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International

A New Middle East?

The US–Israel–Iran war is redrawing Iran’s regional power and shaping the future of the Middle East

By Ambassador Sanaullah | November 2026

A whirlpool of speculation about the future security architecture of the Middle East is intensifying uncertainty and confusion. Many analysts contend that the region’s existing security mosaic has already been transformed. Bluffs have been called, vulnerabilities exposed and myths of invincibility shattered. The Middle East is no longer what it was before the joint US–Israeli attack on Iran. Some even trace the beginning of the unfolding avalanche to the Hamas attack on Israel on 7 October 2023, which set in motion developments that have not only swept away parts of the old security paradigm but also opened the region to a new contest for power.

Although the Middle East has never been entirely peaceful or free from tension, large parts of the region had remained relatively stable. Few could have imagined that the skies over Saudi Arabia would one day become so vulnerable that the UAE’s sense of security would be profoundly shaken, or that the expensive security umbrella built around a network of American military bases would prove insufficient to protect the countries hosting them. Nor could many have anticipated that Iran would withstand American and Israeli bombardment with such determination while inflicting significant military losses on its adversaries.

The war has not yet ended, and its ultimate consequences remain uncertain. When it began on 28 February 2026, Iran was confronting a heavily sanctioned economy and relying on a network of regional partners and armed groups, including the Houthis in Yemen, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and allied groups in Iraq and Syria. The war has altered Iran’s strategic position. Although it has suffered economic damage and military losses, the conflict may also have strengthened national cohesion and earned Iran greater international respect and sympathy in some quarters.

The Middle East that emerges from this war may not necessarily be less Iranian in its strategic orientation; rather, Iranian influence may take a different form. The war has not, at least thus far, eliminated Iran’s regional influence. It has, however, placed its traditional model of contiguous strategic depth under severe pressure. That model extended from Tehran through Iraq and Syria to Lebanon and was carefully cultivated by Iran’s leadership, much of which has now been eliminated.

In its place, a more fragmented Iranian sphere of influence may emerge, relying less on territorial continuity and more on missiles, maritime power, political relationships, autonomous partners and deterrence. Such a model could pose an even greater strategic challenge for the smaller Gulf Arab states because conventional military means alone would be less effective in containing it. Iran could consequently assume a more significant role in shaping the region’s strategic equilibrium.

Arab governments understand that a weakened, cornered Iran could make the Middle East even more unstable. They may therefore resist any attempt by the United States and Israel to sever the connections linking Iran with Iraq, Syria and Lebanon. This does not necessarily imply support for Tehran; rather, it reflects an awareness that Iran’s complete strategic isolation could create new security risks for its neighbours.

Saudi Arabia, the region’s other major power, faces a different challenge. Recovering its lost prestige and restoring confidence in its security arrangements may prove difficult. Although Saudi Arabia possesses considerable military capabilities, its confrontation with the Houthis has demonstrated the limits of conventional superiority. The Houthis may remain a formidable adversary even if their military capabilities are degraded. Moreover, their appeal has increasingly extended beyond their immediate territorial base, finding resonance among sections of the wider Sunni public. Their political and symbolic influence may therefore outlast their battlefield fortunes.

Egypt is another major regional actor whose position may benefit from the conflict. Having remained outside the direct confrontation, Cairo could gain greater diplomatic and strategic relevance, particularly in relation to the Red Sea and Gaza. Its ability to maintain working relationships across regional divides may allow it to capitalise on its relative neutrality and play a more consequential role in post-war diplomacy.


A New Balance of Power
Opinion remains divided over who is winning the war and what kind of security architecture will emerge from it. Nevertheless, a growing perception in major world capitals is that Iran has challenged the aura of invincibility surrounding the United States and Israel. Despite inflicting devastating damage on Iran’s leadership, infrastructure and nuclear facilities, the US and Israel may find it difficult to impose their preferred terms on Tehran as a condition for ending the war on all fronts.

The central issue, therefore, is not simply whether Iran has been weakened or strengthened. It is how the war is changing the geographical, political and military foundations on which Iranian power operates. Iran may seek to reconstruct its regional strategy, shifting from the pre-war model of regional expansion through the so-called Axis of Resistance to a more dispersed system of deterrence, partnerships and asymmetric capabilities.

This transformation will have implications for Pakistan. Pakistan’s national interest requires it to avoid direct military confrontation with Iran. At the same time, Tehran has longstanding reasons to maintain workable relations with Islamabad, particularly because of their shared border, mutual security concerns and Pakistan’s influence in the wider Muslim world. Neither country can afford to treat the other as an expendable neighbour.

A more fragmented Iranian sphere of influence may emerge, relying less on territorial continuity and more on missiles, maritime power, political relationships, autonomous partners and deterrence

Iran will also assess its regional agreements and relationships through a security lens rather than a purely diplomatic one. The same applies to the evolving Saudi–Turkish relationship, which has developed considerably beyond conventional military-to-military contacts. As regional powers reassess their vulnerabilities, bilateral partnerships and defence cooperation may acquire greater strategic significance.

The Prospects for a New Regional Order
In my view, the most important question is not who wins or loses the current war, but whether anyone will seriously address the underlying causes of instability in the Middle East. A lasting settlement will remain elusive if the region’s fundamental security grievances continue to be ignored. Yet there is little reason to expect a fundamental change in Israeli strategic behaviour or a substantial reversal of American support for Israel in the foreseeable future.

The region is consequently likely to experience prolonged instability, characterised by proxy warfare, drone and missile attacks, cyberwarfare, maritime confrontations and recurring escalations. Rather than consolidating into a stable regional order, the Middle East may become more fragmented, with three principal centres of power—Saudi Arabia, Israel and Iran—competing for strategic influence. All three are likely to invest further in their military capabilities, intelligence networks and security infrastructure.

In Iran, the war could strengthen rather than weaken the argument for acquiring a nuclear deterrent. If Tehran concludes that its conventional capabilities and regional partnerships failed to prevent attacks on its territory and leadership, the perceived value of a nuclear deterrent may increase. This would introduce an even more dangerous dimension into an already volatile regional environment.

Iran may also seek to exploit its geographical position and maritime leverage in the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz. However, its ability to influence developments around the Bab el-Mandeb Strait would depend substantially on the capabilities and decisions of regional partners, including the Houthis. These maritime chokepoints could remain important instruments of strategic pressure, although using them would carry considerable economic and military risks for Iran.

At the same time, Tehran may recognise the need to recalibrate its relations with neighbouring countries, including Turkey, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. Managing mutual suspicions and establishing practical arrangements on security, trade and regional stability could better serve Iran’s interests than continued confrontation on every front. Such a policy would not necessarily signal a fundamental change in Iran’s strategic outlook; it could instead represent an adaptation to the realities of the post-war environment.

Iran may also attempt to reconstruct the networks associated with the Axis of Resistance. However, these relationships are unlikely to return unchanged to their pre-war form. Their future effectiveness will depend on the survival, autonomy and capabilities of individual partners, as well as Tehran’s ability to provide political, financial and military support. A reconstructed network could create new threats, but it could also be less cohesive and harder for Iran to control.

Arab states, meanwhile, are unlikely to align automatically with either Washington or Tehran. They will probably pursue cautious, pragmatic policies designed to preserve their security and economic interests while avoiding entanglement in another major regional conflict. Geography, however, will limit their strategic choices. The proximity of Iran, the presence of American military forces and the vulnerability of energy infrastructure will continue to constrain their freedom of action.

This does not mean that countervailing security networks will not emerge. Regional states may explore new defence arrangements, intelligence-sharing mechanisms and strategic partnerships to balance Iranian influence or reduce their dependence on the United States. The resulting architecture could be overlapping and flexible rather than organised into two clearly defined opposing blocs.

India illustrates the complexity of this emerging environment. New Delhi may continue to cultivate relations with Israel while maintaining substantial strategic and economic interests in Iran and Saudi Arabia. India describes this approach as strategic balancing, designed to preserve its civilisational connections and protect its national interests. Whether such balancing remains sustainable will depend on the extent to which regional rivalry forces countries to make explicit strategic choices.

China is also well placed to play multiple roles in the post-war Gulf. Beijing does not need to become the region’s military hegemon to secure economic benefits, protect its energy interests and expand its diplomatic influence. Its approach may combine economic engagement, political mediation and selective security cooperation while avoiding the burdens and risks of assuming primary responsibility for regional defence. The more fragmented the regional order becomes, the greater the opportunity for China to exercise influence without directly challenging American military predominance.

Russia faces a more complicated situation. Preoccupied with its own strategic and economic difficulties, Moscow may seek to consolidate its partnership with Iran while preserving whatever influence it can in Syria and Iraq. Its role elsewhere in the Middle East is likely to remain more limited, although its position as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council will continue to provide diplomatic leverage. Russia will need to manage its declining regional influence carefully to retain a meaningful role in the emerging order.

In summary, the war may ultimately produce neither a decisive Iranian victory nor the complete destruction of Iran’s regional influence. Instead, it could mark the transition from one strategic paradigm to another. The old security architecture, built around American military protection, Israeli military superiority and Iran’s network of regional partners, has been seriously challenged. What replaces it remains uncertain, although American influence in the region is likely to endure.

The danger is that the region will invest more heavily in military deterrence without addressing the political grievances that repeatedly generate conflict. A Middle East dominated by competing hegemons, expanding missile capabilities, maritime vulnerabilities and shifting alliances may be more heavily armed but not necessarily more secure.

The real test of the post-war order will be whether regional powers can move beyond the pursuit of strategic advantage towards arrangements that acknowledge one another’s legitimate security concerns. Without such a shift, the emerging architecture may simply institutionalise confrontation, leaving the Middle East trapped in a cycle of deterrence, retaliation and renewed war.

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