There are two major blocks to furthering the implementation of the peace negotiations. The first is the bizarre and internationally embarrassing oath-taking of two presidents within just a few hours of each other. Ghani’s ceremony was attended by international representatives, including Khalilzad and US and NATO forces commander General Miller. Ghani was thus provided the much-needed legitimacy by the international community, but his rival and supporters may, in all probability, continue to create hurdles to any potential negotiations and stability. Abdullah is a variable to reckon with and unless Khalilzad is able to convince him to withdraw from his ambitions, he could jeopardize any significant progress. Neither Ghani nor Abdullah can be termed representatives of the Afghan people, as only 2.7% of the Afghan population voted for the former and even less for the latter. The US, for the time, is assuring Ghani that he would not be left alone.
The sticking point is the question of the Taliban’s commitment to working towards peace. Their hallmark is armed violence and they have ably financed this over almost two decades through poppy cultivation, finding ready international markets including the US, and levying charges on border travel between the adjoining countries. Initially, Ghani had refused to free the Taliban prisoners, but as he must have been apprised of the terms including their release, he agreed to set free 1,500 of them as a gesture of good faith to begin talks with the Taliban. The latter rejected the offer, claiming that release of prisoners was not conditional. The talks, planned to begin from March 10, have since stalled. The US commander for the Middle East and Afghanistan, Marine General McKenzie, while giving evidence to US Congress hours after US forces began pulling out, warned that the Taliban are not keeping “their part of the bargain”.
The peace deal has basic fault lines that are getting deeper by the day. Although the agreement mentions reduction of US forces to 8,600, it ignores the fate of about 8,000 NATO forces on ground. How the safety of the Afghan government will be ensured after withdrawal of foreign troops depends entirely upon the whims of the Taliban who clearly have the upper hand. When they have violated the agreement within a day of the signing, can they be expected to keep to their word later? They control over 70% of the country and have recouped after their defeat in 2001. They have recruited more youth and have strong ties with the Tehrik e Taliban Pakistan (TTP), not just ideologically, but through marriages and tribal affiliations that carry much weight in tribal cultures. Will they be committed to the terms of the agreement?
There are a set of annexes attached to the peace document that have not been disclosed to the public. The few US senators who have read these annexes have expressed their deep concern with the contents. The deal is vague on benchmarks for meeting commitments and holding the Taliban to their promises.
US analysts are also concerned about the famous Trump unpredictability. “One risk here is that the president wakes up one morning and decides that he is just going to pull out the rest of the American troops,” said Douglas E. Lute, a former Army general who served first as Mr. Bush’s coordinator on Afghanistan for the National Security Council and later worked for Obama before becoming American ambassador to NATO.
The Taliban are said to be suspicious of Trump as well and are said to be training 15,000 fighters for new strikes during spring, especially in rural areas. They are concerned that he may retract upon his withdrawal plan after the November elections in the US.
Although Pakistan has been involved in earlier discussions and also played a role in bringing the Taliban to the table, it was not a part of the formal negotiations and could face build-up of militants along its borders and violence in its own territory. India, another major wannabee player in this saga, was out as well and is waiting for the situation to unfold before taking any steps. Iran is also an important player but is caught up with the corona virus pandemic.
In a mix of cautious optimism and pessimism, one point has been entirely ignored. There is no mention of fundamental human and women’s rights, including the latter’s right to education, work and movement in public places. Neither the US delegation nor the Taliban teams involved in the negotiations included women. It is quite possible that the Taliban, when they dominate the country, could again establish their version of an Islamic emirate, returning to a regime that means strangling of human freedom with deep repercussions for women. Women who have been working over the last many years and are now in positions of power, or those who earn for their families, could find themselves confined to their homes and/or blue burqas and girls banned from going to school. Women were present in earlier discussions on peace as part of the government delegations but have since been ignored. Will the Taliban accept women as part of the government team if and when negotiations begin? Without concerns of women being addressed, Afghanistan could regress into medieval times again.
Leave a Reply