Is Pakistan in the Middle of the Middle East?

Looking at the larger picture, our leadership needs to find ways of harnessing the power of new technologies to boost the economy and improve the quality of life of its people. We cannot afford to lag behind while the world moves on. IT and new technologies, such as development in space, have revolutionized the way we think and the way we work. The astronauts’ ascent to the moon was no ordinary achievement.

The alliance puts New Delhi in a difficult position, as Islamabad has now effectively become the security guarantor of one of India’s key energy suppliers

A few companies in Pakistan have moved in a positive direction and are making efforts to stay abreast with changes. However, a broader focus on this direction will significantly strengthen our economy. All these developments point towards giving greater space to young, educated personnel in policy-making and implementation. They also have to be drawn into politics to change its culture so that leadership can strengthen the country in accordance with and in harmony with the changing world.

Relations with India are on hold, and Indian PM Narendra Modi has not been any different in his third term in office. He continues to pursue the same hostile policy of isolating Pakistan. This is all the more reason that Pakistan should further strengthen its ties with China and seek new avenues of cooperation with Saudi Arabia and other Middle Eastern countries.

On the surface, the deal has always been simple: financial support in exchange for military might. Since the 1950s, Saudi Arabia (KSA) has provided Pakistan with a lifeline whenever it is in economic distress. At first small and symbolic, the aid gradually transformed into significant support. Saudi Arabia sent oil at lower prices, made large deposits in the Pakistani national bank, and even bailed it out in 2018. Pakistan, too, has been very supportive of Saudi Arabia and a guarantor of its defense.

Since the 1960s, thousands of Pakistani troops have been stationed in Saudi Arabia to help build and train its forces, and to protect the royal family. This arrangement proved especially helpful in 1979, after the Iranian Revolution, which heightened KSA’s fears of Shi’ite influence over the region. Theran’s potential for ideological export immediately positioned the Kingdom and the newly established theocracy in a zero-sum geopolitical rivalry. In response, Saudi Arabia sought a potent Sunni counterweight, finding it in Pakistan’s robust, disciplined, and regionally experienced armed forces. But the most critical test for the alliance was yet to come.

During the 1990 Gulf War, with Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait, the Saudi royal family found itself with Iraqi forces sitting just across its northern border, fearing that Saddam might invade the Kingdom next. As a response, 11,000 Pakistani troops were deployed to Saudi Arabia, effectively repelling any potential for an Iraqi invasion – and marking a crucial sign of loyalty to KSA.

Since then, both countries have been closely cooperating. Even when their leaderships did not see eye to eye (as in the case of the Yemen war), their alliance has remained resistant to whatever challenges regional turmoil has brought.

Gradually, the historical cooperation started transcending simple transactional security arrangements. It became a strategic hedge: Saudi Arabia gained an implicit extended deterrence against regional rivals. At the same time, Pakistan secured economic stability and a supply of oil, partially offsetting the volatility of its domestic politics. The deal also contributed to reducing the impact of India’s hostile policies.

The deal between Riyadh and Islamabad had been simmering at the cusp of signing for months. After the Israeli attack on Doha, Gulf leaders lost the idea of American protection for their GCC allies. This power vacuum needed to be filled—and promptly.

On September 17, 2025, the Strategic Mutual Defense Agreement (SMDA) between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan was signed. SMDA stipulates that “any aggression against either country shall be considered an aggression against both”. The agreement includes the following:

• Joint deterrence and training: expanded joint exercises and real-time operational coordination to ensure both forces can move and fight as one if required.

• Defense industrial collaboration: Saudi investment in Pakistan’s defense industry, particularly in munitions, drones, and armored systems, to advance Riyadh’s Vision 2030 goal of localizing half of its defense production.

• Intelligence fusion: integrated intelligence-sharing cells focused on counterterrorism, missile defense, and hybrid threats.

• The nuclear undertone: Though neither side has confirmed it publicly, Saudi officials remarked that the agreement “covers all military means,” which could imply expanding the scope of cooperation to include Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal.

The Saudi-Pakistani defense pact represents a strategic recalibration for Pakistan, elevating its role in the Arab world while reinforcing its global standing as a middle power and reliable security provider. Pakistan Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar noted that other countries have since expressed interest in similar arrangements, implicitly signaling that Pakistan is willing and able to project its strategic influence further by building additional defense partnerships with wealthy Arab states that lack comparable security capabilities. He also said that Pakistan’s defense pact with Saudi Arabia could ultimately develop into an “Eastern NATO” if additional countries decide to join, underscoring Pakistan’s role in leading and shaping the collective security framework of 57 Islamic nations.

Moreover, the pact with Saudi Arabia reinforces Field Marshal Munir’s vision of Pakistan as a “resilient fortress of the Muslim world.” This is a concept once articulated by his predecessor, General Pervez Musharraf, who described Pakistan as the “citadel of Islam,” emphasizing that the nation must first be strong to serve the wider Islamic world effectively.

The alliance with Riyadh also has a crucial economic dimension. Geo-economics is central to Pakistan’s foreign policy, including with regard to the Gulf, as illustrated by Munir’s 2023 commitment to attract $75-100 billion in investments from Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, and Kuwait. In light of that commitment, a mutual defense agreement with the largest GCC member is of additional strategic relevance for Pakistan. Namely, by combining security guarantees with economic incentives, the pact strengthens bilateral ties and provides a pathway for Pakistan to address its severe domestic economic challenges through strategic engagement with resource-rich Arab partners.

The recent trajectory of Pakistani-Saudi economic relations highlights the strategic logic behind Islamabad’s approach. Saudi Arabia has provided billions of dollars to stabilize Pakistan’s foreign exchange reserves. In October last year, Pakistan signed MoUs for Saudi investments worth $2.8 billion, alongside a $3 billion loan to bolster its reserves. Pakistan also relies on Saudi oil supplies and financial support to meet its energy needs. This February, it signed an agreement with the Saudi Fund for Development (SFD) to defer a $1.2 billion payment for oil imports by one year, easing fiscal pressure. Saudi Arabia is a key partner in upgrading Pakistan’s refining infrastructure, including a $6 billion brownfield refinery project to produce cleaner fuels, although plans for a $10 billion greenfield refinery in Baluchistan have faced practical challenges. The defense pact, thus, critically reinforces Pakistan’s economic security by enabling it to leverage military ties to attract Saudi investment and provide protection guarantees for Saudi stakeholders willing to operate on Pakistani soil.

A final major gain for Pakistan to come out of the defense pact with Saudi Arabia would seem to be in the enhanced deterrence this alliance provides it against India. The alliance puts New Delhi in a difficult position as Islamabad has now effectively become the security guarantor of one of India’s key energy suppliers. Saudi Arabia is India’s third-largest source of crude oil, and together with Iraq and the UAE, accounts for 60% of its imports. The kingdom and the other GCC members collectively form India’s largest trading bloc, exceeding $100 billion annually. Logically, this should make Indian military action against Pakistan less likely, as it would turn a heretofore