The N-Factor

The nuclear world is like a schoolyard: Five kids own AK-47s capable of bringing down airplanes. They tell the rest, “Don’t bring sharp pencils to class. It’s dangerous.” One nerdy kid builds a pencil sharpener. The bullies surround him, saying, “If you sharpen that... we’ll call it aggression.” He asks, “Then how come you carry guns in your school bags?” “That’s different. We’re responsible bullies.”

This bitterly sarcastic anecdote offers more than just humour—it lays bare the duplicity of global nuclear diplomacy. The so-called “responsible bullies” are the five recognized nuclear weapon states under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)—the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Russia, and China. These states not only possess the most destructive weapons ever created but also reserve the exclusive right to regulate who else may even dream of acquiring them.

Within this absurd asymmetry lies the story of Iran—a country labeled defiant and dangerous for daring to sharpen its metaphorical pencil in a world dominated by nuclear AK-47s.

Iran’s nuclear journey did not begin in the shadows. It began under the warm glow of American partnership. In the 1950s, the United States launched the “Atom for Peace” initiative, designed to share nuclear technology for peaceful purposes with allied nations. Iran, under Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, was an eager participant. With direct U.S. assistance, Iran received its first research reactor from the American firm General Atomics in 1967. Iranian scientists were trained in American laboratories. Washington even envisioned Iran as a potential nuclear energy hub for the Middle East.

At that point, Iran’s nuclear aspirations were neither hidden nor feared. Tehran had plans to build over twenty nuclear reactors, with contracts signed with West German and French firms. What followed, however, altered the entire trajectory.

The 1979 Islamic Revolution transformed Iran from a Western-allied monarchy into a theocratic republic fiercely opposed to American influence. Washington’s reaction was swift and unforgiving. Nuclear cooperation stopped. Contracts were canceled. What had once been a Western-endorsed energy programme suddenly became a threat.

The eight-year-long Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988) further deepened Tehran’s distrust. Iraq, supported by Western and Arab powers, unleashed chemical weapons on Iranian troops with minimal international condemnation.

This trauma was pivotal. Iran realized it could not rely on international norms or treaties for its survival. As the only non-nuclear country among regional rivals (Israel, Pakistan, and India), Iran began to think not just in terms of scientific progress, but national security. The seeds of nuclear deterrence were planted—not in secrecy, but in betrayal.

In 1968, long before its ideological rupture with the West, Iran signed the NPT and ratified it in 1970. The Treaty was supposed to be a grand bargain: non-nuclear states agreed not to pursue nuclear weapons, and in return, nuclear states promised disarmament and peaceful cooperation in nuclear energy. But the bargain was, and remains, flawed. While Iran upheld its obligations under the NPT—submitting to inspections and declarations—it witnessed the five nuclear powers expand, modernize, and harden their arsenals.

Meanwhile, Israel never signed the Treaty and is widely believed to possess a substantial nuclear arsenal, aided by Western ambiguity. To Iran, the NPT began to resemble a contract written in invisible ink. It constrained the weak while rewarding the powerful. Its core premise—that disarmament and fairness would follow compliance—was belied by the actions of its own architects.

The specter of Israel looms large in Iranian nuclear calculus. Israel’s policy of nuclear opacity—neither confirming nor denying its arsenal—serves as both deterrence and deception. Supported politically, economically, and militarily by the U.S, Israel is considered an unspoken exception to the rules.