Region 
 

Dhaka

Prisoner of the Past

Bangladesh is navigating past partnerships and forging new alignments in a rapidly shifting geopolitical landscape.

By Ambassador Sanaullah | June 2025

The student-led uprising in Bangladesh—initially aimed at job quota reforms—quickly escalated into a nationwide movement demanding Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s resignation. On August 5, 2024, she fled to India, prompting the Army Chief, General Waker-Uz-Zaman, to announce the formation of an interim government. Three days later, Professor Muhammad Yunus was appointed Chief Adviser. Since then, the new leadership has gradually distanced itself from India, signaling a shift in Bangladesh’s domestic politics and regional posture. Even close observers of the student protests were surprised by the sudden collapse of Hasina’s rule.

The Indian leadership was genuinely stunned by this political upheaval, which also triggered public expressions of anti-India sentiment. Just two months earlier, in June 2024, Sheikh Hasina had been received in India on a state visit. The two countries signed 10 Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs), including new agreements on digital cooperation, green initiatives, the blue economy, and the opening of a new Indian consulate in Rangpur. Hasina’s administration had offered India significant space in domestic politics and diplomatic alignment. The interim government’s engagement with Pakistan and a more assertive partnership with China now signal a potential foreign policy realignment. Pakistan, in particular, has welcomed the opportunity to move beyond the acrimony of the 1971 war.

India’s historically close relationship with Bangladesh is clearly under strain. Indian policymakers are unsure how to regain the extensive influence they enjoyed under Hasina. Has India lost all leverage, or can it salvage some influence due to geographic proximity and interdependent strategic interests? To what extent will the new leadership in Bangladesh alter South Asia’s geopolitical landscape? Will India move beyond the 2024 political shock, and will Pakistan transcend the burden of 1971? These are questions deserving of serious inquiry.

Chief Adviser Yunus has already interacted with key leaders, including Pakistan’s Prime Minister (twice), U.S. President Donald Trump, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, and Chinese President Xi Jinping. India appears uneasy about Yunus’s visit to China and his outreach to Pakistan, particularly given the subsequent spate of high-level bilateral exchanges.

Since Hasina’s ouster, Yunus has tried to ease strained ties, including a brief meeting with Modi on April 4, 2025, in Bangkok. He discussed Hasina’s extradition, border security cooperation, and water-sharing agreements on the Ganges and Teesta rivers. India raised concerns about minority rights, especially for Hindus, and stressed avoiding inflammatory rhetoric. Bangladeshi officials described the meeting as “constructive and fruitful.” Earlier, in February, Indian Foreign Minister Jaishankar met Bangladeshi Foreign Minister Touhid Hossain at the Indian Ocean Conference in Oman. Dhaka requested that India consider hosting the long-delayed SAARC Standing Committee meeting. That interaction later turned tense. Jaishankar criticized Dhaka for inconsistency in its diplomatic posture. Hossain, in turn, reminded him that India is harboring Hasina, who continues to issue statements damaging bilateral relations.


Indian Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri’s visit to Dhaka in December also yielded little. Despite agreed intentions to “enhance consultations and cooperation,” the relationship remained frozen. Bangladesh later restricted land imports of cotton yarn from India in retaliation for India denying transshipment facilities. India, for its part, sharply curtailed visa approvals—reportedly dropping over 80%. Hasina’s extradition remains a central sticking point. Until it is resolved, both countries must navigate daily tensions that contradict their broader geo-economic realities. Still, India’s trade volume, proximity, and entrenched influence pose challenges to any significant redefinition of bilateral ties.

In contrast, the tone of Bangladesh-Pakistan interactions has been cautiously optimistic. In their September 2024 meeting at the UN General Assembly, Yunus and Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif discussed revitalizing SAARC and renewing foreign secretary-level talks. At the D-8 Summit in December, Yunus stressed resolving longstanding issues from 1971 to enable a forward-looking relationship. Sharif expressed willingness to address these matters. Pakistan’s Foreign Secretary Amna Baloch visited Dhaka in April as a follow-up. Her Bangladeshi counterpart raised four key demands: a formal apology for the 1971 war excesses, $4.25 billion in war reparations, repatriation of stranded Pakistanis, and transfer of $200 million in cyclone-related donations from 1970. Intriguingly, Pakistan’s official statement at the meeting did not mention these demands. The forthcoming visit of Deputy Prime Minister Ishaq Dar may indicate whether Pakistan treats these as serious issues or mere political posturing aimed at Bangladesh’s domestic audience.

To date, no Pakistani leader has issued a formal apology for the 1971 events. During his 2002 visit, President Pervez Musharraf expressed “regret” at the Bangabandhu Memorial Museum but stopped short of a formal apology. Nawaz Sharif, across his three terms, acknowledged the injustices of 1971 but avoided a direct apology. In 1998, he expressed “deep regret.” More recently, Imran Khan emphasized “moving forward” without addressing past wrongs, while Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the first post-war visitor to Dhaka, refused to apologize in 1974. Given the legal and political sensitivities, a formal apology remains unlikely. Thus, India need not be overly alarmed by Bangladesh’s limited outreach to Pakistan.

Ultimately, Bangladesh is navigating past partnerships and forging new alignments in a rapidly shifting geopolitical landscape. Its leaders are attempting to balance historical grievances, national interests, and future aspirations, all while treading carefully around old alliances and emerging pressures.

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