To be fair, there are other non-elected and powerful constituencies that stand in the way of rational policies and strategies to deal with existential national challenges. There is the political weaponization of religious discourse, the economic weaponization of business discourse, and the rural and urban “feudal” weaponization of social discourse, all of which are interested in accumulating and concentrating economic and political power for self-aggrandizement rather than for a nationally empowering distribution of economic well-being. One of the consequences of this malady has been the subordination of national sovereignty to the agendas of international financial and “counter-terror” institutions and of “brotherly” countries that are integral parts of great power diplomacy and strategy. The elite of Pakistan have, by and large, been happy to be co-opted by international elite who insist on prioritizing their agendas over Pakistan’s national survival, stability and prosperity imperatives. Within this milieu Pakistan’s handicapped foreign policy has to discharge its responsibilities as the country’s first line of defence. It is also the easiest target for criticism for the failures of other more powerful institutions which refuse to take responsibility for their misdemeanours.
Pakistan is fortunate to have a strong relationship with China. It is the world’s greatest success story. It is the only great power willing to invest in developing a strategic partnership with Pakistan.
Very much apart from domestic constraints on efficient and successful foreign policy, there are global developments that represent major challenges. The two most important are climate change and the threat of nuclear conflict. Moreover, in an age of globalization, the international system and global governance are failing to keep pace with and manage the growth of the challenges of climate catastrophe, nuclear annihilation, global pandemics, fake news, and the undermining of international law, especially international humanitarian and human rights laws. Although these challenges are global in their dimensions, each of them have a national aspect which requires national governments to contribute to the world’s response if they are to survive.
Pakistan, for instance, is among the least contributors to climate change and yet it is among those countries which will be worst hit by it. Both domestic and foreign policies will be required to address such challenges. If within the next two decades the world does not prioritize global cooperation for a Global Green New Deal (GGND) to combat climate change and its fatal consequences - which include unprecedented pandemics, loss of animal and plant diversity, desertification and loss of arable land, ever increasing temperatures in which farming and other outdoors activity will become impossible, the loss of coastlines around the world as sea levels rise, international climate refugees numbering in the billions, conflicts and wars, including possibly nuclear war, over disappearing resources, governance collapse at the international and national levels leading to the genocidal culling of human populations, the development of political ideologies that will actually support such crimes, etc. - the 21st century will be the last century for human civilization and human history. This is not conjecture. It is the scientific consensus of the world. Greta Thunberg, the Swedish teenager climate activist, seems to have more common sense and human decency than the combined national and international leadership of the world.
The foregoing provides the frightening but real context for Pakistan’s foreign policy. The traditional foreign policy agenda of Pakistan is well known. It includes relations with neighbours, regional countries, the major powers and the international community, including international institutions of various kinds. When it comes to countries it includes China, India including the Kashmir dispute, Afghanistan, Iran, Turkey, Central Asia, the Arab and Muslim world, the USA, Russia, the UK and Europe, Japan, ASEAN countries, Africa, etc. These relations should have the common object of promoting Pakistan’s security, well-being and stability; the strengthening of the structures of peace, cooperation of all kinds, and mutual understanding and mechanisms for the peaceful resolution of differences; etc.
This is a huge foreign policy agenda for Pakistan which, nevertheless, pales into insignificance compared to the existential challenges that confront all countries, including Pakistan. Moreover, such a foreign policy agenda, including dealing with existential challenges, depends on Pakistan putting its own house in order which in itself will be a massive and unprecedented undertaking for which there is no room for failure if Pakistan is to survive. All this has to be largely accomplished within the next 20 years if Pakistan is not to be overwhelmed. This requires a total national and foreign policy make-over. Very much apart from whether this is a possible or impossible undertaking is the question whether those in charge of Pakistan’s priorities and decision-making have even the intention of completely re-ordering their own personal and institutional priorities. Even more important, is whether the people of Pakistan are ready to face the task of taking charge of their fate or leaving it to the tender mercies of those who have excluded them from their priorities.
Assuming the best, let us look at Pakistan’s main external relationships. Pakistan is fortunate to have a strong relationship with China. It is the world’s greatest success story. It is the only great power willing to invest in developing a strategic partnership with Pakistan. CPEC in the context of BRI offers Pakistan huge opportunities to economically transform itself if it can break with the dependency syndrome it has cultivated for seven decades. China cannot transform Pakistan. China will not go to war for Pakistan. But the US and India are compelling China to further deepen its relations with Pakistan. This places a responsibility on Pakistan to become a reliable and feasible strategic partner despite the pressures of China’s rivals. Unfortunately, a dysfunctional political system in Pakistan will curtail the possibilities to develop a full- fledged strategic relationship with China.
As for the Uighur problem, this is a matter for Pakistan to consider within the context of its essential relations with China and not as part of an anti-China western and Indian narrative which is less concerned with the welfare of the Uighurs than in pursuing a cold war-cum-containment strategy with China. If China’s security concerns are addressed there is no doubt it can offer all its non-Han citizens the best opportunities for their economic and cultural fulfillment and self-expression. If the US prides itself on being a multi-ethnic society, why should it seek to prevent China from developing in a similar direction? Pakistan is itself a multi-ethnic society which has yet to become a multi-ethnic polity and nation.
India, of course, is the biggest challenge for Pakistan and its foreign policy. The relationship has become so deeply set in mutual animosity that a fundamental improvement appears almost impossible. There are reasons for this and India is primarily responsible. It opposed the creation of Pakistan; it subjugated and incorporated the larger part of Jammu and Kashmir against international law, UN Security Council resolutions and the wishes of the majority of the Kashmiri people. It invaded East Pakistan to bring about its separation from Pakistan even though Pakistan’s utterly brutal and stupid policies were primarily responsible for that tragedy. Pakistan has continued its short-sighted policy in Balochistan which has afforded India opportunities to fish in troubled waters. Moreover, India uses the situation in Balochistan to undermine the political cogency of Pakistan’s criticisms with regard to its repressive policies in IOK. The world, by and large, has been critical of India’s policies in Kashmir. But apart from cynical self-interest, the international community has tended to cite Balochistan in order to question the consistency and legitimacy of Pakistan’s criticism of India’s violation of Kashmiri human rights. This has tended to hamstring Pakistan’s Kashmir diplomacy. Nevertheless, not talking to India is not policy as the situation in Kashmir is the number one nuclear flashpoint in the world today.
India cannot eliminate the insurgency in Kashmir through either political sops or conventional military and police repression. It has rendered the Simla Agreement moot and inoperable and, accordingly, it has effectively denounced the LOC thereby rendering any dialogue on Kashmir meaningless. The world, while critical of India, effectively wants Pakistan to accept the unacceptable situation created by India in Kashmir. If Pakistan does so, it would render its own legitimacy questionable in the eyes of many of its people and most certainly in the eyes of most Kashmiris. Given the nature of the challenge, Pakistan has been unable to formulate a credible and effective Kashmir policy. New policy approaches are required; but a government unsure of its legitimacy and room for maneuver is simply unwilling to accept the costs of any policy initiative other than sterile diplomacy backed by nothing on the ground. Pakistan’s Kashmir policy can be described as: take no risks; have no policy; deceive the people; and bank on their acceptance of the inevitable as they did in 1971. The damage to India’s reputation is real; but that does not translate into any benefit for Pakistan or the Kashmiri people who are now moving towards the preferred option of Azadi which could threaten Pakistan’s territorial contiguity with China. That would be a major strategic gain for India and a catastrophic strategic blow for Pakistan.
Afghanistan is the one country with which Pakistan should have no problem. Afghanistan’s initial hesitation with regard to recognizing Pakistan and its encouragement of “Pushtunistan” has to be understood in the context of the British Indian Empire’s carving up of Pushtun lands as part of its strategic containment of Tsarist Russia. Afghanistan has long since accorded de facto acknowledgement of the Durand Line even if for domestic political reasons it has not yet done so de jure. What is important is that Pakistan must not allow itself to be caught in an Afghan-Indian diplomatic pincer. Unfortunately Pakistan’s Afghanistan policy has largely been in the hands of people who have little understanding of either Afghanistan’s history and culture and the character and outlook of the Afghan Pushtun. Many unnecessary provocations can be avoided with a little more understanding and empathy. This would vastly reduce India’s scope for mischief against Pakistan from Afghan territory. Pakistan’s support for the Taliban has always amazed the more urban and educated Afghans since they know Pakistan would never countenance their rule in Pakistan. Moreover, the Taliban have never forgotten how they were sold down the river by Pakistan after 9/11. As a result, Pakistan has leverage without influence or goodwill in Afghanistan. This can be corrected ASAP if the elected government can become the driving force it was elected to be.
The US is the mightiest country in the world. But not for long. Within this decade, China will overtake it as the largest national economy by all measures. China is also challenging the US in cutting edge technologies including, eventually, military technologies. Moreover, at a time when US soft power has been undermined by great power arrogance, China’s soft power has been boosted by initiatives such as BRI and its regional off-shoots such as CPEC and technological feats such as bringing back rock samples from the other never seen side of the moon.
Nevertheless, Pakistan must seek to develop as good and dependable a relationship with the US as possible. The US, however, can never be a strategic partner for Pakistan as it is a strategic partner of India against China which is Pakistan’s only potential strategic partner. Under Biden, the US may deepen its cold war with both China and Russia and seek to bully Pakistan into making choices that could drive a wedge between it and China. It will use India and possibly Afghanistan as well as international financial and counter-terror institutions for this purpose. If Pakistan cannot fashion a credible Kashmir policy as mentioned, how will it fashion a credible response to these pressures? Pakistan cannot avoid giving clear answers to such questions without undermining itself at home and abroad. 
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