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Limits of Reform

As Sri Lankan President Anura Kumara Dissanayake completes two years in office, the long-term viability of his much-vaunted anti-corruption reform programme is still far from assured

By Daniyal Talat | October 2026

Sri Lanka’s National People’s Power (NPP) government has made anti-corruption reform a central pillar of its political and governance agenda, presenting itself as a decisive break from the patronage networks, political impunity and institutional weaknesses that have shaped Sri Lankan governance for decades.

Elected on promises of political transformation and accountability, the NPP has sought to move beyond high-profile prosecutions towards systemic reforms aimed at strengthening institutions, improving transparency and preventing corruption before it occurs. Yet, two years into President Anura Kumara Dissanayake’s presidency, the sustainability of this reform agenda remains uncertain. While the government has introduced important institutional and legislative measures, growing concerns from civil society, including a constitutional challenge by Transparency International Sri Lanka (TISL), raise questions about whether the reform process will genuinely strengthen accountability or create new forms of discretionary power.

A key foundation of the NPP’s anti-corruption programme is the Anti-Corruption Act No. 9 of 2023, which strengthened the Commission to Investigate Allegations of Bribery or Corruption (CIABOC) and expanded Sri Lanka’s anti-corruption framework. Building on this legislation, the NPP introduced the National Anti-Corruption Action Plan (NACAP) 2025–2029. The plan represents an important shift from simply prosecuting corrupt individuals towards addressing the institutional conditions that allow corruption to flourish. It focuses on prevention, institutional integrity, investigation and enforcement, and greater public participation.

Several reforms demonstrate this systemic approach. Sri Lanka has moved towards digital asset declarations for public officials and greater public access to relevant information. A beneficial-ownership register has also been introduced to identify the individuals ultimately controlling companies and assets. Public procurement has been identified as another priority because government contracts and public expenditure have historically been vulnerable to political influence. Government institutions are also being encouraged to establish internal complaint mechanisms, codes of conduct and integrity systems. At the same time, efforts have been made to strengthen CIABOC’s institutional capacity and independence.

There are early indications that the government is willing to pursue politically sensitive cases. Investigations into several high-profile cases have been reopened, including cases involving individuals associated with previous political administrations. This is important in a country where allegations of political interference and impunity have historically weakened public confidence in accountability institutions. However, arrests and investigations alone cannot demonstrate the success of anti-corruption reform. The more important tests will be whether investigations are genuinely independent, whether prosecutions withstand judicial scrutiny, whether convictions follow where evidence supports them, and whether illegally acquired assets can ultimately be recovered.


The NPP has also presented its anti-corruption programme as part of a broader process of institutional and human-rights reform. Addressing the 63rd session of the United Nations Human Rights Council in Geneva on 8 September 2026, Sri Lanka’s Permanent Representative, Ambassador Sumith Dassanayake, highlighted the strengthening of CIABOC and implementation of NACAP 2025–2029 as evidence of national progress. He also referred to reopened investigations, judicial reforms and the strengthening of domestic accountability mechanisms. The government reaffirmed its preference for nationally owned reconciliation and accountability processes while rejecting external evidence-gathering mechanisms associated with international human-rights resolutions.

The Geneva statement also highlighted the government’s intention to repeal the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) and replace it with legislation intended to protect fundamental freedoms. Proposed amendments to the Online Safety Act are being finalised following stakeholder consultations, while judicial reforms seek to increase the number of judges and raise their retirement age to address case backlogs. These developments demonstrate that the NPP views institutional reform as broader than anti-corruption alone. Judicial independence, freedom of expression, due process and accountability are all essential to creating a governance system capable of controlling corruption.

The NPP government’s reform narrative has faced a significant challenge from civil society

However, the government’s reform narrative has faced a significant challenge from civil society. On 31 August 2026, TISL filed a public-interest petition before Sri Lanka’s Supreme Court challenging the proposed Anti-Corruption (Amendment) Bill placed on Parliament’s Order Paper on 19 August. TISL argues that several proposed amendments represent a regression from the safeguards established by the 2023 Act.

One of the most serious concerns relates to judicial oversight. The proposed amendment to Section 70 would allow CIABOC, through its Director-General, to determine whether accomplices should be exempted from prosecution in exchange for full disclosure, removing the existing requirement for Magistrate authorisation. TISL argues that this would concentrate substantial discretionary power in an administrative position and expose the process to political pressure, manipulation and corruption. The concern illustrates a fundamental principle of anti-corruption governance: institutions created to fight corruption must themselves operate under effective checks and balances. TISL has also challenged the proposal to increase the state-shareholding threshold for asset declarations from 25 percent to 50 percent.

Critics argue that this could exclude officials connected to state-linked companies where the government holds a significant minority stake, despite such companies managing public resources or exercising public functions. The proposed removal of cohabitants from the asset-declaration regime has generated another concern, as corrupt officials could potentially conceal wealth by placing assets in the names of people sharing their household but not formally classified as spouses or dependants.

The most controversial issue may be the proposed restrictions concerning asset-declaration information. TISL argues that broad powers to redact information could reduce meaningful transparency, while criminalising certain uses of redacted declarations could discourage journalists, civil-society organisations and citizens from investigating or discussing publicly available information. Transparency cannot be effective if information is technically accessible, but public scrutiny of that information is heavily restricted. The proposed changes concerning bail and remand have also raised constitutional concerns. TISL argues that making bail the exception and remand the norm could undermine fundamental rights and principles of proportionality. The organisation has therefore asked the Supreme Court to determine that the challenged provisions are inconsistent with constitutional protections and require the appropriate parliamentary majority and, where constitutionally necessary, approval through a referendum. These developments expose the central dilemma of the NPP’s anti-corruption project. Its greatest potential achievement is the creation of institutions capable of surviving changes of government. Its greatest risk is allowing those institutions to become dependent on political discretion. A genuinely systemic approach must apply equally to politicians from previous governments, current government officials and future administrations.

The political obstacles are considerable. Sri Lanka’s bureaucracy contains entrenched practices and relationships, while economic interests that benefit from political connections may resist reforms. At the same time, public expectations are exceptionally high. The NPP came to power amid widespread anger over corruption, economic mismanagement and political privilege. Citizens therefore expect rapid results, while genuine institutional reform requires years to produce measurable outcomes.

The decline in the NPP’s vote share in the 2025 local elections demonstrated that public patience cannot be assumed. Ultimately, the NPP’s anti-corruption legacy will depend on whether it can transform political will into institutions that work independently of political power. Strengthening CIABOC, implementing NACAP, introducing digital asset declarations, improving beneficial-ownership transparency and reopening high-profile investigations are important steps. Yet the TISL challenge shows that even reform itself must be subject to scrutiny.

The NPP has created an opportunity for genuine systemic change, but opportunity is not yet transformation. Its ultimate legacy will depend on whether it builds institutions strong enough to survive the political movement that created them and independent enough to hold that movement accountable.

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