A Bridge Too Far

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In an ideal world, civilian will has constitutional and institutional supremacy of the armed forces. The appointment of the new Chief of Army Staff (COAS) will not be such a big deal. All institutions would work well within the constitutional framework without trespassing the sphere of any other organs of the state. And the military would not have an over-arching, larger-than-life role, influence or arbitrary clout…but in an ideal world alone, which is generally well-divorced from the environment, the realities on ground and the personalities of the key stake holders.

This is an effort to pinpoint the reasons for Pakistan’s ‘seemingly’ lop-sided civil-military relations, institutional chasms and the suggested way forward.

First is the cause and effect of the present state of civilian supremacy of the armed forces. It was run up to the first martial law of President Ayub (1958) that functionaries of the Ministry of Defence would keep the top brass waiting outside their offices in their naïve gimmickry to demonstrate civilian supremacy over the military. Military-related correspondence would take longer than life to see the light of approval in the officialdom. And no effort would be spared to replicate the Indian example in doing so.

All this was happening under a non-performing, ever-bickering political elite and a manipulative bureaucracy that did not deliver to the aspirations of the general public. The military meanwhile searched for its role, and its meaning and interpretation in Pakistan’s ever-changing constitutions. In this ensuing unequal contest, the military, the most organized force pitted against a divided and divisive political elite, was a clear winner. It has imposed its will repeatedly ever since under necessity, real threat, adventurism, and personal ambition in different combinations.

In 1953, the Governor-General Ghulam Muhammad dismissed the government of the PM Khawaja Nazimuddin, despite its solid support in the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan. In 1954, he dismissed the Assembly to thwart constitutional amendments to restrict the Governor-General’s powers. The then courts failed to support the representative assembly. When Maulvi Tamizuddin Khan, president of the Assembly, challenged the move, except for one dissenting opinion, all judges supported the dismissal under the ‘doctrine of necessity’. This verdict has haunted Pakistan’s democracy ever since, paving the way for constitutional coups and military interventions. In 1958, President Iskander Mirza dismissed the Constituent Assembly and government of PM Feroz Khan Noon; he appointed COAS Gen. Ayub Khan as the Chief Martial Law Administrator (CMLA), but 13-days later, the CMLA deposed Mirza to become president himself.

In the 1977 coup (Operation FAIRPLAY), General Zia-ul-Haq, packed off PM Z.A. Bhutto, suspending the Constitution. Election-rigging, FSF excesses and dictatorial streaks were cited as some reasons among many for Bhutto’s downfall. Zia’s stint in power was both cherished and criticized. The country under him enjoyed political and economic stability and international relevance.

Come 1999, senior officers loyal to COAS Gen Pervez Musharraf, staged another coup, arrested PM Nawaz Sharif and his ministers, once Sharif dismissed Musharraf, and denied landing to his plane. Musharraf’s decade-long rule stabilized Pakistan economically and cashiered on its geo-strategic relevance. Ever since, the military has exercised its influence from behind the scenes, sometimes not so discreetly.

“Power emanates from the barrel of the gun," said Mao Zedong. This pragmatic realization and its acceptance have brought progress, prosperity and development to China. Clearly demarcated turfs can only be balanced in developing democracies by acknowledging and accepting power dynamics and not denying them. Nobody can deny that the security driven existence of Pakistan, coupled with a diverse and divergent population mix, has resulted in a heavy reliance on its security establishment. While there is need for a balance in the structures of governance, there is also a need for avoidance of a vacuum at any given time, which is filled by those holding the actual power. Former president Gen. Musharraf's idea of having a National Security Council, composed of all stakeholders, including the Armed Forces, as a way of "keeping them in to keep them out" needs serious consideration.

Our civilian presidents have also done their bit to contribute to the political instability. The then President Ghulam Ishaq Khan dismissed both Benazir Bhutto in 1990 and Nawaz Sharif in 1993. Dismissal of Sharif led to his own ouster also, under the reported ‘[Gen] Waheed Kakar formula’. Then there are unsuccessful coup attempts; the 1951 left-wing Rawalpindi conspiracy by Maj. Gen Akbar Khan Rangroot; the 1980 plot by Maj Gen Tajammul Hussain Malik to assassinate Zia-ul-Haq; the 1995 Islamic extremists’ coup attempt against PM Benazir Bhutto by Maj Gen Zahirul Islam Abbasi; and Mustafa Khar’s coup attempt from his exile against Gen. Zia as revealed by his ex-wife Tehmina Durrani in her book ‘My Feudal Lord’.

Ideally speaking, no. They should confine themselves to the barracks, the borders and the battlefield, not stray into the corridors of power.

Recently, Gen Bajwa exhorted the army cadets to steer clear of politics, but the increasing polarisation in the country provides fertile ground for them to step in (or overstep) as arbiters. The army’s penchant for politics is legendary. It has ruled directly for nearly 30 odd years and called the shots from behind the scenes for the rest. The politicians are equally culpable; they have ceded more and more space to the army. They are convinced that the road to the throne passes through the GHQ; further, any departure from the ‘written script’, on foreign policy, security issues and defence budgets - the army’s exclusive domain - could have dire consequences for them. Cases in point: Benazir Bhutto, Nawaz Sharif, Imran Khan. Not surprisingly, it was left to the COAS to mend fences with the US after the ousted Khan’s angry insinuations against the superpower.

Khan recently remarked that he could not realise his dream of a Naya Pakistan as PM, because the orders came from elsewhere - a scathing indictment of those who allegedly brought him to power. Ironically, it was the same Khan, who lambasted his benefactors for remaining ’neutral’’when he was removed through a no-confidence move. Earlier, Nawaz Sharif had publicly denounced the COAS and ISI chief for propping up PTI against PML-N; subsequently, his daughter and other party stalwarts sought an audience with them. And now the Sharifs are desperate to get a COAS of their own choice, as is Khan. It is rumoured that he was engaged in back-door talks with some senior generals to secure a snap election date.

The all-time dilemma of the politicians: you can’t do with them, you can’t do without them...

A dispassionate analysis points to numerous causative factors for such protracted instability. The list goes on from lack of institutional robustness to corruption by dynasts, public pressure on the military to intervene, lack of delivery by elected governments, foreign intervention, our impatience or low patience threshold for any meaningful governance and effects after change of government. No sooner a government is sworn-in, the Opposition and other stakeholders start ill-meaning manipulation and conspiracies to bring it down. Power-grab and the attendant financial, social, psychological and political windfall remains the only and only aim of the power elite – the ashhrafiyya. Military remains a circumspect silent observer, a backdoor interventionist, a facilitator of change or itself an agent of change.

From the cited causative norms, we can discern some antidote. The first is ‘Delivery’. The battle of civilian supremacy of the armed forces would be won in the garbage-strewn and crime-infested streets of Karachi, among the flood-ravaged villages of Sindh, in the terrorist-infested tribal districts of KPK and in the schools and hospitals of Balochistan. Sadly, civilian capability and ability leaves yawning gaps. Delivery and good governance alone would send the military back to the barracks. Moreover, the political class has to match the military’s nationalistic outlook, above and beyond narrow partisan, ethnic, provincial, and sectarian parochialism. And that does not happen quite often.

Since Pakistan’s founding party, the All India Muslim League, later renamed as Pakistan Muslim League, proved to be a weak political force after Pakistan appeared on the world map as an independent state. Pakistan Muslim League did not change the land holdings and structure of states. Even refugee camps were looked after by the military. In 1951 elections, the Muslim League was wiped out in East Pakistan. In 1954, those were politicians who welcomed commander-in-chief Gen. Ayub as member of cabinet. On one side, there was a very fragile political craft and on other side Pakistan had to confront India. In doing so, Pakistan military dominated the scene. After 1985 non-party elections, power was not transferred to the majority party. To date, all democratically elected members of the assembly have been accepting this arrangement. Security issues and foreign policy remain with the Establishment and will continue to do so until the country’s political parties establish real democracy in their own parties and work as political parties not as family proprietors.

The Kayani-engendered “self-restraint” worked until the 2022 Ramzan saga. It may still prevent outright intervention, if players of the political hardball respect the military. Derogatory, insulting and less than graceful opinions against the military are never taken kindly.

Second, institutional boundaries need to be respected by all. However, this virtue cannot be injected unless voluntarily imposed with a matter-of-fact ruthlessness. The Executive, as experienced, refers politically risky decisions to the Judiciary, which exercises an enthusiastic overreach and, in the process, creates a parallel executive. The Legislature remains a venue for political filibuster and point-scoring, instead of making laws and overseeing their implementation. The Media - free and unrestrained - is manipulated, manipulative and beholden to the TRPs (Target Rating Points) war - or money - to be more precise. Every now and then, it brews a storm in Pakistan’s tea cup from seemingly frivolous issues. The government and the Opposition are perpetually locked in verbal duels rather than governance and constructive criticism. So, it is not surprising when traders take their grievances to the Army Chief.

Over the years, the armed forces have become so deeply entrenched and nourished so many political parties that at this stage, it is practically impossible to extricate the forces from the political decision making. Why should they be is a more thought-provoking question. Unfortunately, in most Third World countries, they are involved and Pakistan is no exception. In fact, due to outstanding problems with neighbours, with India having fought two full-fledged wars, our armed forces are in a more politically dominant position than most other Third World countries. I would say that actually here they are not part of any troika but leaders of every troika with dominant persons in each troika look up to them for help and assistance during critical phases of politics.

Pakistan inherited its share of the armed forces, including Army, Navy and Air Force, from the battle-hardened and experienced British Indian armed forces at the time of the country’s independence soon after conclusion of the Second World War. That provided a sound base to raise the national forces for the new state of Pakistan.

The question of "civilian-military relationship" should not raise its head in normal conditions. In our case since the political situation remains mostly unstable and inviting interventions by military chiefs to remove the civilian governments is not a rare practice, the question about the civilian-military relationship is relevant and needs to be addressed.

Under an honest and dedicated civilian leader as the head of the government, the military leadership would be most comfortable with and at ease to concentrate on its primary responsibilities, thus ruling out any concerns and eliminating questions about the "civilian-military relationship".

The third thing is the change of command at the GHQ. Speculations aside, the fact remains that the appointment, selection and tenure of the COAS and other key military appointments, are used by the incumbent political government for absurd political advantage. It is about time, the political masters constitutionally barred any ‘extension’ to a four-star general, and abstained from interfering with the postings and transfers of high-profile three star generals. This would be a well-deserved favour to the nation, calling at the same time, the politicians’ bluff.

Since the early 1950s, the fragility of political parties and nascent democracy of Pakistan has provided space to the military to challenge civilian authority. To accept General Ayub Khan in Pakistan's cabinet during the mid-1950s as a defence minister reflected the failure of politicians to run the country through a political process. It deepened the nexus between the military and bureaucracy to undermine democracy. Later, the judiciary was co-opted by the military and bureaucracy to rule the country. As a result, since the early 1950s till today, the troika has managed to pull the strings in Pakistan's so-called power structure. The failure of political parties to properly govern the country transformed Pakistan as a deep state where major decisions on foreign and domestic affairs are taken by a handful of individuals representing the military, bureaucracy, judiciary and selected political elite, rightly called the real establishment.

So, under the prevalent state of affairs, with power-hungry and perpetually squabbling politicians always scheming to oust the government of the day, irrespective of the cost involved (as we witness these days), civilian supremacy of the armed forces would remain a pipe-dream; and dreams come true if seen closer to wake-up time.

Pakistan’s tumultuous 75-year history has not seen such an entertaining game of musical chairs played between the military establishment and parliamentary democracy. The game organizer or the man wielding the bell has always been a general, sitting in the barracks in Rawalpindi and is always keen to jump either directly or covertly to take the reins of power.

If one looks back, the periods of Ayub and Musharraf resulted in great economic management and stability. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto derailed the economic progress attainted in the 1970s.

After Zia’s mysterious plane crash, a string of successive so-called democratic rulers, such as Benazir Bhutto, Asif Ali Zardari, Nawaz Sharif and their families began to play musical chairs. They all were corrupt to the core. The loot and plunder is still continuing.

Both parliamentary democracy and military rule failed miserably in this period so the GHQ decided to manage matters from the background by dictating on foreign policy, defence and matters related to the ministry of interior affairs.

Now our judiciary is run on legislations dating back to colonial times and is largely incompetent and corrupt. The lower courts are corrupt to the core and superior courts are dictated by a more powerful Establishment

Pakistan should now opt for a presidential form of government, and an all-powerful honest man who could bring tough and difficult reforms in educational, cultural, and social sectors to make Pakistan a modern state.

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