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Foreign Policy Faultline

No country can pursue an independent foreign policy with a sick economy

By Ambassador M. Alam Brohi | November 2025

Let’s briefly revisit the past. A conference on Pakistan’s foreign policy was held at the Pakistan-American Cultural Center in Karachi. The speakers highlighted the lapses in foreign policy. In a detailed speech, this writer endeavored to put the subject in a proper perspective. This write-up is excerpted from that speech.

A nation’s foreign policy cannot be formulated in isolation. It is the continuation of its political and economic conditions at home. However, a country’s foreign policy, like all other policies, is a strategic roadmap to achieve a well-defined set of political, economic, and security objectives from interaction with certain countries, regional and international organizations. The identification of the national interests prepares the pitch for the work of diplomats. The envoys assigned to various countries under the guidance of their Ministry work out ways and means within the bounds of the Vienna Conventions to realize these objectives.

The foreign envoys are the most watched people. All their moves, embraces, smiles, sweet talk, lunches, and presents are linked to a purpose. All their words, sentences, gestures, optics, body language, confidence, or lack thereof are studied and assessed, and conclusions drawn. Hence, the famous saying that there is no free lunch in diplomacy. Another equally famous saying is that there is neither a permanent friendship nor a permanent enmity in inter-state relations because bilateral relations between states are constantly reviewed, reappraised, and recalibrated in accordance with the changing geopolitical, geo-economic, and geo-strategic dynamics.

George Kennan, a US diplomat considered a maestro of diplomacy like Dr. Henry Kissinger, says that if a country achieves 50% of its objectives in given years, it can be credited with a successful foreign policy. No country achieves its 100% objectives. Diplomacy is a continuous, constant, and persistent endeavor. Every country faces lows and highs in the execution of its foreign policy. Measured by this yardstick, the foreign policy of Pakistan, fairly speaking, has not been an utter disappointment as depicted by cynics, notwithstanding some blunders on our part in 78 years. Pakistan faced peculiar and extraordinary circumstances at the inception that drove its foreign policy in one direction - alliances for the first two decades or so.

Pakistan’s foreign policy could be safely credited with some monumental successes. This is my honest view. These could roughly include: a) secured economic and security means for survival after inception; b) a built-up economy based on the manufacturing industry. The Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation, along with the Industrial Development Bank, Agricultural Development Bank and WAPDA, played a monumental role in developing the industrial, manufacturing and agricultural, water and power sectors, and strengthened defence through supply of weapons from the USA; c) kept Kashmir alive in the international forums, though failing to mount enough pressure on India to implement the UN Resolutions; d) presided over UNGA, and elected many times as non-permanent member of UNSC; e) actively helped Morocco, Algeria, South Africa and Namibia in their freedom movements; f) expertly shifted from alliances to bilateralism forging friendship with China; g) successfully mediated between China and US in the peak of Cold War; h) successfully stopped the thrust of Soviets to reach warm waters; I) managed to acquire nuclear technology; j) plays highly visible role in regional and international organizations particularly UN, OIC, ECO, SCO, ASEAN, k) significantly contributes to the UN Peacekeeping Missions; L) has successful reset relations with Russia, and now USA. There must be some other successes which I may have forgotten to recount.

A Bird’s Eye View
Pakistan’s relations with the USA have witnessed cyclical highs and lows. We remained a close ally of the US during the Cold War, but were embargoed for any economic or military supplies in the aftermath of the 1965 war. The scheduled visit of President Ayub Khan to Washington, DC, was postponed without consulting Islamabad. We had already shifted from alliances to bilateralism, forging close relations with the Republic of China. However, China was still trying to overcome the consequences of the Cultural Revolution upheaval. On the advice of then Foreign Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, President Ayub Khan visited Moscow. Though eager to befriend Pakistan, the Kremlin was reluctant to trust our leadership to reset bilateral relations.

After signing the Soviet-moderated Tashkent Treaty, in which no mention of Kashmir was made, Ayub Khan emerged as a vulnerable leader. He dropped Z. A. Bhutto from his cabinet after his return from the USA in 1966. Late. Bhutto claimed that he was sent home at the behest of President Johnson. Ayub Khan could not face the internal turmoil and handed over power to his Commander-in-Chief, General Yahya Khan. He mediated between the USA and China, and arranged a clandestine visit of Dr. Henry Kissinger to Beijing, where he held talks with Premier Chou Enlai, paving the way for the visit of President Nixon. General Yahya Khan did not prove to be a politically wise leader. He lost the bigger half of the country, denying power to the Awami League.

The most documented weakness in our foreign policy formulation is the civil-military imbalance

Z. A. Bhutto came to power. He resolved the post-war issues with India, reset relations with both superpowers, reinvigorated ties with the Muslim world, reactivated Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), and enabled us to stand shoulder to shoulder with the comity of nations. General Zia-ul-Haq plunged the country into the American war against the Soviets in Afghanistan. To some analysts, it was necessary to get the Soviets bogged down in Afghanistan to stem their thrust towards warm waters. However, the consequences of this war were very bad for Pakistan. One credit to General Zia that he never wavered in his resolve to continue the nuclear program despite American pressures. During his tenure, the nuts and bolts of the bomb were tightened.

The successive civilian governments of PPP and PML (N) were never allowed to work independently. There was a lot of goodwill during both terms of Benazir Bhutto’s premiership. We could not get it translated into tangible benefits. In his first tenure, Nawaz Sharif remained enmeshed with the Afghan leaders’ internal bickering and could not succeed in installing a credible interim government in Kabul. In his second tenure, he faced the ugly consequences of the Kargil war and unnecessary quarrels with his army chiefs. General Pervez Musharraf again plunged the country into the American anti-terrorism war. This war’s implications continued reverberating until 2018, when Prime Minister Imran Khan visited Washington.

Pakistan’s foreign policy is often described as reactive, security-centric, and alliance-dependent. While these observations are correct, though not enough to help us reach the deeper truth: Pakistan’s foreign policy has been caught between ambition and confusion, principle and pragmatism, identity and insecurity. The failures in the foreign policy are least because of the incompetence of our envoys. These reasons lie somewhere else. Pakistan has produced a large number of world-renowned diplomats. They included Zafarullah Khan, Z.A. Bhutto, Aziz Ahmed, Agha Shahi, Agha Hilaly, Sardar Shahnawaz, Iqbal Akhund, Niaz A. Naik, Abdul Sattar, Shaharyar M. Khan, and Najmuddin Shaikh. Among the new generation, we have a constellation of equally brilliant diplomats who continue to serve their nation in one way or another.

However, there are a few fault lines that weaken our foreign policy, regional standing, and global relevance.

The most documented weakness in our foreign policy formulation is the civil-military imbalance. Security institutions have historically dominated strategic decisions, particularly about India, Afghanistan, and the USA. The civilian leadership often reacts instead of leading. Secondly, our defence policy is not congruent with our economy. We have a weak economy, primarily dependent on loans, aid, and bailouts. The military might alone cannot sustain a nation; true security rests in economic strength. Thirdly, we seriously think of replacing strategic depth with economic depth. Trade, investment, and economic connectivity, instead of foreign soil or proxy wars, shall define Pakistan’s frontiers. Fourthly, we should carefully follow the principle of non-alignment in our relations with different countries, resisting alliances that compromise our sovereignty. Fifthly, Pakistan’s foreign policy lacks consistency and is more geared to short-termism. Sixthly, we have always suffered from identity contradiction. While priding ourselves on being a modern Islamic Republic, a democracy, a tolerant and progressive state, our laws, institutional approach, performance, and foreign engagements often contradict our claims.

Seventhly, while supporting the Kashmir issue, we should uphold principled diplomacy without letting the issue consume all our energies, isolate us at the global level, or fuel proxy conflicts from the adversary. Eighthly, no country can pursue an independent foreign policy with a sick economy. Excessive reliance on aid, loans, and bailouts limits our sovereign freedom and bargaining power at the regional and global level. The economic self-sufficiency through trade and FDI should be our tool of diplomacy. We should heavily invest in education, technology, and capacity building of our youth. China followed this economic model with brilliant results. Ninthly, despite a strategic location, Pakistan remains under-engaged in its immediate neighborhood; we are not connected with Central Asia’s energy corridor; ties with South Asia have regressed; Afghanistan remains a security challenge instead of a trade and economic partner. A while ago, our traditional friends in the Middle East were pivoting to India and China. With a shaky regional foundation, global ambitions will remain a distant dream.

The foreign policy is not only a tool for survival, but it is also a mirror of national character. If we continue down the path of identity contradictions and economic dependency, we shall remain a peripheral actor in a fast-moving world. We should go for bold and serious political and economic reforms at home, doing away with the illegitimate and immoral capture of state resources by the elite, to claim our rightful role in regional and global affairs. At home, we should show serious respect for the Constitution, democracy, civil supremacy, and provincial rights. This is a sine qua non for political stability and national strength.

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