures suggests it remains unconvinced by growing calls for political dialogue and reconciliation with Baloch insurgents.

The current insurgency was reignited by the killing of Nawab Akbar Bugti and his burial under military supervision, contrary to Baloch traditions. The first insurgency followed Balochistan’s accession to Pakistan in April 1948 under Prince Abdul Karim, while the second erupted in 1955–56 in opposition to the One Unit scheme.


During the early 1960s, the Ayub Khan government sought reconciliation with Nawab Nauroz Khan Zarakzai. Trusting official assurances, the Nawab and his followers descended from the mountains and surrendered. Instead of reconciliation, they were arrested and imprisoned in Sukkur Jail. Seven of his sons and nephews were executed after trial, while the 85-year-old Nawab died in prison.

Policies based on divide-and-rule tactics, such as installing compliant political leadership and restricting mainstream provincial parties, have consistently failed to win public trust and have further aggravated the conflict

However, Baloch leaders continued to participate in Pakistan’s democratic process. They contested the 1970 general elections, formed the provincial government, and played an active role in drafting the 1973 Constitution.

That spirit of participation was short-lived. In February 1973, Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto dismissed the elected provincial government of Sardar Ataullah Mengal. Senior Baloch leaders were arrested and tried for treason before a Special Tribunal in Hyderabad. They were eventually released following General Zia-ul-Haq’s coup.

The cycle of political participation followed by political marginalisation continued. Sardar Akhtar Mengal’s provincial government was dismissed by Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif in 1998. Such repeated interventions have only strengthened centrifugal tendencies rather than diminished them.

Several initiatives have sought to address Baloch grievances, including General Pervez Musharraf’s Chaudhry Shujaat Committee and President Asif Ali Zardari’s “Aghaz-e-Huqooq-e-Balochistan” package (2008–2013), which increased the province’s share under the National Finance Commission Award and promised greater federal employment opportunities. However, neither initiative produced lasting results. The committee’s recommendations were never fully implemented, while the reform package was undermined by political inertia and administrative shortcomings.

These efforts failed for three principal reasons. First, civilian governments and the security establishment have historically approached the Baloch issue from fundamentally different perspectives. While many regard it as a political problem requiring political solutions, the security establishment has largely viewed it through a military lens.

Second, decades of broken promises have created a profound trust deficit between Baloch leaders and the state. The execution of Nawab Nauroz Khan’s family in the 1960s became a defining moment in this relationship. Since then, successive governments have often been accused of favouring compliant tribal elites while marginalising more representative Baloch leadership through political engineering and manipulated electoral processes.

Third, an overreliance on coercive power has fostered a misplaced sense of confidence. In 2002, an FC commander is reported to have declared that he was merely awaiting orders to arrest or kill Akbar Bugti. Years later, a federal interior minister dismissed the insurgency by claiming that a single SHO could control it. Events since then have demonstrated that the insurgency has grown more sophisticated, determined, and lethal.

Policies based on divide-and-rule tactics, such as installing compliant political leadership and restricting mainstream provincial parties, have consistently failed to win public trust and have further aggravated the conflict.

Balochistan remains Pakistan’s most strategically significant province. Its extensive coastline, Gwadar Port, and central role in the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) have elevated its geopolitical importance. At the same time, persistent insecurity has undermined economic development and complicated regional connectivity. These challenges require a comprehensive national strategy that prioritises political reconciliation alongside security measures.

As a first step, the federal government should consider granting a general amnesty to insurgents willing to renounce violence, releasing detained leaders of the Baloch Yakjehti Council, and establishing an independent Truth and Reconciliation Commission with the authority to determine facts, assign responsibility, and recommend both accountability and compensation.

The Commission should examine, among other issues:
• Whether Balochistan has received its constitutional quota in federal ministries, corporations, and public-sector enterprises under Article 38(g).
• The province’s representation at all levels of the armed forces, as envisaged under Article 39, including appointments in military-affiliated educational, commercial, industrial, and financial institutions.
• Balochistan’s participation in employment and revenue generated by its mineral and hydrocarbon resources, consistent with Article 161.
• The implementation of Article 172 (as amended by the Eighteenth Amendment) regarding joint ownership of natural resources.
• The province’s share in the National Finance Commission’s divisible pool.
• The effectiveness of the Council of Common Interests in resolving disputes between the federation and the provinces under Article 153.
• Balochistan’s share in employment linked to Sui Gas and its successor companies, and whether compensation is warranted under Article 158.

Meaningful action on these issues could help rebuild trust, foster empathy and national solidarity, and begin repairing the fractured relationship between Balochistan and the federation. Lasting peace will ultimately depend not only on security measures but also on justice, constitutional fairness, and genuine political reconciliation.

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