Larkana
Of Dams and New Provinces
Pakistan must focus on clearing natural waterways and strengthening its drainage systems, instead of reviving controversial dams.
Each time a natural or man-made disaster strikes Pakistan, a familiar segment of society emerges. Drawn mainly from urban Sindh and Punjab’s middle and upper-middle classes, they loudly decry governance failures and put forward ready-made solutions. As expected, they have resurfaced after the devastating 2025 monsoon rains and floods. Their prescriptions remain predictable: build more dams—notably the Kalabagh Dam—and divide the country into new provinces. Let us examine these claims one by one.
The advocates of dams, particularly Kalabagh, mainly from Punjab, argue that if the dam had been built, Punjab would have been spared the recent floods. They believe Kalabagh would have served dual purposes: protecting Punjab from floods and storing excess water otherwise “wasted into the sea.
The controversial Kalabagh Dam lies on the Indus at Mianwali, whereas this year’s destructive floods came from the Chenab, Ravi, and Sutlej. Mianwali is on the western side, hundreds of kilometres away from these rivers. Even if Kalabagh had existed, how could it possibly have stopped floods in rivers it does not control? To present Kalabagh as a solution in this context is not just misleading, but absurd—an act of political point-scoring.
Sensing the controversy around Kalabagh, some self-styled water experts are now pushing for smaller dams. But are dams, big or small, really the solution? Dr. Hassan Abbas, a renowned water expert, believes dams are unsustainable. He thus recommends letting rivers flow naturally while tapping into the vast 500 million acre-feet of underground aquifers for domestic, agricultural, and industrial needs. Pakistan’s water crisis, he insists, requires smarter management, not more concrete.
This raises a question: why persist with Kalabagh when the Indus is not even in flood? The current flooding is in rivers over which Pakistan has no rights under the Indus Waters Treaty of 1960. Under that agreement, Pakistan ceded rights over the Beas, Ravi, and Sutlej to India. Moreover, geography rules out dam construction: dams are built in hilly terrain, whereas Pakistan’s stretch of the Ravi and Sutlej is flat plain. In short, Pakistan cannot build dams on these rivers, either legally or technically.
The claim that Pakistan “wastes” water into the sea is equally misleading. In reality, even in a normal year, the country fails to release enough water downstream from Kotri Barrage to sustain the Indus Delta. According to a report by the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN), less than 10 MAF have been released, compared to what was agreed upon in the IRSA Accord. Research by Dr. Altaf Ali Siyal of the US-Pakistan Centre for Advanced Studies in Water shows that 92% of the delta has already been lost to the Arabian Sea, with more than 3.5 million acres of land submerged since 1956. What some dismiss as “wastage” is, in fact, an ecological necessity—already insufficient to preserve the dying delta.
The second prescription—creating new provinces—resurfaces every time Karachi drowns under heavy monsoon rains. With their base in the city, certain political parties thrive on this rhetoric. Jamaat-e-Islami and Muttahida Qomi Movement (MQM) demand a separate Karachi province, while the PPP plays with the promise of dividing Punjab, the resolution for which had been accepted in the Punjab assembly in 2012. Some voices even suggest carving 12 or even 20 provinces. But will new provinces cure Pakistan’s chronic misgovernance?
More provinces would mean more disputes—over names, boundaries, resources, and liabilities. They would also saddle the exchequer with new bureaucracies, fleets of officials, and layers of administration. Instead of solving governance failures, multiplying provinces would multiply problems, further paralyzing the state. Karachi, or any other city, does not flood because it lacks provincial status. Nor would provincial status save it from flooding. The real culprits are poor urban planning, the absence of a storm drainage system, encroachment on waterways, and clogged, unmaintained drains. These problems can be fixed without creating more provinces.
Equally troubling is the notion that supporting dams or new provinces is a test of patriotism. In Punjab, opponents of Kalabagh are often branded as anti-Pakistan. This sentiment was visible when some news anchors made derogatory remarks against ethnicities on national television, reflecting the broader mindset of Kalabagh Dam’s supporters.
The floods of 2025 are a painful reminder that Pakistan’s problems do not stem from the absence of dams or provinces, but from the lack of accountability and effective governance. Dams and new provinces may sound like solutions, but they are mirages, distracting us from the reforms the state urgently needs.
Instead of reviving controversial dams, Pakistan must focus on clearing natural waterways and strengthening its drainage systems. Riverbeds must be cleared of illegal construction, since the recent floods in the Ravi were caused largely by encroachments within the riverbed itself. Flood protection dykes must be reinforced and properly maintained. Likewise, rather than dividing provinces without consensus, the demand should be for genuine empowerment of local governments. True devolution of power to the grassroots level, not new provinces, is the real and long-term solution,
Based in Larkana, Sindh, the writer is a freelance contributor and can be reached at sjatoi831@gmail.com
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