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Kabul vs. Kandahar

In today’s Afghanistan, ruled by the Taliban 2.0, the real power of the Taliban lies in Kandahar, not in Kabul

By Ambassador Sanaullah | February 2026


There is renewed interest in the Taliban’s ability to shake off its diplomatic isolation. In this context, a comparison is often made as to whether Taliban 0.2 is better organized than Taliban 0.1 in ultimately securing diplomatic recognition. How far the second administration could adopt a softer position in ideological practices remains enigmatic to outsiders, but not to Afghans, who fully know where the real power of the Taliban lies—in Kandahar, not in Kabul.

A strong opinion exists among Western policymakers that not much has changed in the ideological framework of the Taliban leadership and their internal governance practices. For instance, the Financial Times of 4 December 2025 carried an article claiming that Taliban -0.2 is “neither ideologically nor programmatically different from Taliban 0.1.” The article, however, admits that Afghanistan’s domestic and regional realities are unlike those of 1996–2001. India, Iran, China, and Russia back the present Taliban set-up. Pakistan, which supported the Taliban, is now being treated as a frenemy at best.

If the internal composition of the Taliban as a ruling group is considered, it is clear that during the 1996–2001 regime, the Taliban—like today—were divided, with Mullah Omar’s own inner group based in Kandahar enjoying near-absolute power, and a bureaucratic set-up in Kabul. The Kandahar-based group was effectively the true power center among the coalition of semi-autonomous networks that formed the Taliban’s ruling machinery. Its rival group, the Kabul-based group, differed in origin, ideology, exposure, and administrative style.

The Kandahar Group (“Core Taliban”) comprised senior founding clerics from madrassas in Kandahar and Helmand, and commanders loyal to Omar personally. They adhered to a strict Deobandi and tribal Pashtunwali worldview. They subscribed to hardline, ideology-based enforcement of Sharia as interpreted by Omar. On top of this, they believed in and practiced cultural puritanism. They were wary of the outside world; most of them had no background in dealing with foreigners.

This Group believed its legitimacy came from jihad, not diplomacy. They guarded at all costs their ties with front-line field commanders who wanted strict Sharia implementation and absolute power for themselves. The Group conceived itself as the rightful ruler for carrying out real jihad. It therefore took direct control of key state organs, including the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Interior, intelligence agencies, the Supreme Court, and the Ministry for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice. In effect, the Kandahar Group controlled all critical national matters—war strategy, foreign relations with al-Qaeda, internal security, appointments of governors and judges.

Its members deemed the Kabul Group, which mainly consisted of technocrats such as former bureaucrats, administrators, diplomats, academics, and lower-level mujahideen, too close to the international community and too mindful of global image rather than Afghanistan as an Islamic state. They were seen as a group willing to negotiate on economic and political matters with outside powers, the UN, NGOs, and foreign diplomats. The Group preferred less ideological rigidity but could not oppose the Kandahar Group’s adherence to Mullah Omar’s interpretation of Islamic Sharia. It also aspired to better relations with international actors and attempted quiet diplomacy with Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. Both states pressed Omar to reconsider his relationship with al-Qaeda after the 1998 embassy bombings, but failed. Omar did not budge an inch from his stance. The Kabul Group was left to manage minor ministries such as health, agriculture, finance, urban administration, and coordination with international agencies based in Kabul.

Taliban 0.1 had no formal “cabinet system.” The actual decision-making body under Omar was his inner circle (the Quetta Shura), and in important matters, even this inner circle was sometimes ignored, with decisions taken solely by Mullah Omar (such as the destruction of the Buddhas of Bamiyan). Omar rarely attended cabinet meetings; decisions were relayed through trusted deputies. The system was highly centralized, and no leader within either group could challenge or defy his decrees.


The differences between these two groups can be gauged from how the two groups conducted themselves in the wake of the 9/11 US military intervention in Afghanistan. The Kandahar Group (including Omar’s circle) refused to hand over Osama bin Laden, declared the US attack a holy war, sought help from Islamic countries, and adopted a military strategy of retreating from Kabul and returning to guerrilla warfare. On the other hand, the Kabul Group favored negotiations with the US, supported a conditional handover of bin Laden, and some members defected or surrendered when Kabul fell.

Taliban 0.2 rule differs from Taliban 0.1 only in tone and external posturing

If we now compare domestic practices and social norms, the differences seem trivial; deep down, conservatism runs freely. In Taliban 0.1, near-total female illiteracy was institutionalized. Taliban 0.1 banned all education immediately—primary, secondary, and higher. Women were forbidden from teaching boys or girls. They allowed only very limited religious instruction for young girls in some rural madrassas.

Women were banned from almost all employment, including government, the private sector, and the media. Female doctors and nurses were sometimes allowed due to necessity or emergency; even then, their movement was restricted and humiliating. Widows without male guardians faced starvation. Women could only be treated by female doctors, yet female doctors were banned from working. Women were forbidden from leaving their homes without a mahram and were beaten for walking alone, laughing, or wearing shoes that made a sound.

Under Taliban 0.2 (2021–present), repression is phased, ambiguous, and strategically placed. For instance, post-2021, girls have been allowed education up to the primary level (with limits), while the rest remains banned. Taliban 0.2 allows minimal functional participation of women in healthcare but does not accept it ideologically. Female doctors are still allowed, but the ban continues to prevent the training of new female health professionals. Mahram requirements restrict access in practice. While Taliban 0.1 caused the collapse of healthcare immediately, Taliban 0.2 has allowed it to decay structurally.

Regarding social freedoms, Taliban 0.2 follows the old ideology with softer enforcement optics. It controls the narrative. In cases of dress-code violations, the same approach is followed. Women are partially banned from media and completely banned from advertising, parks, and parlors.

Taliban 0.2 has a cabinet, but decisions or edicts still originate from Kandahar. The current Taliban regime has learned from 1996–2001 that sudden total repression invites collapse and invasion. Today, it employs gradualism, legal ambiguity, and economic coercion. This is why many scholars now argue that Taliban 0.2 is not “reformed Taliban” but rather “Taliban-0.1 with strategic patience.”

Of the two groups, core power still rests with the Kandahar Group, which makes the final decisions. The Kabul Group—although more powerful than its predecessor—still has minimal influence in the decision-making process and cannot override Kandahar’s decrees. All major decrees so far have been issued directly from Kandahar, bypassing Kabul ministries entirely.

Taliban 0.2 rule differs from Taliban 0.1 only in tone and external posturing. They present themselves as more pragmatic, more bureaucratic, and openly engaged in diplomatic and economic outreach. However, deeper analysis reveals that the core policies of gender exclusion, harsh social control, and limits on political pluralism remain unchanged. Taliban-0.2 operates a fuller state bureaucracy—ministries, official notifications, taxation systems, and international negotiations—rather than the looser emirate of the 1990s.

There is little likelihood that the Kandahar Group will abandon its hardline interpretation of Islam and the Pashtunwali code. They will continue to resist politically driven governance and liberal models of rule. Any ideological relaxation is viewed as a serious threat to the Taliban’s “Islamic identity,” a fear rooted in the possibility of internal fragmentation. This Group would rather remain as it is than be recognized as the de jure government of Afghanistan by the international community. Kandahar values purity over diplomacy. The Kabul Group will effectively remain subservient to the Kandahar Group, though its leader is not as powerful or as respected within the Taliban rank and file as Mullah Omar was.

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