Cover Story

Look in the Mirror First

It is time Pakistan and its leaders looked at themselves more closely before blaming other nations for their shortcomings.

By Robert M. Hathaway | July 2022

It’s no secret that relations between Pakistan and the United States have been frosty since Joe Biden was sworn in as U.S. president 18 months ago. Indeed, this chilliness reaches back over more than a decade; many Pakistanis overestimated the closeness of ties under Donald Trump after that mercurial president replaced his earlier public denunciations of Pakistan with something approaching bonhomie.
The irritant du jour rocking the relationship at the moment is the allegations leveled by Imran Khan that Washington had a hand in his fall from power earlier this year. The fact that the former prime minister has failed to offer even a shred of evidence to support his claims has not kept millions of his acolytes from believing him.

If Khan possessed even a scrap of proof to support his contentions, wouldn’t he be flaunting it? Instead, he is following a long-standing Pakistani practice of blaming others for his own leadership failings. Indeed, Pakistani politicians from all the country’s major political parties have regularly fobbed off their shortcomings by alluding darkly to conspiracies and hidden hands.

But Pakistanis do not have a monopoly on this predilection for pointing fingers at others as a way to escape serious soul-searching. Witness the discussion (“debate” would be too dignified a term) among American politicians, retired military officers, scholars, and a vast throng of commentators on the reasons for America’s failure in Afghanistan.

It is hard to avoid the conclusion that four U.S. administrations – those of George W. Bush, Barack Obama, Trump, and Biden – made one misjudgment after another throughout the entire duration of the war in Afghanistan. Incredibly, Washington often had very little sense even of whom it was fighting, let alone why. An honest American reckoning about the war must begin at home.

Yet the American narrative of its Afghan debacle often focuses as much on Pakistan as on itself. True, there is a reason for this emphasis on Pakistan. Few informed observers question the proposition that Pakistan and its security establishment provided invaluable military, political, financial, diplomatic, and moral support to the Afghan Taliban for most of the two decades they were battling the Americans.
But Pakistani support for the Taliban, as important as it was, is not the reason the Taliban refused to quit. Pakistani assistance was not the cause of the Taliban’s steely determination, no matter the cost, to rid their country of a foreign occupier. And Pakistani aid is not the explanation for the Taliban’s vision that they could ultimately triumph in this contest with the world’s mightiest military.

It is entirely proper to examine the Pakistani role in America’s defeat and humiliation. But doing so must not keep analysts from asking why a generation of American leaders failed to understand that their vision for Afghanistan was not necessarily that of Pakistan’s. Or why, even in the face of considerable evidence that Pakistan was hedging its bets, did these American leaders double down on their belief that they could persuade or pressure Pakistan to “do more,” as the saying went. It’s far easier to talk of Pakistani duplicity than of American misjudgment and incompetence, but that doesn’t explain why the Taliban sit in Kabul today.

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