International
New World Order
The world is not bifurcating into the U.S. or China. Rather, it is demanding new rules of engagement and new voices to shape them.
The purpose of this piece is not to retrace well-documented history or restate long-established narratives. Rather, it aims to offer a current and forward-looking perspective on U.S.-China relations, one of the most defining geopolitical dynamics of the 21st century. By reframing this complex relationship through the lens of emerging challenges and shifting global power structures, this article seeks to help both corporations and governments, especially in nations like Pakistan, develop a more strategic and adaptive outlook.
This piece is written against the backdrop of an intensifying geopolitical contest between the United States and China. This rivalry is no longer limited to trade and diplomacy but spans technology, security, finance, and ideology. As the world increasingly orients itself around this axis of competition, understanding the contours of U.S.-China relations is not merely academic; it is a prerequisite for strategic survival and informed decision-making.
The History of U.S.-China Relations
Understanding the historical context is imperative to grasping how U.S.-China relations have evolved and reshaped the global economic and political landscape.
Some key milestones include:
• 1784: The first U.S. representatives travelled to China.
• 1785: The first Chinese individual arrived in the U.S.
• 1862: Anson Burlingame became the first U.S. envoy to reside in Beijing, establishing his post in the legation quarter near the Forbidden City.
• 1878: The first Chinese legation was established in Washington, D.C.
In the early 1960s, the Kennedy administration explored a potential opening with China. Assistant Secretary of State Roger Hilsman publicly suggested that the U.S. was open to improving relations. Still, Cold War tensions froze any tangible progress until 1972, when President Nixon’s historic visit to China marked a diplomatic breakthrough. This move sought to leverage Sino-American cooperation to counterbalance Soviet influence and reorient U.S. foreign policy from ideological opposition to strategic triangulation.
Mao Zedong, sceptical of the USSR’s conciliatory stance towards the West, viewed the Soviets as a rival to China’s revolutionary leadership, leading to the Sino-Soviet split.
The policy of détente with both powers bore fruit. In 1987, President Ronald Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev signed the INF Treaty, signalling a de-escalation of Cold War hostilities. This diplomatic thaw culminated in the fall of the Berlin Wall on November 9, 1989. This scribe happened to be on a business trip in Hamburg at the time and, compelled by history unfolding, drove to Berlin to witness this symbolic moment firsthand. I still keep a piece of the Wall as a reminder of witnessing history.
The Soviet Union’s subsequent collapse in 1991 enabled the U.S. to expand its influence across former Soviet republics. One such example was the construction of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline, which bypassed Russia and Iran, reinforcing U.S. strategic energy interests in Central Asia.
As Executive Vice President and COO of Al-Dabbagh Group (Saudi Arabia), one of the earliest investors in Kazakhstan, I believed even then that a long-term strategic relationship between the U.S. and China would be essential for global economic stability.
China’s Rapid Economic Growth
Before launching its market reforms in 1978, China’s economy was highly centralised, inefficient, and largely disconnected from the global market. Two key drivers underpinned China’s transformation:
• Massive capital investments, particularly in infrastructure and manufacturing, funded by high domestic savings and foreign direct investment (FDI).
• Rapid productivity growth, bolstered by China’s vast labour force and low labour costs. Together, these factors lifted China’s share of global GDP from 2.3% in 1980 to approximately 18.6% by 2024 (PPP basis). In contrast, the U.S. share has declined modestly but remains dominant, at roughly 15% (PPP basis).
China’s economic ascent (now second only to the U.S. in nominal GDP) has made it the world’s largest economy in terms of purchasing power parity. It has also become one of the largest foreign holders of U.S. Treasury securities, intertwining the economic fates of the two nations.
China’s Forward-Looking Economic Strategy
As China’s economy matured, its government embraced slower, higher-quality growth, coined as the “New Normal.” The emphasis has shifted from exports and infrastructure to domestic consumption, innovation, and high-tech industries.
Pakistan’s strategic geography, youthful workforce, and deep ties with both Washington and Beijing place it in a unique position to act as a bridge, not merely a beneficiary, of this new world order.
Rising outbound FDI reflects China’s ambition to move up the global value chain, gain access to advanced technologies, and establish globally competitive brands. This is particularly evident in Beijing’s efforts to transform state-owned enterprises (SOEs) into internationally viable firms.
With rising wages and diminishing cost advantages, China is increasingly offshoring lower-end manufacturing, thus offering a unique opportunity for countries like Pakistan to position themselves as attractive alternatives. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), launched in 2013, could become a key beneficiary of this transition.
Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and CPEC
Launched in 2013, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), formerly known as One Belt, One Road (OBOR), is Beijing’s flagship strategy to deepen global trade integration through infrastructure development, economic corridors, and policy alignment across Eurasia, Africa, and beyond. Nadege Rolland, a senior fellow at the National Bureau of Asian Research, describes BRI as China’s “grand strategy” to respond to internal economic shifts and external geopolitical competition. It is rooted in China’s long-term aspiration to reassert regional influence and build economic interdependence.
U.S. policymakers remain sceptical, warning that BRI may serve Beijing’s strategic interests by indebting partner countries, exporting its governance model, and securing access to critical infrastructure. Its relevance in 2025 is not just about infrastructure. It is now a crucial lever in China’s strategic competition with the West. The IMF and G7 have even launched alternative frameworks such as the “Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII)” to compete with BRI, further evidence of how central BRI is to today’s multipolar contest.
CPEC represents a cornerstone of BRI. Through it, China gains an alternative trade route to the energy-rich Middle East via Gwadar Port, circumventing the U.S.-patrolled Malacca Strait, which is critical if U.S.-China tensions escalate further. With further expansion via the Iran-China Strategic Partnership Agreement, China could solidify its influence from Central Asia to the Indian Ocean.
The Iran-China Strategic Partnership Agreement (ratified in 2021) gives China footholds in ports like Jask and potentially oil-rich zones, consolidating its presence in the Indian Ocean.
Importantly, this strategy increasingly blurs the line between economic and military expansion. Gwadar, Jask, and Djibouti (where China already has a military base) create a chain of potential dual-use facilities, prompting concern among the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command and India’s naval planners.
Chabahar Port, backed by India but now partially aligned with BRI ambitions, adds another layer of rivalry, transforming South Asia’s coastline into a geopolitical chessboard.
Global Trade Imbalances and WTO
Much of the global trade imbalance stems from bilateral U.S.-China dynamics and deeper structural issues rooted in the World Trade Organization (WTO). Established in 1995, the WTO was envisioned to stabilize global trade, encourage fair competition, and facilitate market access.
Theoretically, the WTO was meant to promote a predictable global trading system based on comparative advantage—each country exporting goods it can produce cheaply due to local resources (e.g., labour or feedstocks). However, in practice, the WTO’s policies have often favoured developed nations, offering them better terms of trade and greater protection, sometimes to satisfy other non-trade interests, while exposing developing countries to asymmetrical pressures. This has created a culture of mistrust, inefficiency, and systemic favouritism.
The principle of global free trade has, paradoxically, been undermined by a differentiated tariff regime and an institutional structure that protects industrialised economies. This, in turn, has catalysed protectionist responses globally, most notably from the United States.
Trump’s Tariff Policy and U.S. Strategic Uncertainty
President Donald Trump has doubled down on tariffs aimed primarily at Chinese goods in response to these imbalances. While designed to correct long-standing trade deficits, these tariffs, combined with broader “decoupling” rhetoric, have led to economic uncertainty.
The principle of global free trade has, paradoxically, been undermined by a differentiated tariff regime and an institutional structure that protects industrialised economies.
Referencing Henry Kissinger, “America’s China policy has no strategy.” Trump’s tariff-centred approach, though politically expedient, seemingly lacks a coherent long-term strategy. The endgame is unclear, and the result remains fraught with unpredictability.
While correcting trade imbalances is essential, the costs of abrupt protectionism may be borne globally. In the short run, both the U.S. and the world face, e.g., supply disruptions and diplomatic fallout. The question remains: Is this the necessary cost of correction?
Differentiating Strategic Philosophies
The U.S. increasingly views China as both an economic and military challenger. In 2020, then-Joint Chiefs Chairman Gen. Joseph Dunford warned, “China likely poses the greatest threat to U.S. national security by 2025.” This perception underpins a bipartisan consensus framing China as a “strategic competitor.”
Henry Kissinger once compared Chinese strategy to the game of WEIQI (Go), where long-term positioning and patience are central, unlike Western chess, which is focused on decisive confrontation. This reflects China’s gradual, incremental approach to power projection.
In his book Has China Won?, Kishore Mahbubani outlines U.S. strategic strengths:
• World-leading scientific research
• A dynamic free-market economy
• Top-ranked universities
• An inclusive, immigrant-friendly society
• Strong institutional foundations—notably its central bank and legal system, which uphold global confidence in the U.S. dollar.
However, Mahbubani also highlights America’s strategic missteps: underestimating China’s rise and allowing economic engagement to outpace strategic foresight. China, too, has miscalculated, alienating U.S. corporations and political elites, fuelling bipartisan support for tariffs and decoupling.
While China asserts it does not seek to export its model, the U.S. has long promoted its liberal democratic values. As Hillary Clinton once suggested, “America is the indispensable nation.” While aspirational, this worldview often translates as arrogance abroad, especially in regions with different governance traditions.
Conclusion
“A major geopolitical contest between America and China is both inevitable and avoidable.” -Kishore Mahbubani.
The rivalry is fuelled by America’s domestic challenges and China’s assertive diplomacy. Beijing prioritizes societal harmony and governance stability, while Washington champions individual liberties and democratic norms.
Whether this results in open conflict or peaceful coexistence depends on leadership, mutual understanding, and strategic compromise. While China may not seek to replace the U.S. as a global hegemon, its economic gravity is undeniable.
“A major geopolitical contest between America and China is both inevitable and avoidable.”
-Kishore Mahbubani.
For countries like Pakistan, understanding this evolving contest is critical. Pakistan’s strategic geography, youthful workforce, and deep ties with both Washington and Beijing place it in a unique position to act as a bridge, not merely a beneficiary, of this new world order. To succeed, Pakistan’s leadership must prioritize national interest over personal gain, investing in human capital, institutional reform, and sustainable growth.
Pakistan, with a deep understanding of both U.S. and Chinese strategies and a commitment to multilateralism, must remain agile. A clear-eyed national interest - leveraging its youthful population, strategic geography, and diplomatic credibility - can help it mediate and benefit from the reordering of the global system.
The world is not bifurcating into the U.S. or China. Rather, it is demanding new rules of engagement and new voices to shape them.
Based in Karachi, the writer is a FCA (Institute of Chartered Accountants, England and Wales) EX Partner Coppers & Lybrand and Investment Banker
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