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What India perceives as its objectives through the SAGAR and MAHASAGAR concepts are indeed ambitious, yet not aligned with the ground reality
Realising the importance of the maritime domain, India has been investing in its naval and maritime forces for the last four decades, and in 2015, it was considered that the investment came to fruition when Prime Minister Modi launched SAGAR (in Hindi, Ocean), an acronym for ‘Security And Growth for All in the Region.’ It was aimed to foster India’s maritime engagement within the region through security cooperation, trade and economic integration, capacity building, disaster management, sustainable development, connectivity, and infrastructure.
All in all, matters related to the maritime domain, including maritime security, the blue economy, maritime infrastructure development, humanitarian assistance, the prudent use of marine resources, port construction, naval base development, and the provision of digital services in the region, were focused on enhancing India’s influence among the smaller littorals. Through SAGAR, India has attempted to position itself as a net security provider in the IOR by offering aid, intelligence, and other forms of assistance to less developed countries such as Sri Lanka, the Maldives, Seychelles, and Mauritius. India secured spaces in Seychelles and Mauritius to establish naval footprints and, in fact, gained access to the maritime routes leading through these countries to secure its Sea Lines of Communication.
In 2019, the US unveiled the Indo-Pacific Strategy, outlining a sea-based cooperative mechanism in the Indian and Pacific Oceans to counter growing Chinese influence. The strategy was claimed to be based on multilateralism. Yet, it worked through minilateralism, whereby small groups of like-minded nations were formed, and collaboration in the realms of politics, diplomacy, military, and technology was forged among the US and its partners. Groups such as QUAD, QUAD 2.0, I2U2, and AUKUS, therefore, emerged as a result.
India has been granted special status in this arrangement and was epitomised as the Net Security Provider, a dream it was already working on through SAGAR. This emboldened India, which commenced its preparations primarily against China. In 2025, the Indian government announced the extension of SAGAR as MAHASAGAR (in Hindi, meaning “Great Ocean”)-“Mutual and Holistic Advancement for Security and Growth Across Regions.”Although presented in sequence, a significant difference appears between the two concepts, as a much broader canvas of interests in the maritime landscape is envisioned in the latter. For instance, the use of the word “Regions” instead of “Region” clearly depicts Blue Water ambitions of the Indian Navy.
It is not to be overlooked that India’s actual ambition is to compete with China to curtail its influence. India, through such initiatives, sought to assert its relevance and dominance, especially over the small island states, so that they remained in its fold and did not stray away, drifting towards China. As a test case for proving its worth, India attacked Pakistan in May 2025, post-Pahalgam incident, and perceived it would be convenient to subjugate its western nuclear neighbour. Conversely, Pakistan’s resolute response in the air and on land made India run towards the US, asking for a ceasefire. The situation at sea was very interesting. Indian Navy, with all its might, loitered at 400 to 500 nautical miles away from Pakistan and did not dare to come closer, even though the naval leadership had been given a go-ahead by PM Modi to take necessary steps, also in the backdrop of the Indian media and political leadership’s statements that the Indian Navy would destroy Pakistan.
Even after the event, there have been consistent assertions from Indian political and military leadership that Operation Sindoor 2.0 would be opened from the sea. Why the Indian leadership is making such statements, despite their navy being unable to open the seafront in the May 2025 conflict, is the question most frequently asked. It appears that the Indian leadership is relying on the naval front because the Indian Navy was the only force that suffered no physical losses during the May 2025 conflict. It, however, suffered significant reputational loss as it could not open the much-anticipated seafront against a much smaller-sized navy.
There have been consistent assertions from Indian political and military leadership that Operation Sindoor 2.0 would be opened from the sea
Another key aspect of SAGAR or MAHASAGAR is strengthening maritime security, especially against Non-Traditional Security Threats such as piracy, terrorism, illegal fishing, drug trafficking, smuggling, poaching, and climate change. In February 2025, the Pakistan Navy held the biennial AMAN exercise at Karachi. It also encompassed AMAN Dialogue, in which more than 60 countries were represented. All speakers from around the world were unanimous in seeking collaboration to address non-traditional security threats and affirmed that no single country could address these threats alone. It effectively checkmated India’s assertion and aspiration of becoming a Net Security Provider in the region, meaning that the Indian Navy alone cannot achieve what it aspires to. The effects of climate change in the area are severe and affect all countries. Understandably, a single nation cannot combat such effects alone, necessitating considerable consistent collaboration and cooperation among regional countries.
What India perceived to achieve through its SAGAR and MAHASAGAR concepts is indeed ambitious yet not aligned with the ground reality. It portrayed itself as the saviour for the smaller regional countries, but could not prove it. Especially its confrontation with Pakistan during May 2025 shattered Indian dreams, and before the Indian Navy could receive substantial damages at the hands of the Pakistan Navy and Air Force, the US rescued India by effecting a ceasefire.
Both India and the US have recently gone into a 10-Year Defense Framework Agreement, enhancing cooperation in technology, intel sharing, and joint exercises for regional stability in the Indo-Pacific. This framework builds on existing pacts (LEMOA, COMCASA, BECA) and provides a roadmap for deeper interoperability, military coordination, and co-production, marking a new era for the strategic partnership. How much the Indian Navy will be able to leverage it to further its capability, capacity, and strength is a question only time will answer. However, the fanfare surrounding various notions and slogans is likely to continue in the near future, given that India has made substantial investments in its maritime forces and wishes to reap the benefits through the sea.
The writer is a communication strategist at the Institute of Regional Studies, Islamabad, and can be reached at reema.asim81@gmail.com


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