New Delhi
Maritime Muscle
India’s defence partnerships are central to its efforts to
counter China. Inviting Australia to the Malabar Naval
Exercises would significantly strengthen its military quotient.
Is Australia on the verge of joining the Malabar Naval Exercises in the Indian Ocean on India’s invitation? The trilateral war exercises involving the navies of India, the United States and Japan have been held since 1992 in the Indo-Pacific region, with Japan officially joining in 2015. Before that, Japanese involvement had been limited to only those years when the exercises were held in the Pacific instead of the Indian Ocean, While informal strategic cooperation among India, the US, Japan and Australia has existed in the form of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) since 2007, Australian involvement in the Malabar exercises would be only the second time when Canberra has been involved in any war exercises. The first Australian involvement in 2007 off the coast of Okinawa received a push-back from China and led to the collapse of any formal QUAD Alliance.
Since then, New Delhi has been traditionally hesitant about involving the Australian Navy in the Malabar exercises. It fears that such a move could look as overtly confrontational to the Chinese who have gradually increased their influence in the Indian Ocean to complement their regional hegemony in the neighbouring waters of the Pacific.
With increasingly deteriorating Sino-Indian relations which led to the recent border disputes and the growing tensions of late, it seems that New Delhi is trying to move towards consolidating both its diplomatic and military alliances under the banner of QUAD, involving the US, Japan and Australia. After years of posturing, New Delhi’s reported openness to Australia’s participation in India’s annual naval exercises around Malabar with the US and Japan, hopefully marks the end of its incredibly slow adaptation to a rapidly changing maritime environment in the Indo-Pacific littoral.
It is obvious that China has not taken the issue lightly. Its media is actively branding the imminent formalized military QUAD Alliance as an Asian version of NATO. Formal inclusion of Australia in the war exercises at Malabar is likely to strengthen the QUAD Alliance and give it a more potent and militarized dimension. With this, all four members of QUAD would hope to become active deterrents to what they surmise an aggressive Beijing and put brakes on its expanding influence in the Pacific as well as Indian Oceans.
As for Indian and Australian bilateral relations, these have become gradually more collaborative. The recent Sino-Indian border tensions seem to be a common factor that has brought New Delhi and Canberra further together, with Canberra seeing China’s growing hegemony in the Pacific as a threat to its own strategic interests. Recently, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and his Australian counterpart, Scott Morrison, held a virtual summit in which they agreed to numerous agreements, including the Mutual Logistics Support Arrangement which allows both countries to use each other’s military bases. The two premiers also affirmed their commitment to elevate the partnership between their two countries towards a “comprehensive strategic partnership” with supposedly new trade and investment partnerships to follow.
What remains to be seen is whether the imminent consolidation of QUAD, both as a diplomatic and military partnership, would be enough to deter China from pursuing its policies in the region. Furthermore, from an economic standpoint, does such overt posturing from the members of the QUAD has the potential of disrupting otherwise stable Chinese supply lines to the four countries? This is a question that only time will answer.![]()
The writer is a research fellow at PIDE, Islamabad and a Cornell University alumnus. He can be reached at rr698@cornell.edu |
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