Cover Story
What Asia Must Do
Asia is under the dangerous illusion of distance that it can remain an observer rather than a participant in this unfolding disorder

The world order that took shape after the devastation of World War II is no longer merely under strain — it is visibly rupturing. The carefully constructed balance between power and principle, geopolitics and international law, sovereignty and collective security is giving way to a far harsher reality. Across continents, the norms that once constrained great powers are eroding, and institutions designed to manage conflict are losing relevance. Most affected are the West, Latin America, and the Middle East. So far, Asia is insulated.
The question Asia must now confront is not whether this order is changing but how exposed the region is when it finally gives way. Can Asia be the next battleground? Is it about time that Asia must wake up to a fragmenting system? The answer lies in the evolving geopolitics around the world.
Recent events should leave little room for complacency. The removal of Venezuela’s president and rupture of US and Caribbean nations’ alliances, the cracks in NATO over Greenland’s sovereignty, the grinding and unresolved war in Ukraine, and deepening fractures within the Western alliance system all point to the same conclusion: power politics has returned as the organising principle of global affairs.
There is a collapse of assumptions. For nearly eight decades, much of the world operated on the assumption that international disputes — however intense — would ultimately be moderated by multilateral processes. The United Nations, despite its flaws, served as a symbolic and sometimes practical brake on unilateralism. UN resolutions, international law, and collective legitimacy mattered.
For smaller and middle-ranking states, this is not an abstract concern; it is an existential one. If sovereignty can be overridden in one region, it can be questioned in another.
Equally revealing are the signs of strain within the Western alliance itself. The prolonged war in Ukraine has exhausted political consensus across NATO capitals, exposing divisions over resources, strategy, and long-term commitment. Recent meetings of U.S. and NATO leaders on the sidelines of global economic forums such as Davos have reflected a growing anxiety about alliance coherence.
The recent speech by Canada’s prime minister at Davos, warning of deep fractures in the Western political and economic order, was particularly telling and has sent shockwaves around the globe. Such statements, once confined to academic circles, are now entering mainstream political discourse.
When Western leaders themselves question the durability of the order they once championed, the implications for the rest of the world are profound.
Meanwhile, even within Europe, debates over territorial sovereignty — from the Arctic to Eastern Europe — underscore how fragile long-standing assumptions have become.
The Middle East offers a glimpse into the future of global politics if current trends continue. A single security framework or power broker no longer shapes the region. Instead, it is defined by overlapping conflicts, shifting alliances, and bilateral maneuvering.
The Gaza reconstruction debate has become entangled in broader geopolitical rivalries, while the growing divergence between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates over Yemen highlights how even close partners are recalibrating their interests.
These fractures have reduced the scope for unified regional responses and marginalised multilateral diplomacy. Most notably, these developments are unfolding largely outside the effective control of the United Nations. Resolutions exist, but enforcement does not. Negotiations take place, but legitimacy is fragmented. The lesson is clear: where institutions weaken, power fills the vacuum.
Asia is under the dangerous illusion of distance. So far, much of Asia has remained insulated from the direct shocks shaking Europe, Latin America, and the Middle East. This has fostered a dangerous illusion — that Asia can remain an observer rather than a participant in this unfolding disorder. The belief is misplaced.
Asia is home to some of the world’s most volatile flashpoints: the Taiwan Strait, the South China Sea, the Korean Peninsula, and the unresolved rivalry between India and Pakistan. These are not dormant conflicts; they are managed risks, kept in check by deterrence, diplomacy, and—crucially—the expectation that escalation would be universally condemned and internationally contained. But what happens when the global consensus against unilateral force weakens?
When UN resolutions no longer carry weight, when vetoes paralyse the Security Council, and when powerful states increasingly act first and explain later, the constraints that once prevented escalation begin to erode.
South Asia is the most vulnerable theatre. South Asia occupies a uniquely precarious position in this changing order. It combines nuclear weapons, unresolved territorial disputes, weak regional institutions, and intense great-power interest — a volatile mix in any era, but especially in one marked by declining restraint.
The region lacks a credible collective security architecture. SAARC remains ineffective. Crisis management depends largely on bilateral communication and external mediation — tools that assume external actors are neutral and invested in stability. That assumption is no longer guaranteed.
At the same time, new security arrangements are emerging outside traditional multilateral frameworks. Bilateral and trilateral pacts — such as the evolving Saudi-Pakistan-Turkey security understanding — reflect a broader trend: states are hedging against institutional failure by creating flexible, interest-based alliances.
While such arrangements may offer short-term reassurance, they also signal declining confidence in global mechanisms. The more states bypass the UN system, the faster its relevance erodes.
Today’s world is all about transactions and not many rules. What is emerging is not chaos, but something more unsettling: a transactional world order, where power determines outcomes, alliances are fluid, and norms are invoked selectively. In such a system, smaller states are valued not for their sovereignty, but for their strategic utility.
For South Asia, this raises hard questions. Can the region maintain strategic autonomy without becoming a pawn in larger rivalries? Can it rely on deterrence alone when institutional safeguards are weakening? Can economic interdependence offset strategic vulnerability?
These are no longer academic debates. They are policy questions that demand urgent attention.
The challenge confronting Asia is:
“What Asia Must Do”. Asia cannot prevent the erosion of the post-1945 order on its own. But it can shape how vulnerable it becomes to its collapse.
First, Asian states — especially in South Asia — must invest in regional crisis-management mechanisms, however modest. Even limited confidence-building measures are preferable to strategic silence.
Second, diversification of partnerships is essential. Over-reliance on any single power bloc — Western or otherwise — increases vulnerability in a transactional world.
Third, Asia must defend multilateralism not as nostalgia, but as self-interest. The UN may be weakened, but abandoning it altogether would accelerate a slide towards unchecked power politics.
Finally, strategic maturity requires recognising that non-alignment today does not mean disengagement, but active, interest-driven diplomacy.
Asia is not doomed to become a battleground. But unless states recognise the depth of the ruptures in the global order and act decisively, the region could find itself drawn into conflicts shaped by others’ interests, not its own.
The test for South Asia is straightforward, yet daunting: Can it preserve sovereignty, stability, and agency in an era where old rules are fading, and new orders are yet to consolidate?
The choice ahead is very clear. The post-World War II order may not collapse overnight. But it is undeniably slipping. As it does, Asia — and South Asia most of all — must decide whether it will remain reactive or become strategically prepared.
History offers a sobering lesson: regions that assume they are insulated from global upheaval are often the ones most brutally awakened by it.
The question is no longer whether the world order is rupturing. It is whether Asia is ready for what comes after.
The writer is the former president of the Overseas Investors Chamber of Commerce and Industry.


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