New World Disorder

The old Chinese curse, “may you live in interesting times,” has certainly come true in spades. So, without maintaining any suspense, the simple answer to the question in the title is not just Asia; the world as a whole is the next battleground.

The collapse of the world order created in 1945 after WW2, where the USA was Summus Dominus or the “Highest Lord”, occurred slowly in phases, but more visibly after the strategic illegitimacy of the Iraq war in 2003. And much more decisively and certainly after the Great Financial Crisis of 2008, in which Western banks were bailed out, and no one was punished. This was a systemic collapse of American/Western legitimacy. This bailout was in stark contrast to what the Global South had been prescribed for decades by the IMF and the like: to accept austerity by stringent monetary and fiscal means.
In short, the unipolar moment ended in 2008.

This collapse of Pax Americana occurred concurrently with the undeniable rise of China as America’s peer competitor. When one adds to it an assertive Russia in the face of Western expansion of NATO in Russia’s backyard, in open defiance of its “near-abroad” policy, a multipolar world had to arrive. And it did!

So, America is no longer the sole superpower. The unipolar moment (1991-2008) is long gone. A multipolar world faces us. But its rules, or even an outline of such rules, have yet to be agreed upon, much less formalized.

Breakdown of an old order and absence of a new one to take its place means a period of transition, of grave uncertainty, not only for the Major Powers, but also for the Middle Powers and the rest of humanity.

In this period of transition, the Major Powers are revitalizing their concentration in their respective backyards - their spheres of influence: the Western Hemisphere for the United States; Taiwan, South and East China Sea, and more for China; and the near-abroad for Russia. They are doing that while nervously eyeing their role and national interests in the rest of the globe.

The Middle Powers, too, are concentrating their energies in their respective regions. They are hedging their bets with the Major Powers by staying flexible while scrambling for regional alliances.

Following the Trump administration’s capture of Nicolás Maduro of Venezuela and announcing plans to run the country, The New York Times (NYT) in its Sunday edition of January 11, 2026, published an opinion piece titled, “The World is in Chaos: What Comes Next?” The paper invited five writers to offer their vision of what is likely to come next. Here is a thumbnail version of what each said:

(a) The future world order will be partly shaped by competition between energy systems - traditional fossil fuels and emerging green technologies: China’s is the real dialectic of modernity, not Mr. Trump’s W.W.E. (World Wrestling Entertainment) version. The control of traditional energy domains remains powerful, but technological leadership in clean energy could translate into long-term geopolitical dominance (for China).

(b) Trump, Xi, and Putin, not so much as individuals, but as autocrats capable of using state power to advance and maintain their own power, have revised history in ways that support a demand for muscular, militarily coercive foreign policy. The post-World War II rules-based order is divided into multiple regional blocs or spheres rather than a single universal system (instead of one or two systemic poles, a tripartite world - Western, Chinese-centric, and other regional centers), competing without agreed frameworks.

(c) The Global South - countries in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East are asserting autonomy and resisting being locked into a U.S.- or Western-led order - multipolarity isn’t just about great powers - middle and emerging states are also shaping the rules, not just reacting to them.

(d) China is no longer a challenger within the Western order - it’s actively offering an alternative framework shaped by its own norms and priorities - China’s vision is not a mirror of Western liberalism but a distinct set of governance principles that emphasize state sovereignty, stability, and development in its own terms.

(e) The breakdown of a single world order does not guarantee a stable successor; instead, the coming era is likely to be messy, unpredictable, and unstable. Rather than a smooth transition to a coherent multipolar order, we are entering a period of disorderly adjustment where power competition and disagreement on the rules of the new world order generate volatility.

Across all five pieces in the NYT, there is a shared analytical theme: The old post-1945, U.S.-led order is eroding, and multiple visions of a new order are competing, without a single clear successor, increasing uncertainty and strategic competition.

To quote NYT: “Some of the most existential threats that will confront great powers this century – future pandemics, climate change, weaponized artificial intelligence, cyberattacks and transnational terrorism – simply cannot be managed alone.”