The original ‘Accidental Prime Minister’

As far as the economy goes, Rajiv recognised that “changing times demanded changing policies”. He took steps to dismantle the socialistic, state-dominated policies of his grandfather and mother, and set the stage for the more explicit abolition of the “permit raj” under Manmohan Singh. As Aiyar points out, it was Rajiv’s tenure that recorded the highest ever rate of GDP growth in India when it touched about 10 per cent in 1988.

One is disappointed with the omission of crucial details when the book deals with nuclear disarmament and Pakistan vis-a-vis Kashmir in the Foreign Policy Initiatives section. Suffice it to say that while rightly extolling Rajiv for presenting “a detailed and practical road map verifiable at all stages, to the elimination of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction”, there is no reference to the far earlier initiatives by Pakistan.

For instance, in September 1972, two years before India’s introduction of nuclear weapons into South Asia through the amusingly named “peaceful explosions” at Pokhran in 1974, Pakistan proposed a Treaty at the 16th annual session of the UN Atomic Energy Conference held in Mexico calling for the denuclearisation of South Asia. Subsequent to Pokhran, Pakistan’s resolution in the UN General Assembly in 1974 reiterating the demand for a nuclear-weapons-free region received huge support and was adopted. India moved its own resolution, also adopted, which did not espouse the regional approach advocated by Pakistan. Like Rajiv, all of Pakistan’s successive Presidents and Prime Ministers have called for a nuclear-weapons-free world.

In the section on Kashmir, Aiyar quotes from the recent book by former Ambassador Satinder Lambah to cite the secret visit to Pakistan by the diplomat Ronen Sen in mid-December 1988 as Rajiv’s personal representative to discuss bilateral issues with Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto before the SAARC summit scheduled for December 1988, during which it was agreed that the two young Prime Ministers would also sign a bilateral agreement to annually exchange data on respective nuclear sites and prevent attacks on each other’s installations.

While that agreement has survived 34 years, Aiyar goes on to narrate the bilateral visit on July 16, 1989, by Rajiv to Pakistan, and the agreement on Siachen for “mutual force withdrawal from recorded actual ground position locations and the establishment of a jointly monitored demilitarized zone”. Although he acknowledges that this “came to nothing”, there is no reference to the virtual U-turn by India thereafter, reportedly owing to pressure from the Indian military.

There is also no reference to the inconvenient fact that about six months before Rajiv was pushed into office in November 1984 after the brutal assassination of his mother, India conducted its own version of Kargil 15 years before the actual Kargil skirmish in May-June 1999. And that Rajiv could not, and did not, attempt to correct that blatant violation of the Shimla agreement of July 1972. Despite the omission, Aiyar to his credit does convey that when in October 1992, the Defence Secretaries of the two states were about to sign an agreement in New Delhi to settle the Siachen dispute, Prime Minister Narasimha Rao buckled to covert pressure from the BJP and the plan was scuttled at the last moment.

In his concluding evaluation, Aiyar summarises with candour Rajiv’s strengths and weaknesses. He stresses that Rajiv had only himself to blame for accepting advice from those who had longer and more intimate political experience but who lacked sincerity and long-term vision. He points out that Rajiv did not hesitate to punish his cousin Arun Nehru, or Arun Singh, an old Doon School mate, when he discovered that, along with a disobedient and scheming Army chief General Sundarji, he had been deliberately kept uninformed about Bofors, Operation Brasstacks, and the unauthorised opening of the locks of the Babri Masjid.

Aiyar often shares episodes at his own expense with refreshing self-deprecation. He makes no pretence at being part of Rajiv’s “inner circle”, yet as speechwriter and coordinator for almost all of Rajiv’s travels, the author interacted with the leader frequently and substantively. Aiyar can validly claim an exclusive insight into the subject of this biography.

One owes it to the reader to disclose that Aiyar and this writer have shared a 45-year-old friendship that has weathered mild and strong disagreements. Beginning with his posting to Karachi as India’s Consul General in 1979, when we bonded instantly, our linkage features some notable commonalities and differences. Although he was born in Lahore, his ancestral Tamil Nadu connection was perhaps a spark because my own birthplace is Madras. Yet neither of us speaks Tamil, until he belatedly acquired it for political responsibilities. When he quit the Foreign Service to join the Prime Minister’s Office in March 1985, I entered politics through my election to the Senate of Pakistan that same month and year.

During both of Rajiv’s visits to Pakistan, we assisted our respective Prime Ministers: Aiyar as speechwriter, and I as Minister of State for Information and Broadcasting, when I helped conduct a joint press conference in Islamabad in July 1989. We both share an unwavering commitment to promoting uninterrupted dialogue between India and Pakistan in all channels, from public to secret. We both write—and review—books. We are both public speakers and sometimes capable of putting a foot in the mouth, albeit not often.

The Rajiv I Knew is an engrossing read for both general readers and scholars, not least because this reviewer can vouch for The Mani I Know.
Courtesy: Frontline – a Fortnightly Magazine of great repute from India