No Winners in War

The shortest semi-conventional war between India and Pakistan lasted from May 7 to 10, in which combat aircraft, missiles, and drones were used by both sides, not only in Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK) but also in mainstream cities of the two countries. As the enforcers of a fragile ceasefire from May 11 onwards, India and Pakistan claimed victory, but facts on the ground suggest otherwise. To the dismay of India, a ceasefire was announced by U.S President Donald Trump, who claimed to have saved the two nuclear-armed neighbors from a nuclear war.

Prime Minister of India Narendra Modi’s speech at the air base in Adampur the other day was a reflection of his aggressive posture, threatening Pakistan with dire consequences if another terrorist attack takes place in his country. He ruled out perceived nuclear blackmail from Pakistan and dismissed any American role in the ceasefire. On the other hand, the Prime Minister of Pakistan, during his visit to Sialkot, asserted that his country avenged the 1971 war. Modi’s assertion that Operation Sindoor is still intact reflects the fragility of the ceasefire because the issues that led to a four-day armed conflict are still unresolved.

Soon, facts would reveal that in the recent armed conflict between India and Pakistan, neither side achieved a decisive victory. While analyzing the history of India-Pakistan wars and armed conflicts, it was only the December 1971 war that was conclusive. The 1948 War ended in a draw, whereas the 1965 War led to a ceasefire. The limited armed conflict at Kargil in May-June 1999 ended when the then U.S President Bill Clinton, at the request of Pakistan’s Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, mediated the announcement of a ceasefire with India. Uri and Balakot were minor skirmishes, unlike the recent May 7-10 events, in which the two sides excessively used missiles and drones. Shahbaz Sharif’s assertion at Pasrur, Sialkot garrison on May 14 that Pakistan has avenged the defeat of 1971 was far from the reality.

New realities are emerging as the dust seems to settle after the recent armed conflict. This may be a lesson for the two neighbors, particularly India, that entering a war may be easy, but withdrawing from that situation may be an uphill task. The Indian side is highly embarrassed by the pathetic and unimpressive performance of its air force and the lack of morale on the part of its armed forces to confront the Pakistani side. Relegating an enemy far behind in conventional force, Prime Minister Narendra Modi and his hardline companions are now a target in India, with opposition parties, particularly the Indian National Congress (INC), blaming the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) government of miscalculating the strategic and military skills of Pakistan.

While analyzing the post-May armed conflict between India and Pakistan, one can come up with three major assumptions. First, during the peak of the crisis on May 8-9, when India fired missiles at Pakistani military installations and Islamabad retaliated, major world capitals were alarmed by the possible escalation of conflict, leading to the outbreak of nuclear war in South Asia. For a long time, a part of the Indian strategic community has been urging their government to review its age-old policy of ‘No First Use’ of nuclear options. In marked contrast, Pakistan has categorically ruled out a ‘No First Use’ if it faces a severe threat to its survival. The lack of Pakistan’s strategic depth and the conventional superiority of India compelled Islamabad to focus on minimum nuclear deterrence and the possible use of its nuclear arsenal if New Delhi moves for a major capture of Pakistani territory. That alarming situation compelled Washington, Riyadh, and Moscow to intervene and diffuse the situation.

During the 1990 nuclear crisis, when neither India nor Pakistan had been declared nuclear states, escalation in the Kashmir conflict alerted the U.S that Pakistan was in the process of activating its nuclear arsenal to deter India from any military adventure. That led to the visit of the then Director of the CIA, Robert Gates, to New Delhi and Islamabad to de-escalate the situation. On December 13, 2001, when there was an attack on the Indian Parliament, which led to an escalation of conflict over the Line of Control and the international borders with one million forces of India and Pakistan deployed along the borders, the situation was dangerous. Further escalation of conflict was averted because the United States and the European Union threatened India that they would pull out their investment if New Delhi continued the military standoff with Pakistan. In February 2019, following the Pulwama and Balakot incidents, the India-Pakistan conflict was de-escalated with the intervention of U.S President Donald Trump, who was on a visit to Vietnam.

This time, Donald Trump took the full credit for de-escalating armed conflict in South Asia and arranging a ceasefire, much to the displeasure of New Delhi. While the Indian media is on the defensive after a clear Pakistani edge over India during the May 7-10 armed conflict, Prime Minister Narendra Modi has made it clear that ‘Operation Sandoor’ is still continuing and his country will forcefully repel any future terrorist attack.

In place of fighting a full-scale war, India has already been utilizing its means to weaken its western neighbor economically and by promoting insurgency in Balochistan.

Second, if the previous round of armed conflict has been inconclusive, will the next round be decisive? There is euphoria in Pakistan that it won a four-day war. In contrast, in India, some brainstorming is going on in military and civilian circles to contemplate what went wrong and why their air force failed to deliver and lost six fighter planes worth more than 500 million dollars. When the Indian Prime Minister during his televised speech and address in Udampur made it clear that his country will not come under alleged nuclear blackmailing from Pakistan, the message was clear that India will do everything to prevail over the Trump administration to convince that nuclear war must not take place as it will be a zero-sum game.

In place of fighting a full-scale war, India has already been utilizing its means to weaken its western neighbor economically and by promoting insurgency in Balochistan, Pakistan. However, by pursuing a negative policy vis-à-vis its western neighbor, India is not mindful of the fact that it is facing numerous secessionist movements, particularly in its north-eastern states, Punjab in the form of the Khalistan movement, and separatist movements in its occupied Jammu and Kashmir. Preventing the Indus River’s water from reaching Pakistan will be counterproductive and violate International Humanitarian Law. Furthermore, India, as a lower riparian state vis-à-vis China, will face enormous problems if Beijing stops the supply of the Brahmaputra River by constructing a colossal dam in Tibet.

Be as it may, the coming few weeks will clear the situation as to the extent to which India and Pakistan will adhere to the ceasefire or revert to a war-like situation. Suspending water to Pakistan from the Indus, Chenab, and Jhelum rivers, as guaranteed by the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT), will further jeopardize peace in South Asia. The recent armed conflict must be a lesson for the two neighboring countries that cannot afford another escalation in their disputes and risk the future of over 2 billion people in the region. Only a meaningful dialogue can help India and Pakistan resolve their contentious issues, as war is not a plausible option for the two nuclear-armed nations.