On April 1, Pakistan’s Finance Minister made a surprise announcement that the Economic Coordination Council had decided to import sugar and cotton from India. The rumour mills became active once again. But within 24 hours, Pakistan reversed the decision. There would be no trade unless India restored the special status to Kashmir.
So, will the thaw develop into warmth? Will the two countries embark on talks? Is it the season of new beginnings? For India-Pakistan relations watchers, it is déjà vu all over again.
Spring is in the air but if history is any guide, we have to be watchful. Every Indian prime minister from Vajpayee to Modi has gone out of the way to improve relations with Pakistan but has been disappointed. In February 1999, Prime Minster Vajpayee visited Pakistan to start a new chapter in bilateral relations. His visit was followed by the infamous Kargil War. Even then, he hosted Gen. Musharraf for a summit in Agra in 2002. That was followed by Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) attack on the Indian Parliament House in Dec 2001. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh persisted in his efforts to normalise relations but was thwarted by the Mumbai terror attacks alleged to have been committed by the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT). Regardless, he carried on by initiating a comprehensive dialogue. He encouraged backchannel contacts to work out a solution for Kashmir but nothing concrete came off these initiatives.
India’s relations with Saudi Arabia, the UAE and other Gulf countries have been transformed and taken a strategic character.
In 2014, Prime Mnister Modi, fresh from BJP’s resounding victory in the Lok Sabha elections, invited Prime Mnister Nawaz Sharif to his swearing-in ceremony. The two leaders met again in Ufa in 2015 to resume the dialogue. Another meeting took place between the two in Paris in 2015. Indian and Pakistani National Security Advisers met quietly in Bangkok in 2015 to explore ways to normalization. Modi even paid an unscheduled visit to Nawaz Sharif’s house in Raiwind near Lahore in December that year in the hope that relations would improve. Since then, the narrative on both sides has hardened. After August 19, 2019, Pakistan withdrew its High Commissioner in New Delhi and snapped trade ties with India. Prime Mnister Imran Khan also raised the Kashmir issue at the UN and goaded China to organise closed-door meetings at the UNSC on Kashmir.
The UN Resolutions on Kashmir, envisaging a ‘Plebiscite’, are at the heart of Pakistan’s narrative. This overlooks the reality that the Resolutions have become outdated. Pakistan did not fulfil the preconditions prescribed in the Resolutions that would have led to the holding of the Plebiscite. The constant refrain of the UN Resolutions cuts no ice with India, is counter-productive and misleads the people of Kashmir.
India wants normal relations with Pakistan. The opening of the 4.5 km Kartarpur Sahib corridor in 2019 for Sikh pilgrims at the height of tensions is an indicator of that. But the facts on the ground need to be acknowledged.
It must be appreciated that although Pakistan is an important country for India, it no longer has the criticality in Indian foreign policy that it once used to. As the world is changing, other issues have taken over.
The situation in Kashmir is gradually returning to normal. Abrogation of Article 370 is widely welcomed. The holding of the District Development Council elections (2020) is the beginning of new grassroot level politics in Jammu and Kashmir, including the pro-autonomy parties, that have formed the so-called ‘Gupkar’ alliance and participated in the DDC elections. The Indian government is putting in a lot of resources in the valley, Jammu and Ladakh to stimulate development and these are beginning to show results.
Unfortunately, the cross-border terrorism threat is still alive and cannot be ignored. But the Indian security forces have gained a lot of experience over the years and are prepared to deal with the situation.
During the military standoff with China in eastern Ladakh, India stood firm. Both sides are now negotiating a disengagement plan. But a realisation has dawned that the Indian armed forces must be strengthened and India must at a minimum be in a position to deal with a two-front situation. A spate of defence reforms has also been initiated.
There is bipartisan support in the US for building strategic ties with India. India’s relations with the US are deepening. The Biden administration has reconfirmed the trend that began several years ago. The concept of an Indo-Pacific region is here to stay. After Biden became the US President, the Quad has also been strengthened.
India’s relations with Saudi Arabia, the UAE and other Gulf countries have been transformed and taken a strategic character. This has given India considerable confidence in dealing with regional issues. India is the third-largest importer of oil in the world. The Gulf countries know the importance of relations with India. The Chabahar port is playing an important role in building alternate connectivity to Afghanistan. It strengthens India-Iran relations. India’s relations with Russia remain solid despite some scepticism in the think tank circles.
Lately, India has been facing a major health crisis due to the Covid-19 pandemic. It has used the opportunity to improve its health systems. India’s emergence as a ‘pharmacy of the world’ and its vaccine diplomacy have also earned it international recognition. Health security is now an important part of India’s foreign policy.
The government has taken several steps to strengthen the atmanirbhar or self-reliance programme. Its “Make in India” and ‘Production Linked Incentives’ (PLI) programmes are designed to promote indigenous high-technology production and defence manufacturing. This has encouraged several leading defence manufacturers to set up manufacturing facilities in India.
It has not escaped anyone that Pakistan’s economy remains in great difficulty and the country is still not out of the woods in the FATF. That may also be driving the thaw narrative and thisis the background in which India-Pakistan thaw should be seen.
The broad conclusions, from the Indian point of view, would be:
1. The signals coming from Pakistan seem to be mixed. Indians are not yet convinced that Pakistan has made a strategic and decisive shift in its India policy.
2. Modi government will not reverse its August 2019 decision.
3. For India, terrorism will remain the key issue. Until Pakistan’s support to anti-India terror groups is disavowed explicitly, there would little prospects for real normalisation.
4. India has stakes in a peaceful Afghanistan. It enjoys a high reputation amongst the Afghan people. It has spent USD 3 billion in developmental and infrastructure programmes in the country. The return of the Taliban, without a comprehensive, power-sharing deal that preserves the gains of the past two decades, will not result in a durable peace. Pakistan’s efforts to sideline India will not be conducive for bilateral relations.
India is in no hurry. Modi government is under no pressure. It will wait and watch the situation. At the same time, it will carefully read the signals emerging from Pakistan and respond appropriately. 
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