Which Way, Pakistan?

By Ian Talbot | April 2021

Pakistan is fast approaching its 75th anniversary of independence, but the country is faced with all too familiar problems of weak governance, political instability and faltering economic development. How can one account for the nation’s continuing domestic and international travails? Politicians blame each other; some scholars point the finger at the establishment; liberal commentators highlight the toxicity of religious militancy.

Too often, a change of government is seen as a simple answer to all the country’s problems. They are, in fact, rooted in entrenched attitudes and power relations which stretch back over decades, some indeed to the colonial era. Whilst the present has not been pre-determined, it has been profoundly influenced by these inheritances.

Pakistan came into being with a democratic deficit. It inherited a tradition of bureaucratic authoritarianism, and patron-client politics. There was an absence of representative politics in Balochistan, and the tribal areas. In Punjab, the North West Frontier and Sindh, British rule had bolstered the power of feudal landlords and tribal chiefs. The Muslim League was a latecomer to the Muslim majority areas. It had to co-opt the rural elite in the Pakistan struggle. The prominence of many of today’s so-called ‘electables’ can be traced back to the colonial era. They have proved ‘biddable’ for both civilian and military regimes, thereby undermining political stability and the process of democratic consolidation.

The freedom struggle had also secured popular support by being deliberately vague about the nature of a future Pakistan state. Many of the leading Deobandi ‘ulama’ (Islamic scholars), nevertheless, had opposed the ‘secularist’ Muslim League leadership. The debate about the role of Islam in Pakistan has raged ever since. It is rooted in the fact that the freedom struggle itself was variously conceived as a ‘movement of Islam’ and a ‘movement of Muslims.’

The upheavals of Partition further burdened the new nation. Resources and energies that were needed for building political institutions were diverted to dealing with an unprecedented mass migration of refugees. Furthermore, the trauma of Partition gave birth to what has been termed ‘the fearful South Asian state’ by some scholars. This came into existence determined to prevent future divisions. Demands for greater autonomy by sub-national groups were thus viewed with suspicion. The law and order approach to Bengali demands proved counter-productive, ending in the tragedy of civil war. It has continued to generate dangerous divisions in Balochistan.

For some writers, the long-running Kashmir dispute is the single most important legacy of Partition. They see events in Kashmir in 1947-49 as forming a defining moment both in Indo-Pakistan relations and for the nation’s domestic priorities. Although the military conflict was confined to Kashmir, it highlighted Pakistan’s strategic vulnerability. The priority of building up the armed forces created a ‘political economy of defence.’ At the same time, the state thereafter toyed with the use of Islamic proxies to further its strategic aims as in the ill-fated 1965 Operation Gibraltar. Islamic militancy gained a further stronghold with the West’s encouragement of the mujahideen struggle against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. The intensified Sunni-Shia conflict in the wake of the Iranian Revolution added another factor. The last four decades has seen Pakistan open to charges of being a ‘terrorist state’ at the same time as its economy and population has suffered grievously from the ‘blow-back’ effect of militancy in Afghanistan. International investors have not viewed Pakistan as ‘open for business’ in contrast with other countries in South Asia.

If we step back from the daily rush of events, we can see the structural and historical roots of the problems that continue to undermine Pakistan’s development. Namely, weak political institutionalization that encourages opportunism; imbalances in civil-military relations; unresolved tensions regarding the role of Islam in public life; conflicting provincial and federal interests. Vested interests uphold social and gender inequalities, block reforms in political and economic governance and inhibit pluralistic and inclusive outlooks. Real change will only be possible in an atmosphere of cooperation and tolerance that puts long-term national interests before short-term political gain. Pakistan will then come closer to the vision of its founding father.

Professor Ian Talbot is a Professor in History of Modern South Asia at the University of Southampton, UK. His key interests are in the fields of the history of the colonial Punjab; the 1947 Partition of India and the history of Pakistan. He can be reached at I.A.Talbot@soton.ac.uk

Cover Story